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
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WILLIAM SMITH, D. D.

DEAN OF CHESTER.

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'Dr. Smith's Translation of Thucydides is a work of standard merit and excellence.'—BIBLIOGRAPHICAL MISCELLANY.

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PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK III.—[CONTINUED.]

YEAR VI.—THE following summer, the Peloponnesians and confederates assembled at the isthmus, in order to make the usual inroad into Attica; and Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, was there ready for the command. But the frequent earthquakes which happened about this time caused them to return back, and intirely put a stop to the designed incursion.

About the same space of time shocks of earthquakes were felt in Eubœa, where at Orobisæ the sea breaking over what was then land with impetuous swells, laid a part of that city under water; some of which stagnated there, though some washed its way back: however, a tract now continues sea which before was land. All those who could not reach the higher grounds in time, by running before the surge, were drowned. A similar inundation happened at the isle of Atalanta, amongst the Locrians of Opus, where it washed away the Athenian fort, and of two vessels that lay dry on the beach staved one to pieces. At Peparethus also the surge of the sea rose very high, but did not overflow. An earthquake however demolished part of the fortification,¹

¹ Prytaneum.

the town-house; and some few dwelling-houses. My solution of such effects is this: where the shock of the earthquake was most violent, it forcibly drove away the sea before it, which suddenly returning again occasioned these more violent swells. And without an earthquake I deem all such accidents impossible.

The same summer many of other nations, as they happened to be drawn into the quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily, as well as the Sicilians themselves, who took up arms one against another, and the Athenians together with their allies. Yet, the most memorable actions alone, either of the allies thus aided by the Athenians, or of the common enemy against the Athenians, will I now relate. Charoeadas, the Athenian commander, having lost his life in the Syracusan war, Laches, who had now the sole command of the fleet, in junction with the allies, appeared before Mylæ of the Messenians. The garrison of Mylæ consisted of two companies of Messenians; and these had formed an ambuscade to cut off the enemy when landed. But the Athenians and allies drove them from the place of ambush with great slaughter. Then they proceeded to assault the works, which necessitated the defendants to give up their citadel by capitulation, and even to attend them against Messene. But after this, the Athenians and allies were no sooner approached, than the Messenians also compounded, giving hostages and all other securities required for their future behavior.

The same summer, the Athenians, with thirty sail of ships commanded by Demosthenes,¹ the son of Alci-

¹ This Demosthenes will make a considerable figure in the course of this war. The most celebrated orator of the same name has ranked him amongst the greatest of his countrymen, with Aristides, Pericles, and Nicias. He styles him also an orator; and Thucydides will give us hereafter a specimen of

sthenes, and Procles, the son of Theodorus, appeared on the coast of Peloponnesus; whilst a larger armament of sixty, and two thousand heavy-armed, was employed against Melos, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus. Melos is an island; and as the inhabitants of it were averse to the Athenian subjection, and had refused to accede to their alliance, they were now bent on its reduction. Having laid the island waste, and the Melians still refusing to submit, the Athenians put again to sea, and crossed over to Oropus on the opposite shore; where arriving at night, the heavy-armed were detached to march with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of Boeotia. Notice being given of their arrival there, they were instantly joined by the whole force of Athens, which had marched out of the city under the orders of Hippoⁿicus, the son of Callias, and Eury^medon, the son of Thucles. A camp they formed; and having for the space of a day laid the territory waste, they reposed themselves there the succeeding night. But the next morning having gained a victory over the Tanagreans, who, aided by a party of Thebans, sallied out on them, they only stayed to gather up the arms and erect a trophy, and then marched away—these back again to the city, and those to the fleet. Nicias on this, putting out again with his sixty sail, plundered all the sea coast of Locris, and then returned into the harbor of Athens.

his manner of haranguing. His namesake indeed has carried off all the glory of eloquence: but the Demosthenes who is the subject of this note was an able general, very enterprising, and very brave; always vigilant in the service of his country, though more as a soldier than a statesman: and, provided his country was served, not too anxious about who carried off the honor. In short, he was an openhearted, disinterested, worthy Athenian.

It was about this time that the Lacedæmonians founded the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia. Their view in doing it was this:—those who in general are styled Meliensiæns are divided into three bodies; Paraliens, Hierensiæns, and Trachiniæns. The last of these, the Trachiniæns, who had been terribly distressed by a war made on them by the bordering Oetæans, had first of all intended to throw themselves under the Athenian protection; but afterwards, apprehending they might not be hearty in their support, they made application to Lacedæmon by Tisamenus, the delegate appointed by them on this occasion. The Dorians too, from whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, sent their ambassadors also to accompany and join with him in the negotiation, for they likewise were infested by these Oetæans. The Lacedæmonians, after an audience, resolved to send out this colony, as a sure expedient not only to protect the Trachiniæns and Dorians from insult, but to annoy the Athenians more sensibly in the course of the war from a city so commodiously seated: for thence they could at any time make an attack on Eubœa, as the passage was but short; and farther, it lay most conveniently on the road to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager about building this city. In the first place, therefore, they begged the advice of the god at Delphi. His answer being favorable, they sent out a colony composed of their own and the neighboring people; encouraging farther all Grecian adventurers whatever to join in this settlement, except Ionians and Achæans, and some of foreign nations. These Lacedæmonians were appointed to be the leaders of the colony; Leon, and Alcidas, and Damagon. These arriving at the spot erect on a new foundation, and wall round the

city which is now called Heraclea, distant about forty stadia¹ from Thermopylæ, and twenty from the sea. They proceeded next to build the naval docks; and these they began at Thermopylæ close under the straits, since there they were capable of the strongest defence.

The Athenians, when they saw the large resort to this colony, were at first under great apprehensions. They suspected it to be chiefly intended for the annoyance of Eubœa, as the passage from it was short to Cenaeum in Eubœa; though, in the sequel, their apprehensions proved intirely groundless. Not the least damage accrued to them from this colony; and the reason was this: the Thessalians, who were masters of all the country round about it, and on whose very land it was built, fearing lest this new settlement might prove too powerful a neighbor at last, gave it all possible annoyance, and harassed the new inhabitants with continual war, till, from the large number they were at first, they mouldered into nothing. When the Lacedæmonians first declared the colony, the whole world was eager to get a settlement in the city, which they thought would want no support. Not but that its sudden decay was owing also in great measure to the Lacedæmonian leaders. From the first moment of their arrival they had spoiled every thing wherein they meddled; they reduced their numbers to a handful of men, because their fears had driven away the rest, as the government was always severe, and not always just. The neighboring people, surprising them in such a state, prevailed against them with the utmost ease.

The same summer, and even during that interval of

¹ About four miles.

time the Athenians were employed at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of thirty sail who were on the Peloponnesian coast, in the first place, having placed an ambush at Elomenus of Leucadia, intercepted and cut off a part of the garrison. In the next place, with an augmented force they came up to Leucas, being attended now by the whole strength of the Acarnanians except the Oeniadæ, by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen sail of Corcyreans. The Leucadians, though their territory was laid waste both without and within the isthmus, where the city of Leucas and the temple of Apollo are seated, yet durst not venture out against such superior numbers. On this, the Acarnanians vehemently pressed it on Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to block them up by a wall of circumvallation; imagining they might easily reduce them, and rid themselves of a city which had been their eternal foe. But Demosthenes chose rather to hearken at this time to the suggestions of the Messenians; ‘ how glorious it would be, as he was now at the head of so large a force, to invade the Ætolians, who were such plagues to Naupactus; and, if their reduction could be completed, the rest of that continent might easily be brought into the Athenian subjection: for though the Ætolians were a great and warlike people, yet as they dwelt in open villages remote from one another, as light armor only was in use amongst them, they presumed he might easily complete their reduction before any succor could reach them.’ They advised him farther, ‘ to begin with the Apodoti, to take the Ophionians next, then to proceed to the Eurytanians (which is the most numerous people of Ætolia, reported also to speak in a most barbarous dialect, and to feed on raw flesh); that if these could be surprised, the rest of Ætolia would submit of course.’ He therefore,

willing to oblige the Messenians, and incited above all by the thought that, without exposing the Athenian forces, after he had done with the Ætolians, he might march with the allied strength of the continent, and penetrate by land as far as Boeotia, through the Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right till he got down among the Phocians, who he reckoned, from their constant friendship with the Athenians, would readily join him; or, however, might easily be compelled to do it; and then, that Boeotia borders next on the Phocians: Demosthenes, I say, weighing from Leucas with his whole force, to the great regret of the Acarnanians, coasted it along to Solium. He there communicated his plan to the Acarnanians, in which they refused to join, because he had refused the blockade of Leucas. Demosthenes, with his other force, the Cephallenians, and Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred soldiers draughted from on board the Athenian ships (the fifteen Corcyrean were already departed), set about this expedition against the Ætolians. He began it from Oeneon in Locris: for the Locrians called Ozolæ were allies, and had notice to meet the Athenians with all their force in the midland parts. These, being not only borderers, but using also the same kind of arms with the Ætolians, were judged most proper to accompany the expedition, as they knew so well the method of battle, and their country. Having reposed his army one night within the verge of the temple of the Nemean Jove (in which the inhabitants have a tradition that Hesiod¹ the poet expired, in pursuance of an oracle

¹ The story of Hesiod's death is related by Plutarch in The Banquet of the Seven Wise Men. Solon interposing here, said, ' Such things, Diocles, must be referred immediately to the gods, they are above human condition. But the

which had fixed Nemea for the place of his death), he marched again at break of day, and entered Ætolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocylium, and on the third Tichium. There he halted, and sent away the booty to Eupolium of Locris. It was now his resolution, after he had subdued the rest, to march last of all against the Ophionians, if they did not voluntarily submit beforehand, in his retreat back to Naupactus.

This preparation against them did by no means escape the Ætolians. The scheme was no sooner formed than they had gained intelligence of it, and by the time the army was within their borders, they were all drawn together in a numerous body for their mu-

case of Hesiod is within the lot of humanity, and concerns us all. But perhaps you know the story?'—'I do not,' he replied. 'It is then well worth your hearing. A certain Milesian, it seems, in whose company Hesiod was hospitably lodged and entertained in Locris, had secretly debauched the daughter of their host. When the affair came to light, it was suspected that Hesiod had all along been privy to the intrigue, and concealed such base behavior; and, though he was intirely innocent, he fell a victim to hasty resentment and foul calumnia. The brothers of the damsel laid wait for and slew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, and with him his servant, whose name was Troilus. Their bodies being thrown into the sea, that of Troilus indeed, floating up into the river Daphnus, was stopped at a rock quite surrounded with water, a small distance from the sea; but the moment Hesiod's body was thrown into the sea a shoal of dolphins caught it and carried it to Rhium and Molycrium. The Locrians that very day were assembled at Rhium for a solemn festival and sacrifice, which they still continue to celebrate at the same place. The dead body was no sooner beheld in its approach, than full of wonder, as was likely, they hurried down to the beach, and, knowing it to be the body of Hesiod, and very fresh, they postponed every other care to the discovery of this murder, from their high regard for Hesiod. This was soon done; the assassins were found out, whom they threw headlong into the sea, and demolished their houses; but Hesiod was buried by them in the temple of the Nemean Jove.

tual defence : nay, even the most distant Ophionians, who are seated on the Meliac bay ; the Bomiensians and Calliensians were already come up.

The Messenians continued to amuse Demosthenes with the same suggestions as at first : they still insisted that the conquest of the Ætolians would be an easy performance, and advised him to advance immediately against their villages, nor give them time to collect in a body to oppose him, but to attack every place he came to, and take it. This advice being quite to his own taste, and relying on his own good fortune, which hitherto had never been checked, without waiting for the Locrians, who were much wanted, and were to have joined him (for he stood much in need of light-armed darters), he advanced to Ægitium, and assaulting it, took it by storm. The inhabitants made their escape, and posted themselves on the hills which overlook the town. It was situated amongst lofty eminences, and distant from the sea about eighty stadia.

But now the Ætolians, who were come up for the preservation of Ægitium, running down in separate bodies from different eminences, made an attack on the Athenians and allies, and poured in their javelins amongst them : and whenever the Athenian army approached to charge, they plied before them ; when they again fell back, these again returned to the charge. This kind of engagement continued for a long time, a series of alternate pursuits and retreats, in both which the Athenians suffered most. So long however as their archers had darts, and opportunity to use them, they lost no ground ; for the light-armed Ætolians fell back to avoid the darts. But when the chief of the

¹ About eight miles.

archers dropped, his party was soon dispersed, and the whole army began to incline. Their strength was quite exhausted by so many repeated charges ; and now, the Ætolians pressing hard on them, and pouring in whole showers of missive weapons, they turned about and fled. Now tumbling into caverns from whence they could not recover themselves, or bewildered in places of which they had no knowlege, they were miserably destroyed. For Cromon the Messenian, who laid out all the routes, had been killed in the battle. The Ætolians pursued with their darts, and being not only swift of foot, but also lightly armed, easily overtook many of them in their flight, and did great execution. A large party, who had lost their way, threw themselves into a wood which was quite impassable. The Ætolians set the wood on fire, in the flames of which they were all consumed. Every affecting species of flight and destruction was now the fate of the Athenian army. Those who had the good fortune to escape, effected it by reaching the sea and Oeneon of Locris, from whence they first began the expedition.

The number of the allies who thus perished was large ; that of heavy-armed Athenians was about a hundred and twenty ; so considerable was the loss, and all of them in the very flower of their youth. In the whole course of this war the state of Athens never lost at any one time so many of her most gallant citizens as now. Procles also, the other commander in this expedition, perished.

They afterwards fetched off their dead by a truce obtained from the Ætolians. This being done, they retired to Naupactus, and there shipped themselves for Athens. Demosthenes however was left behind at Naupactus, and the parts adjacent. After such a mis-

carriage he durst not presume to face the people of Athens.

About the same time the Athenians on the Sicilian station, having sailed towards Locris, landed on that coast. They destroyed a party of Locrians who endeavored to make head against them; and then took Peripolium, a town situated on the river Halex.

The same summer the Ætolians, who had some time before despatched an embassy to Corinth and Lacedæmon, composed of Tolphus the Ophionian, Boriades the Eurysthanian, and Tisander the Apodotian, prevailed there in their suit for a diversion against Naupactus, because the Athenians had invaded their territories. It was about autumn when the Lacedæmonians marched away three thousand heavy-armed of their allies; of which number five hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city so lately founded in Trachinia. Eurylochus, a Spartan, was appointed to command in the expedition, and was accompanied by two other Spartans, Macarius and Menedæus. The army being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurylochus despatched a herald to the Ozolian Locri: his route to Naupactus lay through their territory. He was also desirous to detach them from the Athenian alliance. The Amphissons were the readiest of all the Locri to give their concurrence, as standing in perpetual awe of the hatred bore them by the Phocians. These therefore were the first who sent in hostages, and who persuaded others to follow their example, from a dread of this army which was now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonensians, their own borderers, were the first who complied: for their part of Locris is most difficult of access. These were followed by the Ippensians, and Messapians, and Tritænsians, and Challæans, Tolo,

phonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians; and all these gave a personal attendance in the expedition. The Olpeans indeed sent in their hostages, but would not attend. The Hyæans refused their hostages till one of their villages called Polis was seized.

When all things were ready, and the hostages placed securely at Cytinium of Doris, Eurylochus with his army taking the route of Locris, advanced against Naupactus. He seized on Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched for refusing to concur. When they had entered the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by the Ætolian aid, they wasted the country to the very suburb, of which also, because unfortified, they took possession. Turning thence to Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, but now subject to the Athenians, they reduced it.

But Demosthenes the Athenian, for he had continued at Naupactus ever since the Ætolian miscarriage, having received intelligence of this army, and dreading the loss of this place, had addressed himself to the Acarnanians, and with some difficulty, owing to his departure from Leucas, persuaded them to send a succor to Naupactus. Accordingly they put a thousand of their heavy-armed under his orders, whom he threw into the town by sea, which effectually preserved it: for the danger before was manifest, as the wall was very large in compass, and the number of defendants inconsiderable.

When Eurylochus and his council had discovered that such a succor had been received into the town, and that its reduction was now impracticable, they marched away their forces, not towards Peloponnesus, but to that Ætolia which is now called Calydon, to Pleuron, to the neighboring towns, and to Proschium

of Ætolia. The Ambraciots had now been with and prevailed on them to join in some attempts on Argos in Amphilochia, on the rest of that province, and Acarnania ; assuring them, that could these be reduced, the whole continent there would instantly go over to the Lacedæmonian league. Eurylochus having assured them of his concurrence, and given the Ætolians their dismission, halted thereabouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had entered on the expedition against Argos, and it was time for him to join them. And here the summer ended.

The Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of the winter, putting themselves at the head of their Grecian allies, and as many of their Sicilian as, unable to support the Syracusan yoke, had revolted from Syracuse to join them, began fresh operations of war in concert; and assaulted Nessa, a town of Sicily, the citadel of which was in the hands of the Syracusans : but the attempt was unsuccessful, and they again determined to draw off. During the retreat the Syracusans, sallying forth, fell on those allies of the Athenians who marched in the rear, and with such force, that they put a part of the army to flight, and slew a considerable number.

After this Laches and the Athenians, having made some attempts, and landed on the coasts of Locris, near the mouth of the river Caïcinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians, consisting of about three hundred, under Proxenus the son of Capaton. These the Athenians defeated ; and having stripped them of their arms, went off the coast.

The same winter also the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Pisistratus the tyrant had purified it formerly ; not indeed the whole, but so much of the island as lies within the prospect of the

temple. The purification now was universal, and performed in the following manner:—

They broke up all the sepulchres of the dead without exception; and prohibited for the future any death or birth in the island, both which were to be confined to Rhenæa: for Rhenæa lies at so small a distance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who was formerly of great power by sea, amongst other isles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhenæa also, which he consecrated to Delian Apollo and fastened it to Delos by a chain: and after this purification, the Athenians made the first institution of the Delian games to be solemnised every fifth returning year: not but that in the earlier times there was used to be a great conflux of Ionians and neighboring islanders to Delos. They resorted to the solemn festivals there with their wives and children, in the same manner as the Ionians do now to Ephesus. Games of bodily exercise and of music were actually celebrated, and cities exhibited their respective choruses. For this we have the testimony of Homer, in the following verses of his hymn to Apollo:—

To thee, O Phœbus, most the Delian isle
Gives cordial joy, excites the pleasing smile ;
When gay Ionians flock around thy fane ;
Men, women, children, a resplendent train,
Whose flowing garments sweep the sacred pile,
Whose grateful concourse gladdens all the isle,
Where champions fight, where dancers beat the ground,
Where cheerful music echoes all around,
Thy feast to honor, and thy praise to sound.

That there was also a musical game to which artists resorted to make trials of their skill, he fully shows in other verses to be found in the same hymn: for having sung the Delian chorus of females, he closes their

praise with these lines; in which, farther, he has made mention of himself:—

Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day;
Hail! Cynthia, goddess of the lunar sway;
Henceforth on me propitious smile! and you
Ye blooming beauties of the isle, adieu!
When future guests shall reach your happy shore,
And refuged here from toils, lament no more;
When social chat the mind unbending cheers,
And this demand shall greet your friendly ears:
'Who was the bard, e'er landed on your coast,
Who sung the sweetest, and who pleased you most?'
With voice united, all ye blooming fair,
Join in your answer, and for me declare;
Say, 'The blind bard the sweetest notes may boast,
He lives at Chios, and he pleased us most.'

Such an evidence has Homer left us, that in early times there was a great concourse and festival at Delos: but afterwards the people of the islands and the Athenians sent in their parties for the chorus with victims. But the usual games, and most of the solemn rites, had been disused, through some sinister events, till the Athenians now made a fresh institution of this solemnity, with the addition of a chariot race, which had not formerly been a part of it.

The same winter the Ambraciots, in pursuance of their engagements with Eurylochus, who waited their motions, marched away with three thousand heavy-armed against the Amphilochian Argos. Accordingly, breaking into Argia, they seized Olpæ, a strong place, situated on an eminence on the sea-side. This place had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians, who used it for the public tribunal of justice. It is distant from the city of Argos, which is also a maritime town, about twenty-five stadia.¹ The Acarnanians were now

¹ About two miles and a half.

in motion; some running to the defence of Argos, others to encamp at the important post of Crenæ in Amphilochia, to observe the motions of the Peloponnesians commanded by Eurylochus, that they might not perfect their junction with the Ambraciots without some molestation on their route. They also sent to Demosthenes, the Athenian general in the Ætolian expedition, to come and put himself at their head; and to the Athenian squadron of twenty sail, which was then on the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command of Aristotle, son of Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus.

The Ambraciots at Olpæ sent also a messenger to their own city, ordering them, to a man, to come out into the field. They were afraid lest Eurylochus might not be able to pass the Acarnanians, and so they should be compelled either to fight alone, or, should they attempt a retreat, find it full of danger.

But the Peloponnesians commanded by Eurylochus had no sooner heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpæ than, dislodging from Proschium, they marched with all expedition to their support. After passing the Achelous they took the route of Acarnania, desolate then, as the inhabitants had fled to the defence of Argos, having on their right the city and garrison of the Stratians, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. When they had passed through the territory of the Stratians they crossed Phytia, and again through the extremity of Medeon, and then marched across Limnæa. They now entered the kingdom of the Agræans, which had deserted the Acarnanian to favor the Peloponnesian interest. Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a wild uncultivated spot, they crossed it, and descended thence by night into Argia. They afterwards passed undiscovered betwixt the city of the

Argians and the post of the Acarnanians at Crenæ, and so perfected their junction with the Ambraciots at Olpæ. After this junction, their numbers being large, they took possession next morn, at break of day, of a post called Metropolis, and there fixed their encampment.

Not long after this the Athenian squadron of twenty sail came into the bay of Ambracia, to succor the Argians. Demosthenes also arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Messenians, and sixty Athenian archers. The station of the fleet was fixed under the fort of Olpæ: but the Acarnanians, and some few of the Amphilochians, who had already gathered into a body at Argos, for the majority of them was obstructed by the Ambraciots, got every thing in readiness to engage the enemy. They elected Demosthenes to be commander of the whole associated force, with the assistance of their own generals. He caused them to advance near Olpæ, and there encamped them. A great hollow lay between the armies. For five days they remained in a state of inaction, but on the sixth both sides drew up in order of battle. The Peloponnesians were more numerous, and their line of course was farther extended. Demosthenes therefore, that he might not be inclosed, placed an ambuscade of the heavy and light-armed, to the number in all of about four hundred, in a hollow way overgrown with shrubs and bushes, with orders that in the heat of the charge they should rise up and attack the over-extended line of the enemy in their rear. When all things were ready on both sides, they came to blows. Demosthenes led the right wing, composed of the Messenians and his few Athenians: the other consisted of the Acarnanians, drawn up in the order they happened to fall into as they came up, and the Amphilochian darters, who were at hand: but

the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up promiscuously, except the Mantineans. The Mantineans stood embodied rather towards the left, but not in the extremity : for Eurylochus, with a select party, was posted there over-against the Messenians and Demosthenes.

No sooner was the battle joined, and the Peloponnesians on that wing were moving forward their superior numbers to surround the right of their adversaries, than the Acarnanians, starting up from their ambuscade, fell on them in the rear, assaulting and putting them to flight. They gave way before the very first shock ; and struck such a consternation into the bulk of the army, that they also began to run : for they no sooner saw the party with Eurylochus, and which was the flower of their strength, intirely broken, than they felt a panic for themselves : and the Messenians, who fought at the same post with Demosthenes, behaved so very well, that they finished the rout. The Ambraciots, in the mean time, and those in the right, had got the better of their opponents, and were pursuing them towards Argos ; for beyond a doubt they are the most warlike people of any in those parts. But when they were returned from the pursuit, they perceived the bulk of their army was defeated ; and the rest of the Acarnanians beginning to charge them, with much difficulty they threw themselves into Olpæ. The number of the slain was great, as they had made their attacks without any order, and with the utmost confusion : we must except the Mantineans, who kept most firmly together, and retreated in the best order of the whole enemy. The battle was ended only with the night.

The next morning, as Eurylochus was killed, and Macarius also, the command devolved on Menedæus. The defeat was irrecoverably great ; and he was highly:

perplexed, whether he should abide a siege, in which he must not only be shut up by land, but by the Athenian ships be blocked up also by sea ; or, whether he should endeavor to secure his retreat. At length, he treated with Demosthenes and the Acarnanians for a suspension of arms both for his own departure and the fetching off the dead. The dead they at once delivered, and set up a trophy themselves, and took up their own dead, to the number of about three hundred ; but a truce for their departure was not openly granted to them all. Demosthenes, in concert with the Acarnanian generals, agreed to a secret article with the Mantineans, and Menedæus, and the other Peloponnesian officers, and as many others as were of any consideration, that ‘they should depart immediately.’ His policy was, to have the Ambraciots and the promiscuous body of mercenaries left quite destitute, wishing above all things for such a pretext to calumniate the Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians amongst the Grecians of those parts, ‘as men who wilfully abandon their friends, from a mere selfish treacherous regard to their own safety.’ Having leave therefore to fetch off their dead, they interred them all as well as their hurry would admit. And those in the secret were busy in concerting the means of their departure.

But intelligence was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots of the city with their whole collected force had, in pursuance of the former summons, begun their march for Olpæ through Amphilochia, designing to join their countrymen at Olpæ, and quite ignorant of the late defeat. On this he immediately detached a part of his army to beset all the passes, and to seize all the advantageous posts on their route, and got ready at the same time to march against them with the remainder of his force.

In the mean time, the Mantineans, and those comprehended in the secret article, going out of the town on the pretext of gathering herbs and fuel, went gradually off in small parties, gathering what they pretended to come out for as they passed along. But when they had thus straggled to a considerable distance from Olpæ they moved away in a more nimble pace. The Ambraciots and others, who in great numbers came out in their company, when they perceived them thus stealing off, felt an inclination to follow, and so taking to their heels, ran speedily after them. The Acarnanians imagined at first that they were all equally endeavoring to escape without permission, and therefore set out in the pursuit of the Peloponnesians. Their officers endeavored to stop them, crying out, ‘leave was given for their escape.’ On which a soldier, concluding their officers had been guilty of treachery, darted his javelin amongst them. But afterwards they connived at the escape of the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, but made a slaughter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed was the tumult, and the perplexity also to distinguish which was an Ambraciot, and which was a Peloponnesian; and amidst the confusion about two hundred were slain. The rest made their escape into the bordering kingdom of Agræis, where Salynthius, king of the Agræans, who was their friend, took them under his protection.

The Ambraciots of the city were now advanced as far as Idomene. There are two lofty eminences which are called by that name. The higher of the two, by favor of the dark, the detachment sent before by Demosthenes from the camp had seized, without being discovered, and had posted themselves on it. The Ambraciots had possessed themselves already of the lower, and halted there for the night. Demosthenes, after

his evening repast, and the remainder of the army, about shut of evening, began to march. He himself took half of them to attack the enemy in front, whilst the other was fetching a compass round the mountains of Amphilochia.

The next morning was no sooner in its dawn than he came on the Ambraciots, yet in their beds, still ignorant of all that had passed, and rather supposing these new-comers to be their friends; for Demosthenes had politicly placed the Messenians in the van, and ordered them to discourse as they moved along in the Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from their advanced guards; who farther, so long as the dark continued, could not possibly distinguish their faces. By this means, he no sooner assaulted the camp than the rout began. Numbers of them were slain on the spot. The remainder fled amain towards the mountains. But the passes were all beset; and more than this, the Amphilochians, who were well acquainted with their own country, were pursuing in the light enemies who were encumbered with the heavy armor. Quite ignorant of the country, nor knowing whither they were flying, they rushed headlong into hollow ways, into all the ambuscades laid ready by the enemy, to their own destruction. Yet as no possible method of escape was unattempted, some of them turned towards the sea, which was not greatly distant. And when they beheld the Athenian ships moving along the shore, in so fatal a concurrence for their ruin, they plunged into the water, and swam up to them, choosing rather, in the present consternation, to be destroyed by the Athenians on board those ships, than by barbarians, and their most inveterate foes, the Amphilochians. Through such a series of misfortunes, but few out of the numerous body of Ambraciots were so happy as

to escape to their own home. The Acarnanians, having stripped the dead and erected the trophies, marched back to Argos.

On the following day they were addressed by a herald, sent from those Ambraciots who had escaped from Olpæ, and were now in the Agræis. His commission was to obtain the bodies of the dead who had been killed since the first engagement, as they were attempting without permission to escape along with the Mantineans and others who were going off by agreement. This herald, casting his eyes on the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, was astonished at the number. He knew nothing of that fresh calamity, but concluded they all belonged to the party for whom he was now employed. Somebody asked him the reason of his surprise, and what he judged to be the number of the dead. Now he who asked the question supposed the herald to have been sent by those of Idomene. ‘Not more than two hundred,’ said the herald. The demandant then replied: ‘It should seem otherwise by the arms, for these are the arms of more than a thousand men.’ The herald rejoined: ‘Then they cannot belong to those of our party.’ The other replied: ‘They must, if you fought yesterday at Idomene.’ ‘We fought nowhere yesterday; we suffered the day before in our retreat from Olpæ.’ ‘But we fought yesterday against those Ambraciots, who were advancing from the city to relieve you.’ When the herald heard this, and found that the army of relief from the city was thus destroyed, he burst into a groan; and quite overpowered with the weight of the present calamities, he went off abruptly, and without renewing his demand about the dead.

During the whole course of this war no other Grecian city suffered so great a loss in so short a time. I

have not presumed to mention the number of the slain, because it is said to have been incredibly great, when compared with the size of their city. But I am well convinced that, if in compliance with the advice of the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians would have proceeded to the excision of Ambracia, they might have done it with the bare shout of their voice. But they dreaded its falling into the hands of the Athenians, who might prove worse neighbors to them than the old.

But to return. A third part of the spoils was bestowed on the Athenians; the rest was divided amongst the confederate cities. Those allotted the Athenians were lost at sea: for the three hundred suits of armor which are reposed in the temples of Athens were selected for Demosthenes, who now returned thither and brought them with him. The dread he had been under ever since his miscarriage in Ætolia was quite dispelled by the good service he had now performed.

The Athenians, with their squadron of twenty sail, were now returned to Naupactus; and, since the departure of the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had granted by treaty to those Ambraciots and Peloponnesians, who had refuged with Salynthius and the Agræans, a safe retreat from amongst the Oeniadæ, who had also gone over to Salynthius and the Agræans. And afterwards the Acarnanians and Amphilochians concluded a peace and an alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, on these conditions:

‘ That neither the Ambraciots should be obliged to join the Acarnanians in any attempts against the Peloponnesians; nor the Acarnanians to act with the Ambraciots against the Athenians.

' That if either were attacked, the others should march to their defence.

' That the Ambraciots should restore all the places and frontier belonging to the Amphilochians, which were at present in their hands. And,

' That they should in no shape support Anactorium, which was then in hostility with the Acarnanians.'

These articles being mutually agreed to, the war came to a conclusion. But after this, the Corinthians sent a party of their own people, consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xenoclides, the son of Euthycles, for the guard of Ambracia; who arrived, after great difficulties, as they marched all the way overland. And this is the account of transactions in Ambracia.

The Athenians in Sicily, the same winter, made a descent against Himeræa, from their ships, whilst the Sicilians, pouring down from the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. They steered their course also against the isles of Æolus. But when they were returned to their old station at Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, who was commissioned to take on him the command of the fleet, in the room of Laches: for the confederates of Sicily had sent a deputation to Athens, to solicit a more ample succor of shipping: because, as in fact the Syracusans were masters of all their lands, and they were also awed at sea by a few Syracusan vessels, they were now intent on gathering together such a naval force as might strike an effectual terror. The Athenians equipped out forty sail as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their motive was, not only to bring the war in those parts to a speedy determination, but also to keep their own mariners in constant practice. Pytho-

dorus, one of the admirals appointed for this service, they sent off immediately with a few ships: Sophocles, son of Sostradites, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, were soon to follow with the main body of the fleet. But Pythodorus, who had now taken the command from Laches, steered about the close of the winter against that fortress of the Locrians which Laches had taken before; but, being defeated at his landing by the Locrians, he returned again to his station.

About the spring of the year, a torrent of fire overflowed from mount *Ætna*, in the same manner as formerly, which destroyed part of the lands of the Cataneans, who are situated at the foot of that mountain, which is the largest in all Sicily. It is said that fifty years intervened between this flow and the last which preceded; and that in the whole, the fire had thus issued thrice since Sicily was inhabited by the Greeks. Such were the occurrences of this winter, at the end of which, the sixth year also of this war, the history of which Thucydides has compiled, expired.

BOOK IV.

YEAR VII. B. C. 425.—THE ensuing summer, when the corn was beginning to ear, ten sail of Syracusan joined by an equal number of Locrian vessels, at the invitation of the inhabitants, stood away for Messene in Sicily, and took possession of the place. And thus Messene revolted from the Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing to the practices of the Syracusans who, foreseeing that this town might open the way for the reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid lest the Athenians should get established there, and with augmented forces pour out from thence on them. The Locrians assisted out of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they were desirous to have it in their power to attack both by land and sea. At the same time also these Locrians broke in on the territory of the Rhegians with their intire force, to deter them from any attempt to save Messene, and to gratify also those fugitives from Rhegium, who acted now in combination with them; for Rhegium had for a long time been embroiled in sedition, and so was unable to take the field against these invaders, who for the same reason were more eager to distress them. When the ravage was completed, the Locrians marched their land forces back, but their ships were stationed on the guard of Messene. They also were very busy in the equipment of an additional number, which were to repair to that station, and be ready to move from thence to any future operations of war.

About the same season of the spring, before the corn was fully grown, the Peloponnesians and allies

made their inroad into Attica. Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded. They fixed their camp, and ravaged the country.

The Athenians now sent out to sea the forty ships already prepared for the Sicilian voyage, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, who stayed behind to bring up this reinforcement, since Pythodorus the third in the commission was already in his post at Sicily. They had orders also in the course of the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide effectually for the preservation of those in the city, who were sadly infested by the outlaws posted on the mountain. Sixty sail of the Peloponnesians were now on that coast, to act in support of those on the mountain, who, as the city was sorely oppressed with famine, presumed they should with ease carry all before them. Demosthenes farther, who had been in no public employ since his return from Acarnania, procured leave to go on board this fleet with authority to employ it on the coast of Peloponnesus, if he judged it for the service.

When they were got to the height of Laconia, intelligence was brought them, that ‘the Peloponnesian fleet is now in Corcyra.’ Eurymedon and Sophocles were for making the best of their way thither. But it was the advice of Demosthenes to go first to Pylus, and after they had secured that place to proceed on their voyage. This was positively refused; but it so happened that a storm arose, which drove the whole fleet to Pylus. Demosthenes insisted that they should immediately fortify the place, since this was the motive of his attendance in the fleet. He showed them that ‘there was at hand plenty of timber and stone for the work; that, beside the strength of its natural situation, the place itself was barren, as was also the greatest part of

the adjacent country :’ for Pylus lies at the distance of about four hundred stadia¹ from Sparta, in the district which was formerly called Messenia ; but the name given it by the Lacedæmonians is Coryphasium. The others replied, ‘ there are many barren capes in Peloponnesus, which those may secure who have a mind to plunge the commonwealth into needless expenses.’ This place, however, seemed to him to be better marked out for this purpose than any other, as being possessed of a harbor ; and as the Messenians, who formerly bore some relation to it, and still used the same dialect with the Lacedæmonians, might from hence give them great annoyance, and at the same time effectually keep possession of it. But when neither the commanders nor soldiers, nor the inferior officers,² to whom he afterwards communicated his project, would be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it drop till the mere love of employment, during the idleness of their suspended voyage, seditiously inclined the private soldiers to compass it with a wall. They took the work in hand, and plied it briskly. Tools they had none for hewing and fitting the stones ; but picked out and carried such as they judged most proper for the work, and laid them one on another as compactly as they could. The mud, that was any where requisite, for want of vessels they carried on their shoulders, bending forwards as much as possible

¹ About forty English miles.

² The word in the original is *taxiarchs*. They seem to be nearly the same with captains of a company, in the modern style, as their command was over about one hundred men. *Taxiarchs* were also officers of a higher class, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing one, whose business it was to marshall the armies, to order the marches and encampments, to take care of provisions, and to punish military offences ; but the former seem to be the officers to whom Demosthenes applied himself in the present instance.

that it might have room to stick on, and holding it up with both hands clasped fast behind, that it might not slide down. They spared no pains to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to put the place in a proper posture of defence, before they could come to their disturbance : for the largest part of it was so well fortified by nature that it stood in no need of the defence of art.

The news of this arrived at Sparta during the celebration of some public festival. They set light by it, assured, that so soon as they appeared in sight, the enemy would either abandon it, or the place be recovered by an easy effort. And they were something more dilatory because their army was yet in Attica.

The Athenians, having completed their works on the side towards the land and on the other necessary spots in the space of six days, left Demosthenes with five ships to guard it, and with the larger number resumed their voyage for Corcyra and Sicily.

But the Peloponnesians in Attica were no sooner advertised of this seizure of Pylus than they marched back with all expedition. The Lacedæmonians and Agis their king regarded this affair of Pylus as their own domestic concern. And besides, as they had made inroad early in the year and whilst the corn was yet green, many of them labored under a scarcity of provisions. The weather also, which proved tempestuous beyond what was usual in that season, had very much incommoded the army. In this manner, many accidents concurred to accelerate their retreat, and to render this the shortest of all their invasions : for the whole of their stay in Attica was but fifteen days.

About the same time Simonides, an Athenian commander, having gathered together a small party of Athenians from the neighboring garrisons and a body of

the circumjacent dependents, took possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendeans. It had declared against the Athenians, but was now put into their hands by treachery. Yet, the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans coming immediately to its relief, he was beaten out of it again, and lost a great number of his men.

After the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica, the Spartans,¹ in conjunction with those of their allies, marched without loss of time to the recovery of Pylus. The rest of the Lacedæmonians were longer in their approach, as but just returned from another expedition: yet a summons had been sent all round Peloponnesus, to march directly for Pylus. Their fleet of sixty sail was also remanded from Corcyra; which being transported by land over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived before Pylus undescribed by the Athenians, who lay at Zacynthus: and by this time the land army had also approached.

Demosthenes, before the coming up of the Peloponnesian fleet, had timely despatched two vessels to Erymedon and the Athenians on board that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, pressing them to return as the place was in danger of being lost; which vessels made the best of their way, in pursuance of the earnest commands of Demosthenes. But the Lacedæmonians were now preparing to attack the fortress both by land and sea; presuming it would easily be destroyed, as the work had been raised with so much precipitation, and was defended by so small a number of hands. But, as they also expected the return of the Athenian ships from Zacynthus, they designed, in case they took not

¹ The reader will be pleased to take notice that the word Spartans is here emphatical. It means those of the first class, the noblest persons in the community, as is plain from the sequel.

the place before, to bar up the mouths of the harbor, so as to render the entrance impracticable to the Athenians: for an isle which is called Sphacteria, lying before and at a small distance, locks it up and renders the mouths of the harbor narrow; that near the fortress of the Athenians and Pylus a passage for two ships only abreast, and that between the other points of land for eight or nine. The whole of it, as desart, was overgrown with wood, and quite untrod, and the compass of it at most is about fifteen stadia.¹ They were therefore intent on shutting up these entrances with ships moored close together, and their heads towards the sea. And to prevent the molestation apprehended, should the enemy take possession of this island, they threw into it a body of their heavy-armed, and posted another body on the opposite shore: for by these dispositions the Athenians would be incommoded from the island, and excluded from landing on the main-land: and, as on the opposite coast of Pylus without the harbor there is no road where ships can lie, they would be deprived of a station from whence to succor the besieged: and thus, without the hazard of a naval engagement, it was probable they should get possession of the place, as the quantity of provisions in it could be but small, since the seizure had been executed with slender preparation. Acting on these motives, they threw the body of heavy-armed into the island, who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. These for a time were successively relieved by others: but the last body who guarded that post, and were forced to continue in it, consisted of about four hundred and twenty, exclusive of the helots who at-

¹ One mile and a half.

tended them ; and these were commanded by Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes, perceiving by these dispositions that the Lacedæmonians would attack him by land and sea, provided for his own defence. The triremes yet remaining with him he drew ashore, and ranged them by way of palisade before the fortress. The mariners he armed with bucklers ; sorry ones indeed, as most of them were only twigs of osier plaited. Better arms were not to be procured in so desart a place : and even these they had taken out of a cruiser of thirty oars, and a light packet belonging to the Messenians, who happened accidentally to put in. The Messenians on board were about forty heavy-armed, whom he ranged amongst his own body. The greater part therefore of the unarmed, as well as some who had armor, he placed on the strongest parts of the fortress towards the continent, with orders to beat off the land army whenever they approached. And having selected from his whole number sixty heavy-armed, and a few archers, he marched out of the fortress to that part of the beach where he supposed the enemy would endeavor to land. The shore indeed was rough and rocky, and bordered on the main sea : as the wall was weakest in this quarter, he judged it would soonest tempt and animate an assault : for never imagining they should be outnumbered in shipping, they had left the wall on this side but weak ; and should the enemy now force a landing, the place would undoubtedly be lost.

Sensible of this, and determined if possible to prevent their landing, Demosthenes posted himself with his chosen band on the very edge of the water, and endeavored to animate them by the following harangue :—

‘ My fellow-soldiers, here posted with me in this dangerous situation, I conjure you, in so urgent an extremity, to throw away all superfluous wisdom. Let not a soul amongst you compute the perils which now environ us, but regardless of the issue, and inspirited by hope, let him charge the foe, and be confident of success. A desperate situation like this allows no room for calm consideration, but demands the most precipitate venture. Superior advantages however are along with us: of this I am convinced, provided we only stand firm together, and scorning to be terrified at the number of our foes, do not wilfully betray those advantages which are now in our favor. The shore is most difficult of access: this, in my judgment, makes abundantly for us; this will support us, if we keep our ground: but if we give way, difficult as it is now, their landing will be easy when there are none to obstruct it. Nay, what is worse, we shall make the enemy more furious, when, if we may afterwards press hard on him, it is no longer in his power to re-embark with ease: for so long as they continue on board, they may most easily be encountered; whilst they are busy in landing, they cannot so far overmatch us, as that we ought to shrink before their numbers. Large though they be, the spot of action will be small for want of ground to draw up in order. What though their force be superior for the land, that advantage will be lost in their present service, when they must act from their vessels and on the water, where many lucky contingencies are requisite. And thus am I satisfied, that with these disadvantages they are but merely a balance for our smallness of number.

‘ As for you, O Athenians, who are now present, and who, by the long experience of frequent descents, are perfectly convinced that men, who stand firm and

scorn to give way before the dash of the surge or the menacing approach of a vessel, can never be beaten off, from you I insist, that firmly embodied together and charging the enemy on the very margin of the water, you preserve all us who are here, and preserve this fortress.'

In this manner Demosthenes having encouraged his men, the Athenians became more animated than ever ; and, marching forwards to the very margin of the sea, posted themselves there in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians were also in motion ; their land force was marching to assault the fortress, and their fleet was approaching the shore. It consisted of forty-three vessels ; and a Spartan, Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, was on board as admiral. He steered directly for the spot on which Demosthenes expected his coming. In this manner were the Athenians assaulted on both sides, by land and sea.

The ships of the enemy came on in small divisions, because there was not room for larger. They slackened by intervals, and endeavored by turns to force their landing. They were brave to a man, and mutually animated one another to beat off the Athenians and seize the fortress.

But Brasidas signalised himself above them all. He commanded a trireme ; and observing that the other commanders and pilots, though they knew they could run aground, yet kept aloof because the shore was craggy, and shunned every hazard of staving their vessels, he shouted aloud, 'that it was shameful, for the saving of timber, to suffer enemies to raise fortifications within their territory.' He encouraged them, on the contrary, 'to force their landing, though they dashed their vessels to pieces ;' begging the confederates 'in this juncture not to refuse bestowing their

ships on the Lacedæmonians in lieu of the great services they had done them, but to run them ashore; and landing, at all adventures to seize the enemy and the fortress.' In this manner he animated others; and having compelled his own pilot to run the vessel ashore, he was at once on the stairs, and endeavoring to get down, was beat back by the Athenians. After many wounds received, he fainted with loss of blood; and falling down on the gunwale, his shield tumbled over into the water. It was brought ashore, and taken up by the Athenians; who afterwards made it a part of the trophy which they erected for this attack.

The others indeed with equal spirit endeavored, but yet could not possibly land, as the ground was difficult of access, and the Athenians stood firm, and nowhere at all gave way. Such now was the strange reverse of fortune, that the Athenians on land, on Laconic land, beat off the Lacedæmonians who were fighting from the water; and the Lacedæmonians, from ships, were endeavoring a descent on their own now hostile territory against Athenians: for at this period of time it was the general opinion that those were landmen, and excelled most in land engagements, but that these were seamen, and made the best figure at sea.

The attack was continued the whole day, and part of the next, before it was given up. On the third, they detached some vessels to Asine to fetch timber for engines; hoping by them to accomplish the taking of the wall adjacent to the harbor, which, though of a greater height, yet might easier be approached by sea.

During this pause forty sail of Athenians came up from Zacynthus. This fleet had been enlarged by the accession of some guard-ships from off the station of Naupactus, and four sail of Chians. These no sooner discovered the main-land about Pylus and the island

Sphacteria to be full of armed soldiers, the harbor also to be occupied by the ships of the enemy which lay quiet in their posts, then perplexed how to act, they sailed back for the present to the isle of Prone, not far distant, and desert, and there spent the night.

The day following, being formed into the order of battle, they showed themselves again as ready for engagement, should the enemy venture to stand out against them into the open sea; and if not, were determined to force their way into the harbor. The enemy still kept in the same quiet posture, nor set about executing their former design of barring the entrances. They continued in their usual position along the shore, when they had manned their vessels, and got every thing ready to engage the assailants should they break into the harbor, where there was no danger of being straitened for room. The Athenians, perceiving their intent, broke into the harbor at both entrances. Falling there on the greater number of vessels now advanced into deep water to obstruct the passage, they put them to flight; and following the chase, which could be but short, they shattered several, and took five, one of which had her whole crew on board. They proceeded to attack the rest, which had fled amain towards the shore. Some moreover, which had just been manned, were disabled before they could launch into the deep. Others, deserted by the mariners who had fled along the shore, they fastened to their own, and towed away empty. The Lacedæmonians seeing these things, and prodigiously alarmed at the sad event, lest now the communication should be cut off with the body in the island, rushed down with all their force to prevent it. Armed as they were they plunged into the water, and catching hold of the vessels in tow, pulled them back

towards the shore. It was now the apprehension of every soul amongst them that the business flagged wherever he himself was not present. Great was the tumult in this contest for the ships, inverting the general custom of both contending parties : for the Lacedæmonians, inflamed and terrified, fought a sea-fight (if it may be so expressed) from the shore : the Athenians, already victorious, and eager to give their good fortune its utmost completion, fought a land-battle from on board. The struggle on both sides was long and laborious, and blood was abundantly shed before the dispute could be ended. But at length the Lacedæmonians recovered all their empty vessels, excepting such as had been taken on the first onset. Each party being retired to their respective posts, the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered up the dead, and were masters of all the wreck and shatters of the action. Then, without loss of time, they ranged their vessels in circuit quite round the island, and kept a strict watch, as having intercepted the body of men which was posted there. But the Peloponnesians on the main-land, with the accession of their auxiliaries who had now joined them, remained on the opposite shore near Pylus.

When the news of this action at Pylus was brought to Sparta, it was resolved, as the great calamity was so urgent, that the magistrates in person should repair to the camp, and consult on the very spot what resource they had left. And when their own eyes had shown them the impossibility of relieving their men, and they were loath to leave them in the wretched extremity either of perishing by famine, or, over-powered by superior numbers, of being shamefully made prisoners, it was concluded ‘ to send to the Athenian commanders to ask a suspension of arms a’

Pylus, whilst they despatched an embassy to Athens to procure an accommodation, and to obtain leave as soon as possible to fetch off their Spartans.' These commanders accepting the proposal, the suspension was agreed to on the following conditions :

' That the Lacedæmonians should immediately deliver up the ships in which they had fought ; and all the ships of war in general, which they had any where in Laconia, they should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians. That they should refrain from making any attempt whatever on the fortress either by sea or land.

' That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians on the main-land to carry over a stated quantity of provisions to those in the island, two Attic¹ chœnixes of meal, with two cotyls of wine, and a piece of flesh for every Spartan, and a moiety of each for every servant. These provisions to be carried thither under the inspection of the Athenians ; and no vessels whatever to cross over without permission.

' That the Athenians, notwithstanding, be at liberty to continue their guard round the island, but not to land on it ; and should refrain from giving any annoyance to the army of the Peloponnesians either by sea or land.

' That if either party should violate these conditions, either in the whole or any part whatever, the truce to be immediately void ; otherwise, to continue in force till the return of the Lacedæmonian embassy from Athens.

' That the Athenians should convoy that embassy thither and back again in a trireme.

¹ More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, English measure.

‘ That on their return the truce should be ended, when the Athenians should restore the ships now delivered to them, in the same number and condition as they were in before.’

On these conditions a suspension of arms took place, in pursuance of which the ships were delivered up to the number of sixty, and the ambassadors despatched away, who arriving at Athens, addressed themselves as follows :

‘ Hither, O Athenians, we are sent on the part of the Lacedæmonians, to negotiate with you in behalf of their citizens in the island, and to propose an expedient which will tend very much to your advantage, and will at the same time preserve as much as possible our own honor, in the great calamity with which we are at present beset. It is not our purpose to run out into a long unaccustomed flow of words. We shall adhere to the rule of our country, to spare many words where few may suffice ; and then only to enlarge, when the important occasion requires an exact detail for the more judicious regulation of necessary acts. Receive therefore our discourse with an attention cleared of enmity. Be informed as men of understanding ought ; and conclude that you are only to be put in mind of that judicious method of procedure of which yourselves are such competent judges.

‘ You have now an opportunity at hand to improve a present success to your own interest and credit, to secure the possession of what you have hitherto acquired, and to adorn it with the accession of honor and glory. You are only to avoid that insolence of mind so frequent to men who have been, till the present, strangers to success. Such men are ever apt to presume too much on larger acquisitions, though merely because their present prosperity was beyond

their expectation : whilst they who have experienced the frequent vicissitudes of fortune, have gained a more judicious turn, and presume the least on continuance of success. And there is the highest reason to conclude, that experience has improved the commonwealth of Athens and us Lacedæmonians in this piece of wisdom, much more than any other people.

‘ But be assured of it now, when you behold the calamities with which we are at present environed ; we, who are invested with the highest honors and dignities of Greece, are this moment addressing ourselves to you, begging such favors as we formerly thought were more peculiarly lodged in our own dispensation. Not that we are thus reduced through failure of our strength, or through former strength too haughtily exerted, but merely through the weight of such unforeseen disasters as continually happen, and to which the whole of mankind alike are ever subject. And from hence it is right that you should learn, amidst the present strength of your state and its late acquisitions, that fortune may not always declare on your side. Wise indeed are they, who in their estimates of success make judicious allowances for chance. Such are best able to bear the alternatives of calamity with prudence and temper. Such will from their judgments of war, not as the infallible means of accomplishing whatever scheme they please to undertake, but as deriving its effects from the guidance of fortune. Such are the persons who are most of all exempted from fatal miscarriages ; because they are not puffed up by presuming too far on present prosperity, and would gladly acquiesce in the peaceable enjoyment of what they now possess.

‘ It concerns your honor, Athenians, to deal in this manner with us, lest, in case you now reject our pro-

posals, when you yourselves in future times miscarry (many such events must happen), your present good fortune may then be perversely ascribed to chance, even though you are now able to deliver down to posterity the fame of your power and moderation beyond a possibility of blemish. The Lacedæmonians invite you to agreement, and a conclusion of the war. They offer you peace and alliance, nay, friendship in its whole extent, and the exchange of good offices mutually revived; demanding nothing in return but their citizens out of the island. To this step they have condescended rather than be exposed to the dangers incidental on either side, should they either seize some favorable opportunity to force their escape by arms, or holding out to the last against your blockade, be reduced with all the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in our opinion, may the soonest be brought to a firm determination; not when either party having exerted all their strength, and gained the far greater superiority in war, disdains the fair accommodation, and relies on that forced acquiescence which necessitated oaths impose; but rather when, though victory be within their reach, they recollect humanity, and having succeeded by valor quite beyond their expectations, determine the contest with temper and moderation. Then the foe, who has not felt the extremity of force, is henceforth disarmed by the strength of gratitude, and is more securely bound by the affections of his own mind to abide for the future by all his compacts. Such ready deference mankind are more apt to show towards those who have been with a remarkable superiority their enemies, than to such as they have opposed in more equal competition. It is natural, when men take the method of voluntary submission, for the pleasing contest of generosity to be

kindled between them ; but to hazard the last extremities, and even grow desperate against that haughtiness which will not relent.

‘ Now, if ever, is the crisis come to effect such a pleasing reconciliation between us both, before the intervention of some incurable event to ulcerate our passions, which may lay us under the sad necessity of maintaining an eternal enmity both public and private in regard to you, and you lose the benefit of those advantageous offers we now lay within your option. Whilst the event is yet undetermined, whilst the acquisition of glory, and of our friendship is within your reach, whilst yet we only feel the weight of a sup-portable calamity, and are clear from foul disgrace, let us now be mutually reconciled : let us give the preference to peace over war, and effectuate a cessation of miseries to the other Grecians. The honor of such an event will by them be more abundantly ascribed to you. At present they are engaged in a perplexing warfare, unable yet to pronounce its authors. But in case a reconciliation now takes place, a point for the most part within your decision, they will gratefully acknowlege you for generous benefactors.

‘ If then you thus determine, you gain an opportunity to render the Lacedæmonians your firm and lasting friends, since now they request your friendship, and choose to be obliged rather than compelled. Reflect within yourselves how many benefits must in all probability result from such a lucky coincidence. For you cannot but know, that when we and you shall act with unanimity, the rest of Greece, conscious of inferiority, will pay us the utmost honor and regard.’

The Lacedæmonians talked in this strain on the presumption that the Athenians had formerly been desirous of peace, and had been obstructed merely

through their opposition; but now, thus freely tendered, they would accept it with joy, and give up the men. The Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the Spartans in the island already in their power, imagined that a peace would be at any time in their own option, and were now very eager to improve their present success. But such a measure was insisted on most of all by Cleon the son of Cleonetus, the greatest demagogue at this time, and most in credit with the people. It was he who persuaded them to return the following answer:

‘ That, previous to all accommodation, the Spartans shut up in the island must deliver up their arms and their persons, and be brought prisoners to Athens. When this was done, and the Lacedæmonians had surrendered Nisæa and Pegæ, and Trœzene and Chalcis, (of which places they had not possessed themselves by arms, but in pursuance of a former treaty, when distress exacted compliance from the Athenians, and they had been obliged on any terms to purchase peace,) then they might fetch away their countrymen, and conclude a peace for whatever term both parties should agree.’

To this answer the Lacedæmonians made no direct reply;¹ they only requested that a committee might be appointed, with whom, after the arguments on each side should be freely offered and discussed, they might agree on some expedient to mutual satisfaction. Cleon on this broke out into loud invectives against them,

¹ Diodorus Siculus, l. xii, says farther, that the Lacedæmonian ambassadors offered to set at liberty an equal number of Athenians, who were now their prisoners. And, when this offer was rejected, the ambassadors replied freely, ‘ It was plain they set a higher value on Spartans than on their own citizens, since they judged an equal number of the latter not to be an equivalent.

affirming, ‘ he knew beforehand that they intended nothing just or fair ; but now their view was manifest to all, as they had absolutely refused to have any transactions with the body of the people, and had thus expressed a desire to negotiate with a small committee : if their views were fair and upright, he called on them to explain themselves in the presence of all.’ But the Lacedæmonians perceiving that nothing they could urge would have any influence on the people, and in case, to ward off the distress they feared, they should make too large proposals, these offered and unaccepted, would expose them to the censure of their confederates ; and that farther, the Athenians would not comply with their demand on any reasonable terms ; they broke off all farther conference, and quitted Athens. The very moment they returned to Pylus the truce was at an end. The Lacedæmonians redemanded their ships, according to the article for that purpose agreed on. But the Athenians objecting some infractions to them, such as an incursion towards the fortress, expressly prohibited by the articles, and some other matters of little consequence, absolutely refused a restitution. They justified the refusal on this express stipulation between them, that ‘ if the conditions were in any degree violated, the truce should immediately be void.’ The Lacedæmonians protested against these proceedings, and charging the detention of their ships with the highest injustice, broke off all farther debate, and prepared for war.

Pylus was now the scene in which both these warring parties exerted their utmost efforts. The Athenians sailed the whole day round the island with two ships in an opposite course ; in the night their whole fleet was stationed round it on guard, except on that side towards the main sea when the weather was tempestu-

ous. And to strengthen their guard, they had now received a reinforcement of twenty sail from Athens ; so that the number of their shipping amounted in the whole to seventy. The Peloponnesians maintained their post on the continent, and made frequent assaults on the fort ; intent all along to seize the first favorable opportunity, and to accomplish the preservation of their countrymen.

In Sicily, this while, the Syracusans and confederates, augmenting the number of their guard ships on the station of Messene with another squadron they had since equipped, from Messene renewed the war. The Locrians spared no pains to spur them on, from the great aversion they bore to the Rhegians. They had now broken into the territories of the latter with their whole force. They had even a mind to hazard a naval engagement against them, as they saw the number of Athenian ships at hand to be very inconsiderable, and had received intelligence that the larger numbers designed for this service were stopped for the present to block up the isle of Sphacteria : for should they once get the better at sea, they hoped, as they then might attack Rhegium both by sea and land, to find it an easy conquest, and so the posture of their own affairs would be considerably strengthened. For as Rhegium, which is a promontory of Italy, lies at a very small distance from Messene in Sicily, they could then prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be intirely masters of the strait. This strait is that part of the sea which runs between Rhegium and Messene, and over which lies the shortest cut from Sicily to the continent. It is the place which was formerly called Charibdis, and through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. As the current here sets in strongly from two great seas, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and runs with

great rapidity, it is not at all strange that it should have been esteemed a dangerous passage.

Yet in the very middle of this strait the Syracusans and confederates, with a number of ships little more than thirty, were forced to engage in the evening of the day; the dispute beginning about a vessel that was passing through. They stood away to oppose sixteen sail of Athenians and eight of Rhegians. They were worsted by the Athenians; but each side separated in hurry and confusion, just as they could, to their several stations at Messene and Rhegium. They lost one ship in this action, which was stopped by the sudden approach of night.

But after this, the Locrians evacuated the territory of Rhegium, and the whole collected fleet of the Syracusans and confederates took a new station at Peloris of Messene, and their whole land force attended. The Athenians and Rhegians sailing up to their station, and finding none at present on board the ships, rushed in amongst them. Yet they lost one of their own vessels by the force of a grappling iron fastened on it, the crew of which was saved by swimming. Immediately after this the Syracusans got on board, and being towed along the shore towards Messene, the Athenians came up again to attack them; but, the enemy running off into the deep, and giving the first charge, they lost another of their ships. Though continuing to be towed along the shore, and to charge in this manner, yet the Syracusans, without suffering any loss, got safe into the harbor of Messene. And now the Athenians, having received intelligence that Camarina was betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his accomplices, stood away for that place.

In the mean while the Messenians, with their whole force by land, and accompanied by their ships, marched

away against Chalcidic Naxus, which bordered on their own territory. The first day they forced the Naxians to shelter themselves behind their walls, and then they plundered the country. The day following, sailing up the river Acesine, they plundered along the shore, and with their land force made an assault on the city. The Siculi, who live on the mountains, were now pouring down in numbers to repel the Messenians. This the Naxians perceiving, became more courageous; and animating one another with the thought that the Leontines and their other Greek allies were now marching to their relief, they suddenly sallied out of the city and fell on the Messenians, whom they put to flight, and slaughtered more than a thousand of them; the remainder, with difficulty, escaped to their own homes: for the barbarians attacked them on their road, and made great havoc of them. The ships on the station of Messene broke up soon after, withdrawing respectively to their own harbors.

Immediately the Leontines and allies, in concert with the Athenians, appeared before Messene, as now reduced to a very low ebb. They assaulted it on all sides; the Athenians making their attempt from their ships on the side of the harbor, whilst the land forces did the same on the body of the place. But the Messenians, and a party of Locrians commanded by Demoteles, who after their late blow had been left there for the security of the place, made a sudden sally from the city, and falling unexpectedly on the army of the Leontines, put the greater part to flight, and did great execution on them. This was no sooner perceived by the Athenians than they threw themselves ashore to succor their confederates, and, falling in with the Messenians, who had lost the order of their battle, drove them again behind their walls.

This done, having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhegium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily continued a land war against one another, in which the Athenians had no participation.

At Pylus, the Athenians still kept the Lacedæmonians blocked up in the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians remained in their old post on the continent in a state of inactivity. Their constant guard subjected the Athenians to excessive hardships, since provisions and fresh water were equally scarce. There was but one single fountain for their use, which lay within the fortress of Pylus, and yielded but a slender quantity of water. The majority of them were forced to dig into the gravel on the beach of the sea, and take up with such water as could thus be got. They were farther very much straitened in their station for want of room. They had not road enough for their ships to ride in with tolerable convenience, so that alternately one division lay ashore to take their necessary repasts, whilst the other launched more to sea: but what discouraged them most was the length of the blockade, so contrary to what they had expected. They had imagined a few days' siege would have worn out a body of men shut up in a barren island, and having only salt water for their drink; but this had been redressed by the Lacedæmonians, who had by a public edict encouraged all who were willing to carry over into the island meal, and wine, and cheese, and any other eatable which might enable them to hold out, assigning a large pecuniary reward for any successful attempt of this nature, and promising freedom to every helot who carried them provisions. This was performed through a series of dangers by several; but the helots were most active of all; who putting off from Peloponnesus, wherever they chanced to be, landing

by favor of the dark on the side of the island which lies on the main sea. Their chief precaution was to run over in a hard gale of wind: for whenever the wind blew from the sea they were in less danger of being discovered by the guard of triremes, which then could not safely lie quite round the island. In executing this service they put every thing to hazard. As a prior valuation had been given in, they ran their vessels on shore at all adventures; and the heavy-armed soldiers were ready to receive them at every place most convenient for landing. Those, however, who ventured out when the weather was calm were certainly intercepted. Such, farther, as were expert at diving swam over through the harbor, dragging after them by a string bottles filled with poppies mixed up with honey and the powder of linseed. These for a time escaped discovery, but were afterwards closely watched. No artifice was left unpractised on either side; some being ever intent to carry provisions over, and others to intercept them.

At Athens, in the mean time, the people being informed of the hardships to which their own forces were reduced, and that those in the island received supplies of provision, were perplexed how to act. They were full of apprehensions lest the winter should put a stop to their siege, being conscious of the impossibility of procuring them subsistence from any part of Peloponnesus; and more so, as the soil about them was barren, and that even in summer they were not able to furnish them with necessary supplies; that farther, as no harbors were in the parts adjacent, there would be no commodious road for their shipping; so that, in case they relaxed their guard, the besieged would go securely away: or otherwise, they might get off, by the favor of stormy weather, in those vessels which

brought over provisions. But they were most of all alarmed at the conduct of the Lacedæmonians, who, because they had now a safe resource in prospect, had discontinued all manner of negotiation. In a word, they highly repented the refusal of their former offers.

Cleon, conscious to himself that the blame of baffling that accommodation would be thrown on him, taxed them who brought the last advices as broachers of falsehoods. But those who had been sent to make the report demanded, ‘since they could not be credited, that a deputation might be sent to know its truth.’ For which office Cleon himself was nominated by the Athenians, in conjunction with Theognes.

But now he plainly saw, that he must either be necessitated to make the same report as those had done whom he had charged with falsehood; or, should he report differently, must soon be convicted of a lie. He perceived also, that the inclinations of the people were mostly bent on an ample reinforcement; on which he ventured to give them this farther advice, that ‘sending a deputation on such an errand was quite superfluous, since opportunities might be lost by so dilatory a measure: if they were really convinced of the truth of the report, they should at once put to sea against their enemies.’ He then proceeded to a malicious glance against Nicias, son of Niceratus, who at that time presided over the military affairs. He baited him, and sneered him thus; that ‘if their generals were really men, it would be an easy matter to sail thither with an additional strength, and make a seizure of those in the island; for his own part, was he in command, he would do it in a trice.’ The Athenians began immediately to clamor and rail at Cleon, for not instantly setting about that enterprise himself, which to him appeared so easy. This Nicias laying

hold of, chagrined at the same time by the sneer on himself, called on him aloud, ‘to take what force he pleased, and to perform the service in his stead.’ Cleon, imagining this to be a mere verbal offer, declared himself ready. But when he found that Nicias was earnest in the point of resignation, he drew back, alleging that ‘it could not be, since not he but Nicias was general.’ He trembled now, since he never suspected that the other would venture to give up his office to him. Nicias however called a second time on him, and formally surrendered his office to him, so far as related to Pylus, desiring the Athenians to be his witnesses. The people now, for such is the temper of the multitude, the more pains Cleon took to decline the voyage and disentangle himself from his own bravadoes, called out so much the more vehemently on Nicias to give up the command, and roared aloud at the other to go on board. Unable now to extricate himself, he intimated his acceptance of the employ; and standing forth, averred that ‘he was not under the least dread of the Lacedæmonians; would not be accompanied by so much as one Athenian; but would take only what Lemnians and Imbrians were at hand, and those targeteers who were come to their aid from Ænus, and the four hundred archers from other places. With these,’ he said, ‘added to the military force already at Pylus, he would either in the space of twenty days bring off all the Lacedæmonians alive, or put them all to death on the spot.’

This big way of talking raised a laugh among the people: all men of sense however were not a little delighted. They concluded they should compass by it one of these two desirable ends; either to rid themselves effectually of Cleon, which they chiefly expected;

or, should they be disappointed of this, to get those Lacedæmonians into their power.¹

Having thus transacted the requisite points in the public assembly, where the Athenians had awarded the expedition to him by a formal decree, and Demosthenes, at Cleon's own request, was joined in the commission of commanders at Pylus, he hastened to his post with the utmost speed. His reason for associating Demosthenes in the command was owing to some notice received that he was bent on landing on the island; as the soldiers, terribly incommoded by the straitness of their stations, and resembling be-

¹ The honor of Athens was very deeply concerned in the point, which had been the subject of this day's debate in the assembly of the people, and yet it has turned out a mere comic scene. The dignity of the republic had never been well supported on these occasions, since the death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all kind of drollery and scurrility into the debates; and it was now become quite the same thing to the people, whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He has now railed Nicias, though none but a person of so diffident and fearful a temper as Nicias could so have been railed, out of an honorable command; and then is laughed himself into it; and though an arrant poltroon, is metamorphosed into a general of the first class, and soon after swells into a very hero. However, the Athenian good sense, whatever turn Thucydides gives it, can hardly be justified on this occasion in thrusting so important a commission on Cleon purely for a joke. Plutarch says they always bore this impudent and mad way of talking, because it was humorous and diverting. Once, when the assembly had been met some time, and the people had sat long expecting his coming, at length he made his appearance with a garland on his head, and begged the favor of them to adjourn till to-morrow, 'For at present,' said he, 'I am not at leisure, since I have sacrificed to-day, and must entertain my friends.' A loud laugh ensued at his impudence, and then they rose and adjourned. This affair of Pylus was, however, far from a jocular point; and the Athenians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had not Cleon been wise enough to associate Demosthenes with him in the command.

sieged more than besiegers, were eager for this bold adventure. Demosthenes was animated more to the attempt because the island had lately been set on fire. Before this accident, as it had been quite covered over with wood, and was pathless, because ever uninhabited, he durst not think of such a step, and judged all these circumstances to be for the enemy's advantage: for, though a more numerous army should have landed against them, they were enabled terribly to annoy them from posts undescribed. What errors might be committed, or how large their strength, might be more easily concealed on that side by the covert of the woods; whereas all the errors of his own army would lie clear and open to observation, when the enemy might suddenly attack, and in what quarter they pleased, since battle must be intirely in their own option. On the other side, should he force them to a close engagement on rough and woody ground, the smaller number, by being skilled in the passes, he imagined, must prove too hard for a superior number without such experience; that by this means his own force, merely on account of its numbers, might be imperceptibly destroyed, as it could not be discerned which part of it was hardest pressed, and stood most in need of support.

These inward suggestions were more prevalent in the mind of Demosthenes from the remembrance of his Ætolian defeat, which was partly owing to the woods amongst which he engaged. But as the narrowness of their station had necessitated his soldiers to land sometimes on the skirts of the island, and under the cover of an advanced guard, to dress their repast, a soldier, though intirely without design, set the wood on fire, which spread but slowly, till a brisk gale happening to arise, the greatest part of it was unexpectedly de-

stroyed by the flames. Demosthenes, having gained by this means a clearer view of the Lacedæmonians, found them more numerous than from the quantity of victuals sent in by stipulation he was used to compute them. He then judged it highly to concern the Athenians to exert their utmost efforts: and, as the island was now become more opportune for a descent, he got every thing in readiness for its execution, having sent for a supply of men from the adjacent confederates, and busied himself about all the dispositions needful for success. He had farther received an express from Cleon notifying his approach; who now, at the head of the supply he himself had demanded, arrived at Pylus. No sooner were they joined, than they despatched a herald to the camp on the continent, demanding—‘ Whether they were willing to order their people in the island to surrender their arms and persons, without risking extremities, on condition to be kept under an easy confinement till the whole dispute could be properly accommodated?’—This being positively refused, they remained quiet one day longer; but on the succeeding day, having embarked their whole strength of heavy-armed on board a few vessels, they put out by night, and a little before the ensuing dawn landed on each side of the island, both from the main sea and the harbor, amounting in the whole to eight hundred men in heavy armor. They advanced with their utmost speed towards the first guard on the island. This was done in pursuance of a previous disposition; for this first guard consisted of about thirty heavy-armed: the main body under Epitadas posted about the centre, where the ground was most level and watery: and another party guarded the extremity of the island facing Pylus, which towards the sea was a rocky cliff, and by land altogether impregnable. On the top far-

ther off this cliff was seated a fort, built some ages before of stones picked carefully for the purpose. This they judged might be serviceable to them, should they be forced to shelter themselves from superior violence. In this manner was the enemy posted.

The Athenians immediately, in their first career, put the whole advanced guard to the sword, having surprised them yet in their huts, and but seeking to lay hold of their arms. Their landing was yet undiscovered, since the enemy judged their vessels to be only the usual guard which was every night in motion.

No sooner also was the dawn completely broke than the remainder of the Athenian force was landed from a number of vessels, somewhat more than seventy. All the mariners came ashore, in their respective distinctions of arms, excepting the rowers of the lowest bench.¹ They were eight hundred archers, and a body no less numerous of targeteers. The Messenian auxiliaries attended, and all in general who had been employed at Pylus, except such as were necessarily detained for the guard of the fortress.

According to a disposition formed by Demosthenes, they advanced in separate bodies, consisting of near

¹ It is in the original, excepting the thalamii. The rowers on the different benches were distinguished by a peculiar name. Those of the uppermost were called thanitæ; those of the middle, zeugitæ; and those of the lowest, thalamii. The labor of the thalamii was the least, though most constant, because of their nearness to the water, and the shortness of their oars. Much more strength and skill were required on the upper benches, and most of all on the uppermost, who for that reason had better pay. Those on the lowest bench seem to have been mere drudges at the oar, and qualified for nothing better; the others were more complete seamen, and ready on all occasions for the duty both of rowing and fighting.

two hundred, more or less, and took possession of all the eminences. The design was, thus to reduce the enemy to a plunge of distress by surrounding them on all sides, and puzzling them in their choice which party first to make head against, that at the sight of numbers on all sides they might be quite confounded; and, should they then attack the body in their front, they might be harassed by others in their rear; or, should they wheel towards those on either flank, they might be exposed to the bodies both in front and rear. Which way soever the enemy might turn, they were sure to have behind them the light-armed and less martial of their opponents, infesting them with their bows, and darts, and stones. These would do execution from a distance: an enemy could not possibly engage with them; since even flying they would prevail, and when the enemy retreated would return briskly to their work: with so much address had Demosthenes previously planned the order of landing, and in close adherence to it brought them now to action.

The body commanded by Epitadas, and which was the bulk of the whole force in the island, when they saw their advanced guard intirely cut off, and the enemy advancing to attack them next, drew up in order, and marched towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, designing to engage them: for the latter was so placed as to oppose them in front: the light-armed were posted on either side of their flanks, and in the rear. But against these heavy-armed they could not possibly come to action, or gain an opportunity to exert their own distinguishing skill: for the light-armed, pouring in their darts on either of their flanks, compelled them to halt; and their opposites would not move forwards to meet them, but stood quiet in their

post. Such indeed of the light-armed as adventured in any quarter to run up near their ranks, were instantly put to flight: however, they soon faced about, and continued their annoyance. They were not encumbered with any weight of armour; their agility easily conveyed them beyond the reach of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever left desert, had never been levelled by culture. In such spots the Lacedæmonians, under the load of their arms, could not possibly pursue. In this kind of skirmish, therefore, they were for a small space of time engaged.

When the Lacedæmonians had no longer sufficient agility to check the attacks of these skirmishing parties, the light-armed soon took notice that they slackened in their endeavors to beat them off. It was then that their own appearance, many times more large than that of their foes, and the very sight of themselves began to animate them with excess of courage. Experience had now lessened that terror in which they had been used to regard this foe. They now had met with no rough reception from them, which fell out quite contrary to what they firmly expected at their first landing, when their spirits had sunk very low at the thought, that it was against Lacedæmonians. Contempt ensued; and embodying, with a loud shout they rushed on them; pouring in stones, arrows, and darts, whatever came first to hand. At such a shout, accompanied with so impetuous a charge, astonishment seized their foes quite unpractised in such a form of engagement; at the same time the ashes of the wood, which had been burnt, were mounting largely into the air. So that now each lost the sight of what was close before him, under the showers of darts and stones thrown by such numbers, and whirling along in a cloud of dust.

Amidst so many difficulties the Lacedæmonians now were sorely distressed. The safeguards on their heads and breasts were no longer proof against the arrows, and their javelins were broken to pieces when poised for throwing. They were quite at a loss for some means of defence; they were debarred the prospect of what was passing just before them; and the shouts of the enemy were so loud that they could no longer hear any orders. Danger thus surrounding them on all sides, they quite despaired of the possibility of such resistance as might earn their safety. At last, a great part of that body being wounded, because obliged to adhere firmly to the spot on which they stood, embodying close, they retreated towards the fort on the skirt of the island, which lay at no great distance, and to their guard which was posted there. But when once they began to move off, the light-armed, growing more resolute, and shouting louder than ever, pressed hard on their retreat; and whatever Lacedæmonian fell within their reach, in the whole course of the retreat, was instantly slaughtered. The bulk of them with difficulty recovered the fort, and in concert with the guard posted there drew up in order to defend it, in whatever quarter it might possibly be assaulted. The Athenians, speedily coming up, were hindered by the natural site of the place from forming a circle and besetting it on all sides. Advancing therefore directly forwards, they endeavored to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long time, for the greatest part of the day, both sides persisted in the contest, under the painful pressures of battle, thirst, and a burning sun. No efforts were spared by the assailants to drive them from the eminence; nor by the defendants to maintain their post. But here the Lacedæmonians defended themselves with more ease than

in the preceding engagement, because now they could not be encompassed on their flanks.

When the dispute could not thus be brought to a decision, the commander of the Messenians, addressing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, assured them, ‘they took a deal of pains to no manner of purpose; but would they be persuaded to put under his guidance a party of the archers and light-armed, to get a round-about way on the enemy’s rear by a track which he himself could find, he was confident he could force an entrance.’ Having received the party he demanded, marching off from a spot undescried by the Lacedæmonians in order to conceal the motion, and continuing to mount higher and higher along the ridge of rock that lay on the verge of the island, in the quarter where the Lacedæmonians, depending on its natural strength, had placed no guard, with great difficulty and fatigue he got behind them undiscovered. Now showing himself on a sudden on the summit and in their rear, he astonished the enemy with this unexpected appearance; and his friends, who now beheld what they so earnestly looked for, he very much emboldened. The Lacedæmonians were now exposed to the missive weapons on both sides; and (if a point of less consequence may be compared to one of greater) were in a state parallel to that of their countrymen at Thermopylæ.¹ For those being hemmed in by the Per-

¹ The famous three hundred Spartans with king Leonidas at their head, who stopped the vast army of Xerxes at the pass of Thermopylæ, and at length perished all to a man. They were all afterwards entombed on the spot where they fell, with this short epitaph:—

Tell, traveller, at Sparta what you saw,
That here we lie obedient to her law.

The same spirit and resolution was at this time generally expected from the Spartans, now encompassed round about by their enemies, in the isle of Sphacteria.

sians in a narrow pass, were utterly destroyed : these now, in like manner beset on both sides, were no longer able to contend. Being but a handful of men opposed to superior numbers, and much weakened in their bodies for want of food, they quitted their post. And thus the Athenians became masters of all the approaches.

But Cleon and Demosthenes, assuredly convinced that should the foe give way too fast, it would only conduce to their expeditious slaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, began to stop their fury, and to draw off their men. They were desirous to carry them alive to Athens, in case they would so far hearken to the voice of a herald as to throw down their arms. dejected as they must be in spirit and overpowered with the instant danger. It was accordingly proclaimed, that ' such as were willing should deliver up their arms and their persons to the Athenians, to be disposed of at discretion.'

When this was heard, the greater number threw down their bucklers and waved their hands, in token of accepting the proposal. A suspension of arms immediately took place ; and a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon the son of Pharax on the other. Of those who had preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was the first, had been slain, and Hippagretes, who was his successor, lying as dead among the slain, though he had yet life in him, Styphon was now the third appointed to take the command on him, according to the provision made by their law, in case their generals drop. Styphon intimated his desire of leave to send over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. This the Athenians refused ; but however called over some heralds to him from the continent. Messages

passed backwards and forwards twice or thrice ; but the last who crossed over from the Lacedæmonians on the continent brought this determination :—‘the Lacedæmonians permit you to take care of your own concerns, provided you submit to nothing base.’ In consequence of this, after a short consultation with one another apart, they delivered up their arms and their persons. The remainder of the day and the succeeding night the Athenians confined them under a strong guard. But the day following, having erected a trophy on the island, they got themselves in readiness to sail away, and distributed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the triremes. The Lacedæmonians, having obtained permission by a herald, fetched off their dead.

The number of those who were slain, and those who were taken alive, stood thus : they who had thrown themselves into the island amounted in the whole to four hundred and twenty heavy-armed. Of these, three hundred, wanting eight, were carried off alive ; the rest had been destroyed. Among the prisoners were about one hundred and twenty Spartans. The number of Athenians slain was inconsiderable ; for it was not a standing fight. The whole space that these men were besieged in the island from the engagement at sea till the battle in the island, was seventy-two days. Twenty of these, during the absence of the ambassadors to negotiate an accommodation, they were supplied with food : the remainder of the time they were fed by such as got over by stealth. Nay, meal and other eatables were found in the island, even when all was over. Their commander, Epitadas, had made a more sparing distribution than his stores required.

Now the Athenians and Peloponnesians respectively drew off their forces from Pylus to return home ; and

the promise of Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed ; for within the twenty days he brought them prisoners to Athens, and made his words good.¹

The expectation of Greece was more disappointed by this event than by any other occurrence whatever in the series of the war. It was generally presumed that neither famine nor any extremity could have reduced these Lacedæmonians to deliver up their arms, but that sword in hand, and fighting to the last gasp, they would have bravely perished. They could not afterwards believe that those who surrendered were like to those who were slain. Some time after, a soldier in one of the confederate bands of the Athenians, demanding with a sneer, of one of them who were taken prisoners in the island, ‘if the slain were not men of true gallantry and courage?’ the other replied, that ‘a spindle (by which he meant an arrow) would be valuable indeed, if it knew how to distinguish the brave;’ intimating by this answer, that the slain were such as stones and darts despatched in the medley of battle.

When the prisoners were brought to Athens, it was the public resolution there ‘to keep them in bonds, until some definitive treaty could be agreed on : and

¹ It should be added here that he also robbed for the present a very able and gallant officer of the praise he merited on this occasion. The whole affair of Pylus was planned, carried into execution, and brought to a successful and glorious issue by the conduct and bravery of Demosthenes. Aristophanes, in *The Knights*, has made a low comic character of the latter, and introduced him venting sad complaints against Cleon for pilfering the honor from him. ‘This Paphlagonian,’ says he, ‘has snatched from every one of us whatever nice thing we had got to suit the palate of our lord and master, the people. It is but the other day, I myself had cooked up a noble pasty of Lacedæmonians at Pylus, when this vilest of scoundrels came thither, pilfered it away from me, and has served it up to table as if it was of his own dressing.’

if previously to this the Peloponnesians should repeat their inroad into the Attic territory, they should all undergo a public execution.' They established also a garrison for Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus sending thither the most proper of their own people, as into their own native country, for Pylus is a part of the ancient Messenia, infested Laconia with depredations, and did them vast damage, the more because they spoke the same dialect.¹

As for the Lacedæmonians, who never knew before what it was to be thus plundered, war in such a shape being new to them, and their helots deserting continually to the foe; apprehensive, farther, lest such unusual proceedings within their own district might draw worse consequences after them, they had a painful sense of their present situation. This compelled them to send their embassies to Athens; desirous, however, at the same time, to conceal what they really thought of their own state, and spare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus and their people. But the Athenians grew more unreasonable in their demands, and after many journeys to and fro, sent them away with an absolute denial. Such was the course of proceedings in relation to Pylus.

The same summer, and immediately on the close of the former event, the Athenians set out to invade Corinth with a fleet of eighty ships, which carried two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and with some horse-transports, on board of which were two hundred horsemen. They were also attended by some of their confederates, by the Milesians and Andrians, and Carysthians. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, with

¹ The Doric.

two colleagues, commanded this armament. At the early dawn of morning they came to anchor between Cherronesus and Reitus, on the shore of that place which the Solygian hill overhangs; of which formerly the Dorians possessing themselves, made war on the Corinthians then in Corinth, who were of Æolian descent. On that eminence there is now a village called Solygia. From the shore where the armament came now to an anchor, this village was distant about twelve;¹ the city of Corinth, sixty;² and the isthmus, twenty stadia.³

The Corinthians, who had already been advised from Argos of the approach of the Athenian armament, had long since, by way of prevention, drawn their whole force together at the isthmus, excepting what was in employ without the isthmus, and the five hundred absent in the guard of Ambracia and Lencadia. With all the rest of their people able to bear arms, they were posted on the isthmus to watch the approach of the Athenians. But when the Athenian fleet had passed by undiscovered by favor of the night, and signals notified their approach elsewhere, leaving half their force at Cenchrea to obstruct any attempt of the Athenians on Crommyon, they marched with all speed against the enemy. Battus, one of their commanders, for there were two such in the field, at the head of a separate body marched up to the open village of Solygia in order to defend it, whilst Lycophron, with the remainder, advanced to the charge. The Corinthians fell first on the right wing of the Athenians, who were but just landed before Cherronesus, and then proceeded to engage the whole of that army. The action

¹ Near 1½ mile.

² Six miles.

³ Two miles.

was warm, and fought hand to hand. The right wing, consisting of the Athenians, and also the Carysthians, who were drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a warm reception, and with much difficulty repulsed them. Retreating therefore upwards to a wall built of stone, for the ground was a continued ascent, and being there above the enemy, they annoyed them with stones; and having sung the pean, rushed down on them again. The Athenians having stood the shock, they engaged a second time hand to hand: but a band of Corinthians being come up to the support of their own left wing, occasioned the rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea-side. But the Athenians and Carysthians now turned again, and beat them off from the ships.

In other parts of the action the dispute was resolute on both sides, especially where the right wing of the Corinthians, with Lycophron at its head, was engaging the left wing of the Athenians. They were apprehensive the enemy would endeavor to force their way to the village of Solygia: for a considerable space the battle was obstinate, neither side giving way; but at length, through the advantage on the Athenian side of being assisted by a party of horse, whereas their opponents had none, the Corinthians were broke and driven up the ascent; where, grounding their arms, they came down no more to the charge, but remained in a quiet posture. In this rout of the right wing numbers of the Corinthians perished, and Lycophron their general. But the rest of the body had the good fortune to make a safe retreat, and so to secure themselves on the eminence as they could not be briskly pursued, and were not compelled to move off with precipitation. When the Athenians perceived that the enemy would no more

return to the charge, they rifed the bodies of the foes whom they had slain, and carried off their own dead, and then without loss of time erected their trophy.

That division of the Corinthians which had been posted at Cenchrea to prevent any attempt on Crommyon, had the view of the battle intercepted from them by the mountain Oneius : but when they saw the cloud of dust, and thence knew what was doing, they marched full speed towards the spot. The aged inhabitants, also, when they were informed of the battle, rushed out of Corinth to succor their own people. The Athenians perceiving the approach of such numerous bodies, and judging them to be succors sent up by the neighboring Peloponnesians, threw themselves immediately on board their ships, with what spoil they had taken, and the bodies of their own dead excepting two, which not finding in this hurry, they left behind. They were no sooner re-embarked than they crossed over to the adjacent islands, from whence they despatched a herald to demand leave, which was granted, to fetch off the dead bodies they had left behind.¹

¹ This incident is related by Plutarch, in the life of Nicias, as a proof of the great piety and humanity of Nicias. His asking leave to fetch off these two bodies was, according to that writer, an actual renunciation of the victory ; since it was against all rules for persons who had condescended to such a submission to erect a trophy. But, without disparaging the good qualities of Nicias, or his obedience to the institutions of his country in regard to the dead, which were ever most sacredly observed, it may be questioned whether he renounced the victory on this occasion. Thucydides says the trophy was already erected, which ascertained, without doubt, the honor of the victory, and nothing is said of its demolition by the Corinthians, when they received this request of truce from Nicias. His re-embarking in a hurry seems a distinct affair. It had no connexion with the late battle, which had been clearly and fairly won ; but was owing to a fresh army coming into the field on the side of the

The number of Corinthians slain in the battle was two hundred and twelve; that of Athenians somewhat less than fifty.

The Athenians, leaving the islands, appeared the same day before Crommyon, situated in its territory, and distant from the city of Corinth one hundred and twenty stadia.¹ They landed and ravaged the country, and that night reposed themselves there. The day following they sailed along the coast; first to Epidaurus, and, after a kind of descent there, arrived at Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and Trœzene. Possessing themselves there of the isthmus of Cherronesus, on which Methone is situated, they ran up a wall across it, and fixed a garrison of continuance in that post, which for the future extended their depredations over all the districts of Trœzene, Halias and Epidaurus: but the fleet, when once this post was sufficiently secured, sailed away for Athens.

During the space of time which coincided with these transactions, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who, with the ships of the Athenians, had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the Corcyreans of the city, marching out against those who were posted on the mount of Istone; that party who, repassing soon after the sedition, were at this time master of the country, and committed sad ravage. Accordingly they assaulted that post, and carried it by storm. The defendants, who had fled away in a body towards another eminence, were soon forced to capitulate; ‘giving up their auxiliaries, and then giving up their own arms; to be proceeded with after-

enemy. This stopped him indeed from gaining any fresh honor, but surely did not deprive him of what he was already possessed of.

¹ About twelve English miles.

wards at the pleasure of the people of Athens.' The commanders removed them all for safe custody into the isle of Ptychia, till they could conveniently be conveyed to Athens; with this proviso, that 'if any one person should be caught in an attempt to get off, the whole number should forfeit the benefit of the capitulation.'

But the leaders of the populace at Corcyra, apprehending that the Athenians, should they be sent to Athens, might possibly save their lives, contrived the following machination. They tampered successfully with some of those who were confined in the isle, by the means of some trusty agents whom they sent privately amongst them, and instructed that 'with great professions of regard for them, they should insinuate no other resource was left for them but to make their escape with all possible expedition, and that themselves would undertake to provide them with a bark, for it was the certain resolution of the Athenian commanders to give them up to the fury of the Corcyrean populace.' When they had given ear to these suggestions, and were on board the bark thus treacherously provided for them, and so were apprehended in the very act of departure, the articles of capitulation came at once to an end, and they were all given up to the Corcyreans. The Athenian commanders did not highly contribute to the success of this treachery; since, in order to make it go down more easily, and to lessen the fears of the agents in the plot, they had publicly declared that 'the conveyance of those persons to Athens by other hands would highly chagrin them, because then, whilst they were attending their duty in Sicily, others would run away with all the honor.' The Corcyreans had them no sooner in their power than they shut them up in a spacious edifice.

Hence afterwards they brought them out by twenties, and having formed two lines of soldiers, in all military habiliments, facing one another, they compelled them to walk between the lines, chained one to another, and receiving blows and wounds as they passed along from those who formed the lines, and struck at pleasure so soon as they perceived the objects of their hatred. They were followed by others who carried scourges, and lashed those forward who moved not readily along. Threescore persons had been brought forth and destroyed in this manner, before those who remained in the edifice became sensible of their fate: for they had hitherto imagined, that those who fetched them out did it merely to shift their confinement. But when they learned the truth from some person or other whom they could not disbelieve, they called out aloud on the Athenians, and implored as a favor to be put to death by them. To stir from the place of their confinement they now absolutely refused, and averred, that to the utmost of their power they would hinder every body from coming in to them. But the Corcyreans had not the least inclination to force an entrance by the doors. They mounted on the top of the edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the tiles, and shot arrows down on them. The others protected themselves to the best of their power; and many of them were employed in making away with themselves by cramming the arrows shot from above down their throats. Others tearing away the cordage from the beds which happened to be within, or twisting such ropes as they could from shreds of their own garments, so strangling themselves to death. No method was omitted during the greatest part of the night (for night dropped down on this scene of horror) till, either despatched by their own contrivance, or shot to death by

those above, their destruction was completely finished. So soon as it was day the Corcyreans, having thrown their bodies on heaps into carriages, removed them out of the city. But their wives, so many as had been taken prisoners in company with their husbands, they adjudged to slavery for life.

In this manner the Corcyreans from the mountains were destroyed by the people; and a sedition so extensive brought to this tragical period, so far at least as relates to the present war. For nothing of the same nature broke out afterwards so remarkable as to need a particular relation.

The Athenians departed from Corcyra, made the best of their way for Sicily, whither they were bound at first setting out, and prosecuted the war there in concert with their allies.

In the close of this summer the Athenians on the station of Naupactus, marching in conjunction with the Acarnanians, possessed themselves of Anactorium, a city of the Corinthians, situated on the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It was put into their hands by treachery. In consequence of this, the Corinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place repeopled by new inhabitants invited thither from all parts of Acarnania: and the summer ended.

The ensuing winter, Aristides the son of Archippus, one of those who commanded the squadrons which the Athenians had put out to raise contributions among their dependants, apprehended Artaphernes, a noble Persian, at Eion on the river Strymon. He was going to Lacedæmon on a commission from the king. Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had his letters, which were written in Assyrian, translated and read in public. Their contents were large; but the principal was this passage addressed to the Lacedæ-

monians; that ‘ he was not yet properly informed what it was they requested of him. For though he had been attended by frequent embassies, yet they did not all agree in their demands. If therefore they were desirous to make an explicit declaration, they should send some of their body to him in company with this Persian.’ But the Athenians afterwards sent Artaphernes back to Ephesus in a trireme, and with an embassy of their own, who meeting at that place with the news that Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes was lately dead, (for about this time that monarch died) the ambassadors returned back to Athens.

The same winter also the Chians demolished their new fortifications. The Athenians had expressly ordered it, suspecting that they were intent on some innovating schemes.* It availed nothing that they had lately given the Athenians all possible securities, and the strongest assurances that they would in no shape attempt or think of innovations. And thus the winter ended; and with it the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history, was brought to a conclusion.

YEAR VIII.—Early in the following summer, at the time of the new moon, the sun was partially eclipsed; and in the beginning of the same month the shock of an earthquake was felt.

The fugitives from Mitylene and Lesbos in general, who to a great number had sheltered themselves on the continent, assembled in a body, and having hired some additional succors in Peloponnesus, and drawn them over safely from thence, surprised Rhætium; but, in consideration of two thousand Phocean staters¹ paid

* Above 1800L sterling.

immediately down, they restored it again undamaged. This being done, they marched next against Antandrus, and got possession of it by the treachery of a party within the city, who betrayed it to them. It was farther their intention to set at liberty those cities styled the Actean, which had formerly been possessed by the Mityleneans, but were now in the hands of the Athenians. But their principal view was the possession of Antandrus, which once effectually secured, for it lay convenient for the building of ships, as it had plenty of timber, and Mount Ida stood just above it, they would then be amply furnished with all the expedients of war; nay, might act offensively from thence; might terribly annoy Lesbos, which lies near it, and reduce the Æolian fortresses along the coast. This was the plan, which now they were intent to put in execution.

The same summer the Athenians, with a fleet of sixty ships, and taking with them two thousand heavy-armed, a few horsemen, the Milesians, and others of their confederates, made an expedition against Cythera. The command was lodged with Nicias, son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, son of Diotrepes, and Autocles, son of Tolmæus. Cythera is an island: it lies on the coast of Laconia, over-against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedæmonians, resorting thither from the neighboring coast. A magistrate was sent over yearly from Sparta by the style of judge of Cythera; the garrison of heavy-armed established there was regularly relieved; and no care omitted in the good government and management of the place. It was the port which their trading ships first entered in the return from Egypt and Libya. It was the chief security of Laconia against those piratical parties which might infest it from the sea, from whence alone they are

capable of doing them any mischief: for by its situation it has intirely the command of the seas of Sicily and Crete. The Athenian armament therefore arriving here, with a detachment of ten ships and two thousand heavy-armed, surprised a maritime town which is called Scandea. With the rest of their force they made a descent on that part of the island which is opposite to Malea, and advanced toward the city of Cythera, situated also on the sea, and they found immediately that all the inhabitants were drawn out into the field in readiness to receive them. An engagement ensued, wherein the Cythereans maintained their ground for a small space of time, but then turning about, fled amain into their citadel. They soon afterwards capitulated with Nicias and his colleagues, submitting to the Athenians at discretion, barring only the penalty of death. Some of the Cythereans had beforehand obtained a conference with Nicias. This rendered the capitulation more easy and expeditious, and not only the present, but all future points were by this means speedily and satisfactorily adjusted: for the Athenians insisted that they should evacuate Cythera, because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay so conveniently on the Laconic coast. The accommodation being once perfected, the Athenians, having secured Scandea, the fortress situated on the harbor, and fixed a garrison in Cythera, stood away for Asine and Helas, and most of the adjacent places on the coast. There they made descents, and reposing themselves in the nights at the most convenient of those places, they spent about seven days in ravaging the country.

The Lacedæmonians, though they saw the Athenians had possessed themselves of Cythera, and expected farther that they would proceed to make more such descents on their territories, yet nowhere drew to,

gether in a body to repulse them. They only stationed their parties of guard in such posts as were of greatest importance. In other respects they exerted their utmost vigilance, being under apprehension that the very form of their government was in danger of subversion. Their loss in Sphacteria was unexpected, and great indeed. Pylus was now in the hands of the enemy, as was also Cythera. War was bursting in on them on all sides with irresistible impetuosity. This compelled them, contrary to their usual maxims, to form a body of four hundred horse and archers. If they were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, at this juncture they were more feelingly so, when they saw the necessity of entering the lists, contrary to all that practice of war to which they had been inured, in a naval contest, and in this against the Athenians, whose passion it was to compute as so much loss whatever they left unattempted. Their general misfortune besides, which so suddenly and so fast had poured in on them, had thrown them into the utmost consternation. They excessively dreaded the weight of such another calamity, as they had been sensible of the blow at Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durst no longer think of fighting; nay, whatever measures they concerted, they at once desponded of success, as their minds, accustomed until of late to an uninterrupted career of good fortune, were now foreboding nothing but disappointments. Thus, for the most part, whilst the Athenians were extending their devastations all along their coast, they remained inactive. Each party on guard, though the enemy made a descent in the face of their post, knowing themselves inferior in number, and sadly dispirited, made no offer to check them. One party indeed which posted near Cotyra and Aphrodisia, perceiving the light-armed of the enemy to be straggling,

ran speedily to charge them; but when the heavy-armed advanced to their support, they retreated with so much precipitation, that some, though few, of them were killed, and their arms rifled. The Athenians, after erecting a trophy, re-embarked, and repassed to Cynthera.

From thence they sailed again along the coast to the Limerian Epidaurus; and, after ravaging part of that district, they arrived at Thyrea, which, though it lies in the district called Cynuria, is the frontier town which parts Argia and Laconia. This place belonged to the Lacedæmonians, who had assigned it for the residence of the exiled Æginetæ, in requital of the services they had done them at the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the helots; and farther, because, though subject to the Athenians, they had ever firmly abided in the Lacedæmonian interest. The Æginetæ, thus again invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the fortification on the sea-side, which they were busy in throwing up, and retreated into the city, which was the place of their residence, seated higher up at the distance of about ten stadia¹ from the shore. A party of Lacedæmonians had been posted there to assist those who were employed in the new fortification; and yet, though earnestly pressed by the Æginetæ, they refused to accompany them within their walls, being averse to run the risk of a new blockade. They chose rather to retreat towards the eminences, as they judged themselves disabled by the inferiority of their number from facing the enemy, and remained there in a state of inaction.

By this time the Athenians, having completed their landing, and advanced with their whole force, took

¹ About a mile.

Thyrea by storm. They set the city in flames, and destroyed whatever was within it. Such of the *Æginetæ* as survived the instant carnage they carried prisoners to Athens; and with them Tantalus, son of Patrocles, who commanded there as general for the Lacedæmonians. He had been wounded, and so taken prisoner. They also carried thither some few persons whom they had taken in Cythera, such as for its security it was expedient to remove. These the Athenians after a consultation decreed 'to be disposed of in the islands; but the rest of the Cythereans still to occupy their own lands, subjected to the yearly tribute of four talents;¹ but the *Æginetæ*, as many as had been taken prisoners, to be all instantly put to death,' to gratify that eternal rancor they bore them, 'and Tantalus to be kept in prison along with his countrymen taken in Sphacteria.'

The same summer a suspension of arms was agreed on in Sicily; first, between the Camarineans and Ge-loans; and then, the other Sicilians, holding a general congress at Gela, whither the ambassadors from the several states resorted, entered into conferences about the terms of a general reconciliation. Many different expedients were proposed on all sides, and many disputes arose, each insisting on a reparation suitable to their own private sense of grievance. But Hermocrates,² the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, who labored

¹ Seven hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling.

² This great and accomplished Syracusan seems to be ushered into this history with peculiar dignity, as the very mouth of Sicily, exhorting them all to concord and unanimity, and teaching them the method of securing the welfare and glory of their common country, on the noblest plan. This is noted merely to draw on him the attention of the reader. He will act afterwards in the most illustrious scenes, and show himself on all occasions a man of true honor and probity, a firm and disinterested patriot, an excellent statesman, and a

most of any at a firm reunion, delivered his sentiments thus:—

‘I am here the representative, ye men of Sicily, of one, and not the meanest, of the Sicilian states, nor yet the most exhausted by war; and what I am going to propose is calculated for, and will, I am convinced, most effectually secure the welfare of our common country. And what need is there now to run over in minute detail the calamities inseparable from war, in the hearing of men who have experienced them all? None ever plunge headlong into these through an utter ignorance of them; nor, when the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are men used to be deterred by fear. The acquisitions proposed in the latter case are generally imagined to overbalance dangers: and the former choose rather to submit to hazards than suffer diminution of their present enjoyments. Yet, where the parties, actuated by these different views, embroil themselves at a juncture when it is impossible to succeed, exhortations to a mutual agreement are then most highly expedient.

‘To be influenced by such exhortations must at present be highly for the advantage of us all: for it was the strong desire of fixing our own separate views on a firm establishment, which at first embroiled us in this war, and which at present raises such mutual altercations even during our endeavors to effect an accommodation: and in fine, unless matters can be so equally adjusted as to satisfy all parties, we shall again have recourse to arms. But then, we ought to recollect, that not merely for securing our separate interests, if we would act like men of sense, is this

most able commander. The Athenians never had a more determined or a more generous enemy. But that will not hinder our historian from representing him in all his merit.

present congress opened; but, to concert the best measures within our reach to preserve, if possible, our country from falling, and, as I judge, in great danger of falling a sacrifice to Athenian ambition. It is, to convince you how unnecessary a reunion is, not so much from what I can urge, as from the light these very Athenians themselves hold out before you. Possessed of a power far superior to any other Grecians, here they lie amongst us with a few ships to note down our indiscretions; and, under the plausible pretext of alliance, though with malice lurking in their hearts, they are studying to improve them in a specious manner to their own advantage. For should war be again our option, and in it should the assistance of men be accepted, who, though uninvited, would be glad to invade us, whilst we are harassing and exhausting one another, and cutting open for these Athenians a road to our subjection, it is much to be apprehended that, when once they behold our strength at the lowest ebb, they will pay us a visit with more formidable armaments, and exert their utmost endeavors to complete our destruction.

' It becomes each party amongst us, provided we know what is really our interest, to form alliances, and not to launch into hazardous attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to others than to prejudice what themselves at present possess; and to rest assured that sedition must ruin our several states; nay, Sicily itself, of which we the joint possessors are ready, are all of us ready, to be supplanted by hostile treachery, whilst mutually embroiled in our domestic quarrels. It is high time we were convinced of this, that every individual might be reconciled with his neighbor, and community with community, and all in general combine together to preserve the whole of Sicily; that our

ears be deaf to the mischievous suggestions; that those amongst us of Doric descent are enemies to every thing that is Attic ; whilst those of Chalcidic, because of that Ionian affinity, are sure of their protection. The Athenians invade us not from private enmity, because we are peopled here from these divided races, but to gratify their lust after those blessings in which Sicily abounds, and which at present we jointly possess. Nay, this they have already clearly declared, by their ready compliance with the invitation of those of the Chalcidic race. For though they have never claimed assistance from hence by virtue of their natural attachments here, yet they have shown a greater readiness in support of those than any compact between them required. Yet though the Athenians be in this manner rapacious, in this manner politic, by me at least they ought to be forgiven ; since I blame not men who are greedy of empire, but such as are too eager to bend their necks to their yoke : because it is the constant never-failing turn of the human temper to control who will submit, but to make head against more powerful encroachments. As for us, who know these things, and yet will not timely provide against them, though each in this assembly be separately convinced that it demands our greatest attention to unite in dissipating a storm which threatens us all, we err strangely in our conduct ; especially, when its diversion might be so readily effected, would we only bring our private quarrels to an amicable determination ; for it is not from quarters of their own that the Athenians rush thus to annoy us, but from ground which belongs to those who invited them. Thus of course, without any intervening trouble, one war will not be terminated by another, but dissension will at once subside in peace. And these new comers, who under spe-

cious colors are here for our ruin, must return again with a disappointment, which they may as speciously palliate. So desirable a benefit will at once infallibly accrue from proper determination in regard to the Athenians.

' That peace is the greatest of human blessings, is truth which all the world allows: what hinders us then, why we should not firmly establish it with one another? or, do you rather imagine, that if the condition of one man be happy, and that of another be wretched, tranquillity will not contribute sooner than warfare to amend the state of the latter, and to preserve the state of the former from a sad reverse? or that peace is no better calculated to preserve unimpaired the honors and splendors of the happy, and all other blessings, which, should we descend to a minute detail, might largely be recounted, or might be set in the strongest light by opposing to them the calamities which ensue from war? Fix your minds therefore on these considerations that you may not overlook my admonitions, but in compliance with them look out respectively in time for expedients of prevention.

' In case it be presumed that success must result from power, without taking into debate the justice or violence of the cause, let me detect the dangerous fallacy of such a sanguine hope, which must be blasted in the end. Many are they, it is well known, who would have gratified their revenge on violent oppressors, and many who have exerted their utmost force for their own aggrandisement; yet the first, so far from accomplishing their revenge, have met destruction in its pursuit; and it has been the fate of the latter, instead of enlarging, to suffer the loss of what they already possessed; for revenge is not certain, because justly sought after to retaliate violence; nor is power

assured of its end because invigorated with sanguine expectation. Events are for the most part determined by the fallible unsteady balance of futurity ; which, though deceivable as deceit can be, yet holds out before us the most instructive hints : for thus, armed equally beforehand with needful apprehension, we embark into mutual contests with wise premeditation. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy dread of the yet invisible event, and awed on all sides by the terrors which the presence of these Athenians spreads amongst us ; deterred farther by these hopes already blasted, which assured us alternately of success against one another, had not they interfered to obstruct and control us ; let us send far away from Sicily these enemies that are hovering about us ; let us enter into firm and lasting union with one another ; at least, let us conclude a truce for so long a time as can possibly be agreed, and defer our own private disputes to a remote decision. In a word, let us acknowledge that, if my advice takes place, we shall continue free in our respective communities, where, masters of ourselves, and accountable to none besides, we shall be enabled to recompense both our friends and our foes according to their deserts. But, in case it be obstinately rejected, and the mischievous insinuations of others prevail, why then adieu henceforth to the just vindication of our own wrongs ; or, if we are violently bent on effecting it, we must strike up a friendship with unrelenting foes, and must range ourselves in opposition there, where nature has most closely attached us.

‘ For my own part, who now (as I observed at setting out) represent the greatest of the Sicilian states, and in this character am more accustomed to attack another than to defend myself, I here, in her name, conjure you to make use of conviction and unite together

in a speedy accommodation, nor so eagerly to thirst after the damage of our foes as to plunge ourselves into irreparable mischiefs. I am not conscious to myself of that foolish haughtiness of heart, which expects to be absolute in its own private will; or that fortune, whose master I am not, should attend my orders; but I am ready to give way to good sense and reason. And I require you all respectively thus to give way to one another, and not to wait till you are compelled to do so by your enemies. It can argue no baseness, for kinsmen to give way to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidean to others of his own race. Nay, what is most comprehensive, we are all neighbors, all joint inhabitants of the same land, a land washed round by the sea, and all styled by the same common name of Sicilians. Wars indeed in the course of time I foresee we shall wage on one another, and future conferences will again be held, and mutual friendship shall thus revive. But when foreigners invade us, let us be wise enough to unite our strength, and drive them from our shores; for to be weakened in any of our members, must endanger the destruction of the whole; and to such confederates and such mediators we will never for the future have recourse.

' If to such conduct we adhere, we shall immediately procure a double blessing for Sicily. We shall deliver her from the Athenians, and a domestic war. For the future we shall retain the free possession of her in our own hands, and more easily disconcert any projects that hereafter may be formed against her.'

The Sicilians acknowledged the weight of these arguments thus urged by Hermocrates, and all the several parties joined in one common resolution ' to put an end to the war, each retaining what they were at

present possessed of ; but the Morgantina should be restored to the Camarineans on the payment of a certain sum of money to the Syracusans.' Such also as were confederated with the Athenians, addressing themselves to the Athenian commanders, notified their own readiness to acquiesce in these terms, and their resolution to be comprehended in the same peace. These approving the measure, the last hand was put to the accommodation.

The Athenian fleet, which had no longer any business there, sailed away from Sicily. But the people at Athens manifested their displeasure against the commanders at their return home, by passing a sentence of banishment against Pythodorus and Sophocles, and subjecting Eurymedon, who was the third, to a pecuniary mulct ; as if, when able to have perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been bribed to desist. They had enjoyed so long a career of good fortune, that they imagined nothing could disconcert their schemes ; that enterprises of the greatest as well as of small importance, no matter whether adequately or insufficiently supported, must be ended to their wish. This was owing to the unexpected good luck with which most of their projects had of late succeeded, and now invigorated their expectations.

The same summer, the Megareans of the city of Megara, pressed hard by the Athenians, who constantly twice a year made an inroad into their territory with their whole united force ; harassed at the same time by their own outlaws, who having been ejected by the popular party in the train of a sedition, had settled at Pegæ, and from thence were continually plundering them, began to have some conference about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, that the city might not doubly be exposed to ruin. The friends of these

exiles; perceiving such a design to be in agitation, insisted more openly than ever that the affair should be regularly considered. The leaders of the people, being convinced that their own and the strength of the people united in their present low condition could not possibly overrule it, were so far influenced by their fears as to make a secret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, the son of Aiphro, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, ‘to put the city into their hands ;’ concluding they should be less endangered by such a step than by the restoration of the exiles whom they themselves had ejected. It was agreed, that in the first place the Athenians should take possession of the long walls ; these were eight stadia¹ in length, reaching down from the city to Nisaea their port, to prevent any succor which might be sent from Nisaea by the Peloponnesians, since there alone they kept their garrison for the security of Megara. After this, they promised their endeavors to put them in possession of the upper city. And this they would be able to effect more easily when the former point was once secured.

The Athenians therefore, when all was fixed and determined on both sides, crossed over by night to Minoa, the island of the Megareans, with six hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Hippocrates, and sat themselves down in a hollow, whence the bricks for the walls had been taken, and which lay near enough for their purpose ; whilst another body, under Demosthenes the other commander, consisting of light-armed Platæans and the Athenian patroles, concealed themselves near the temple of Mars, which lay still nearer. Not a soul within the city knew any thing of these motions, excepting those whose vigilance it concerned

¹ About three quarters of a mile.

this night to observe them. When the morning was ready to break, the plotters of Megara proceeded thus :

Through a series of time they had established a custom to have the gates of the long walls opened to them in the night, by carrying out a wherry on a carriage, which they persuaded the officers posted there they conveyed nightly down the ditch into the sea, and so went on a cruise. And before it was light, bringing it back again to the walls on the carriage, they conveyed it through the gates, that it might escape the notice of the Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means might be eluded, as they never could descry any boat in the harbor. The carriage was now at the gates, which were opened as usual for the reception of the wherry. This the Athenians observing, for this was the signal agreed on, came running from their place of ambush to take possession of the gates before they could be shut again. The very moment the carriage was between, and obstructed the closing them together, both they and the Megarean coadjutors put the watch which was posted at the gates to the sword. The Plataeans and patrolling parties under Demosthenes rushed in first to the spot where the trophy now stands, and having thus gained an entrance, for the Peloponnesians who were nearest had taken the alarm, the Plataeans made good their ground against those who attacked them, and secured the gates till the heavy-armed Athenians, who were coming up with all speed, had entered. Each of these Athenians afterwards, as fast as he got in, advanced along the wall. The Peloponnesian guards, though few in number, made head against them for a time : some of them soon dropped, and then the rest ran speedily off. They were dismayed at such an attack from their enemies in the

night; and, as the treacherous Megareans fought against them, they concluded that all the Megareans were combined together in betraying them. It happened farther that an Athenian herald had proclaimed of his own accord 'that such Megareans as were willing to side with the Athenians should throw down their arms.' When the Peloponnesians heard this they at once quitted their posts; and, seriously believing that all the Megareans had combined to betray them, fled amain into Nisaea.

At the time of morning's dawn, the long walls being thus surprised, and the Megareans within the city thrown into a tumult, the agents for the Athenians, in concert with all their accomplices in the plot, insisted on the necessity to throw open the city gates and march out to battle; since it had been agreed between them, that as soon as ever the gates were thus opened, the Athenians should rush in. There was a method to be observed on their side, in order to be distinguished; this was to besmear themselves with ointment, that they might receive no harm. Their security would have been greater had they opened the gates at once; for now four thousand heavy-armed Athenians and six hundred horsemen, who had marched in the night from Eleusis, according to a prior disposition, were at hand: but whilst the accomplices, properly besmeared, stood ready at the gates, one of their own party, who was privy to the whole plot, discovered it to the other Megareans. These, drawing up together, came forward in a body, and 'denied the expediency of marching out; since formerly, when stronger than now, they durst not hazard such a step, or running such a manifest risk of losing the city: and, should any one affirm the contrary, the point should be instantly determined by blows.' They gave not the least hint as if they had

discovered the design, but strenuously insisted that their own measure was most advisable, and stood firm together for the security of the gates. Thus it was no longer possible for the conspirators to put their plot in execution.

The Athenian commanders, being sensible that the project had been somehow crossed, and that they were not able themselves to take the city by storm, immediately ran up a wall to invest Nisaea ; concluding, that could they carry it before any succors came up, it would be impossible for Megara to hold out much longer. Iron and workmen, and all proper materials, were quickly supplied them from Athens. They began at the wall which they had lately surprised ; they ran it along for some time parallel with Megara, and then down to the sea on both sides of Nisaea. The work, both of ditch and wall, was divided amongst the army. They made use of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled some trees and wood, they strengthened what was weak with an additional palisade. The houses of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, served the use of turrets. This whole day they plied hard at the work ; and about the evening of the succeeding day it was nearly completed. The garrison within Nisaea was in great consternation. They labored already under a scarcity of provisions, which they had been used to fetch daily from the upper city. Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could not succor them with sufficient expedition, and imagining the Megareans were combined against them, they capitulated with the Athenians on the following terms :

‘To be dismissed, every man, at a certain ransom, after delivering up their arms.

‘But as for the Lacedæmonians, their commander,

and every other person in that number, these to be disposed of by the Athenians at discretion.'

These terms being agreed to, they evacuated Nisæa. And the Athenians, having thus cut off their long walls from the city of the Megareans, and possessed themselves of Nisæa, were preparing to accomplish what was yet to be done.

But Brasidas, son of Tellis, the Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thrace. He was no sooner informed of the surprisal of the walls than he trembled for the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be taken. He summoned the Bœotians to attend him expeditiously with their forces at Tripodiscus, (the place so named is a village of the Megaris under the mountain Geranea,) whither he was marching with two thousand seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and what levies he had already made on his own account. He imagined he might come up before Nisæa could be taken: but hearing the contrary, for he came up in the night to Tripodiscus, with a picked body of three hundred men, before the news of his march could be spread, he approached to the city of Megara undescried by the Athenians, who were posted near the sea. He intended to declare that he was ready to attempt, and in fact would have been glad to have effected, the recovery of Nisæa: but it was principally his view to get admission into Megara, and provide for its security. He demanded admission, assuring them he had great hope of recovering Nisæa. But the factions in Megara, perplexed at this step of Brasidas; on one side, lest he meant to reinstate the exiles by ejecting them; the other, lest the people with

such an apprehension might at once fall on them, and their city thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be lost, if the Athenians, who lay ready in ambush, should seize it, refused him admittance; and both factions thought proper, without any stir, to await the event: for it was severally their full expectation that a battle must ensue between the Athenians and these newcomers; and then, without plunging themselves into unnecessary hazards, they might join their own favorite party if victorious.

Brasidas, when he could not prevail, withdrew again to the main of his army. By the succeeding dawn the Boeotians joined him, who had resolved to succor Megara, even previous to the summons sent by Brasidas, since they regarded the danger that place was in as their own. They were actually advanced with their whole force as far as Platæa; and, the messenger having met with them here, they became much more eager than before. They sent forward a detachment of two-and-twenty hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred horsemen, but dismissed the multitude to their own homes. When the whole force was thus united, consisting of at least six thousand heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians stood drawn up in order near Nisæa and the sea-shore, whilst their light-armed were straggling about the plain, the Boeotian cavalry made an unexpected sally against those stragglers, and chased them to the shore: for hitherto no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf of the Megareans. The Athenian cavalry clapped spurs to repel the Boeotian, and a battle ensued. The horse were a long time thus engaged, and both sides claimed a victory: for the general of the Boeotian cavalry, and a small number of his party, the Athenians drove before them to Nisæa, where they put them to the sword, and rifled

them. They remained masters of the dead bodies ; gave them up afterwards by truce, and erected a trophy : but neither side so keeping their ground as to render the action decisive, they retreated as it were by consent ; the Boeotians to their main army, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the sea, and to the city of Megara, with his army. Having occupied there some advantageous ground, they drew up in order, and stood still, imagining the Athenians would attack them ; and assured that the Megareans were intently observing for whom the victory might declare. In both these respects, they judged their present posture the most judicious ; because it was not their own business to attack, or voluntarily to run into conflict and danger ; and thus having manifestly exhibited their alacrity to act defensively, a victory might justly be ascribed to them without the expense of a battle. In regard farther to the Megareans, the consequence could not but be fortunate : for, in case the latter had never beheld them thus prompt in their succor, they would have stopped all farther risk, and so undoubtedly they should have lost the city, as men completely vanquished : but now, should the Athenians decline an engagement, the points for which they themselves came thither must be secured without a blow ; which proved to be the result : for the Megareans, when the Athenians came out and drew up in order close to the long walls, and then, as the enemy did not advance to attack them, stood quiet in their ranks : their commanders also judging the hazard by no means equal, and themselves, who had so far been successful, not at all concerned to begin an engagement against superior numbers, in which, should they prevail, they could only take Megara ; but, should they miscarry, must

lose the flower of their domestic strength, especially as their opponents would act in probability with more daring resolution, since, as the large strength they had now in the field consisted only of quotas from several constituents, they hazarded but little; thus facing one another for a considerable space, and neither side presuming to make an attack, till each at length wheeled off; the Athenians first, towards Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians again to their former post. Then, I say, the Megareans in the interest of the exiles, regarding Brasidas as victor, and animated by the refusal of attack on the Athenian side, opened the gates of Megara to Brasidas himself, and the several commanders from the auxiliary states; and, having given them admission, proceeded with them to consultation, whilst the partisans of the Athenian interest were in the utmost consternation.

Soon afterwards, the confederates being dismissed to their respective cities, Brasidas also himself returned to Corinth, to continue his preparations for that Thracian expedition, in which before this avocation he had been intently employed.

The Athenians also being now marched homewards, the Megareans in the city, who had acted most zealously in favor of the Athenians, finding all their practices detected, stole off as fast as possible. The others, afterconcerting the proper steps with the friends of the exiles, fetched them home from Pegæ, having first administered to them the most solemn oaths, ‘to think no more on former injuries, and to promote the true welfare of the city to the utmost of their power.’

But these, when reinvested with authority, and taking a review of the troops of the city, having previously disposed some bands of soldiers in a proper manner, picked out about a hundred persons of their

enemies, and who they thought had busied themselves most in favor of the Athenians: and having compelled the people to pass a public vote on them, they were condemned to die, and suffered an instant execution. They farther new modelled the government of Megara into almost an oligarchy. And this change, though introduced by an inconsiderable body of men, nay, what is more, in the train of sedition, yet continued for a long space of time in full force at Megara.

The same summer, the Mityleneans being intent on executing their design of fortifying Antandrus, Democles and Aristides, who commanded the Athenian squadron for levying contributions, and were now at the Hellespont, for Lamachus, the third in the commission, had been detached with ten ships towards Pontus, when informed of what was thus in agitation, became apprehensive that Antandrus might prove of as bad consequence to them as Anaea in Samos had already done; wherein the Samian exiles having fortified themselves, were not only serviceable to the Peloponnesians at sea, by furnishing them with pilots; but farther, were continually alarming the Samians at home, and sheltering their deserters. From these apprehensions they assembled a force from among their dependents, sailed thither, and having defeated in battle those who came out of Antandrus to oppose them, gained once more possession of that town: and no long time after, Lamachus, who had been detached to Pontus, having anchored in the river Calex, in the district of Heraclea, lost all his ships. A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, and the land-flood rushing suddenly down, bore them all away before it. He himself, and the men under his command, were forced to march over-land through Bithynia, possessed by those Thracians who are seated on the other

side of the strait in Asia, to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megareans, in the mouth of the Euxine sea.

This summer also, Demosthenes, immediately after he had quitted the Megaris, with the command of forty sail of Athenians, arrived at Naupactus : for with him, and with Hippocrates, some persons of the Boeotian cities in those parts had been concerting schemes how to change the government of those cities, and introduce a democracy on the Athenian model. The first author of this scheme was Ptæodorus, an exile from Thebes ; and matters were now ready for execution.

Some of them had undertaken to betray Siphæ. Siphæ is a maritime town in the district of Thespiae, on the gulf of Crissa. Others of Orchomenus engaged for Chæronea, a town tributary to that Orchomenus which was formerly called the Minyeian, but now the Boeotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the chief undertakers of this point, and were hiring soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. Chæronea is situated on the edge of Boeotia towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is in part inhabited by Phocians. The share assigned to the Athenians was the surprisal of Delium, a temple of Apollo in Tanagra, looking towards Eubœa. These things farther were to be achieved on a day pre-fixed, that the Boeotians might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of Delium with all their force, by the necessity of staying at home to defend their respective habitations. Should the attempt succeed, and Delium once be fortified, they easily presumed that, though the change of the Boeotian government might not suddenly be effected, yet, when those towns were in their hands, when their devastations were extended all over the country, and places of safe retreat lay near at hand for their parties, things could not long remain in their former posture ; but in process of time, when the

Athenians appeared in support of the revolters, and the Boeotians could not unite in a body to oppose them, the designed revolution must necessarily take place. This was the nature of the scheme at present in agitation.

Hippocrates, having the whole force of Athens under his command, was ready at the proper time to march into Boeotia. But he had despatched Demosthenes beforehand to Naupactus with forty ships, that after he had collected a sufficient force in those parts from the Acarnanians and their other confederates, he should appear with his fleet before Siphæ, which was then to be betrayed to him. A day also was fixed on between them, in which both of them were at once to execute the parts assigned them.

Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, found the Oeniadæ already compelled by the united Acarnanians into an association with the confederates of Athens. He marched away therefore, at the head of the whole confederacy in those parts, and invaded first Salynthius and the Agreeans; and having carried some other points, got all in readiness to show himself before Siphæ at the time appointed.

About the same time this summer Brasidas, at the head of seventeen hundred heavy-armed, began his march towards Thrace. When he was come up to Heraclea in Trachis, he despatched a messenger beforehand to his correspondents in Pharsalus, to beg a safe conduct for himself and his army. And as soon as he was met at Melitia, of Achaea, by Panærus, and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus, who had been formerly the public host of the Chalcideans, he continued his march forwards. Others also of the Thessalians assisted in conducting him, and from Larissa, Niconidas the friend of Perdiocas. The passage

through Thessaly without proper guides is always difficult, and must be more so to an armed body. Besides, to attempt such a thing through a neighboring dominion without permission first obtained, has ever been regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye, and the bulk of the Thessalians had been ever well affected to the Athenians. Nor could Brasidas have possibly effected it, had not the Thessalian been rather despotic than free governments: for on his route he was stopped at the river Enipeus by some of contrary sentiments to the rest of their countrymen, who ordered him to proceed at his peril, and taxed him with injustice in having come so far without the general permission. His conductors told them in return, that ‘without such permission he should not proceed; but, as he had come amongst them on a sudden, they thought themselves obliged in friendship to conduct him.’ Brasidas also gave them strong assurances that ‘he was come hither for the service of Thessaly and of them; that his arms were not intended against them, but against the common enemy, the Athenians; that he never suspected any enmity between Thessalians and Lacedaemonians, why they might not tread on one another’s ground; that even now, should they withhold their consent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to proceed; but he conjured them however to give him no molestation.’ Having heard these declarations, they acquiesced and withdrew. Brasidas now, by the advice of his conductors, advanced with the utmost speed without ever halting, in order to anticipate fresh and more potent obstruction. Nay, the very same day that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as to Pharsalus, and encamped on the banks of the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded to Phacium, and from thence into Peræbia. Being so far ad-

vanced, his Thessalian guides received their dismission ; and the Peræbians, who are tributaries to the Thessalians, escorted him to Dium, in the kingdom of Perdiccas : it is a fortress of Macedonia, situate under Mount Olympus, on the Thessalian side. In this manner Brasidas, advancing so expeditiously as to prevent all obstruction, completed his passage through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominions of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis : for those in Thrace who revolted from the Athenians had joined with Perdiccas in procuring this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus, because the great success of the Athenians had struck a terror amongst them. The Chalcideans were persuaded that they should be first attacked by the Athenians ; and in truth their neighbours, who yet persevered in their obedience, were secretly instigating them to it. Perdiccas, indeed, had not yet declared himself their enemy ; but he dreaded the vengeance of the Athenians for former grudges and now he had a scheme at heart for the subjection of Arribæus, king of the Lyncestians.

Other points concurred to facilitate the procurement of such a succor from Peloponnesus, such as the misfortunes by which the Lacedæmonians at present were afflicted : for, the Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and not least of all on Laconia, they hoped in case they could equally annoy them in this quarter, by thus marching an army against their dependents, to effect a diversion. And they were more encouraged by the offers of maintenance for their troops, and solicitations to support revolts. They were at the same time glad of a pretext to rid themselves of their helots, lest, in the present state of affairs, now that Pylus was in hostile hands, they might be tempted to rebel. This farther gave rise to the following event: dreading the

youth and number of these slaves, for many precautions have ever been put in practice by the Lacedæmonians to curb and awe their helots, they made public proclamation that ‘ so many of them as could claim the merit of having done signal service to the Lacedæmonians in the present war, should enter their claims, and be rewarded with freedom.’ The view in this was to sound them, imagining that such who had the greatness of spirit to claim their freedom in requital of their merit, must be also the ripest for rebellion. About two thousand claimants were adjudged worthy, and accordingly were led about in solemn procession to the temples, crowned with garlands, as men honored with their freedom. But, in no long time after, they made away with them all ; nor has the world been able to discover in what manner they were thus to a man destroyed.

Now also with alacrity they sent away seven hundred of their heavy-armed under the orders of Brasidas. The rest of his body were mercenaries, whom he had hired in Peloponnesus. And it was in compliance with his own particular desire that Brasidas was employed in this service by the Lacedæmonians.

The Chalcideans, however, were highly satisfied with a person who had ever passed in Sparta for one of the most active and accomplished citizens ; and who, in his foreign employments, had performed very signal services for his country. From his first appearance amongst them, his justice and moderation so instantly recommended them to the adjacent cities, that some voluntarily submitted, and others were by intrigue put into his possession. By him the Lacedæmonians were actually empowered, if the accommodation they wished for took place, which it afterwards did, to make ex-

change a restitution of towns, and so relieve Peloponnesus from the hardships of the war.

Nay more, even in succeeding times, on the breaking out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and prudence of Brasidas exerted at this juncture, which some attested by their own experience, others on sound and unsuspected report, imprinted a zeal on the confederates of Athens to go over to the Lacedæmonians : for, having been the first sent out to foreign trust, and approved in all respects as a worthy man, he left behind him a strong presumption that the rest of his countrymen are like himself.¹

So soon therefore as it was known at Athens that he was arrived to take on him the conduct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians declared Perdiccas their enemy, ascribing this expedition to his cabals, and by strengthening their garrisons kept a strict watch over all their dependents in that quarter.

But Perdiccas with his own forces, and accompanied by the body under Brasidas, marched against a neighboring potentate, Arribæus, son of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lyncestians : enmity was subsisting between them, and the conquest of him was the point in view. When he had advanced with his army, and in conjunction with Brasidas, to the entrance of Lyncaus, Brasidas communicated his intention to hold a parley with Arribæus, before he proceeded to act offensively against him ; and, if possible, to bring him over to the Lacedæmonian alliance : for Arribæus had already notified by a herald that he was willing to

¹ When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thrace he wrote this letter to the ephori at Sparta :—‘ I will execute your orders in this war, or die.’ Plutarch’s Laconic Apophthegms.

refer the points in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. The Chalcidean ambassadors also, who followed the camp, were continually suggesting to him, that ‘he ought not to plunge himself rashly into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas,’ designing to reserve him more intire for their own service. And besides this, the ministers of Perdiccas had declared it at Lacedæmon to be their master’s intention to bring over all the neighboring states into this alliance: so that it was intirely with public view that Brasidas insisted on treating with Arribæus. But Perdiccas urged in opposition, that ‘he had not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his controversies, but to execute his vengeance on the enemies he should point out to him; that it would be unjust in Brasidas to treat with Arribæus, when he supported half the expense of his troops.’ Yet, in spite of such remonstrances, and in open defiance of him, Brasidas parleyed. And being satisfied with the offers of Arribæus, he drew off his troops without so much as entering his dominions. But henceforth Perdiccas, looking on this step as an injury to himself, reduced his contribution of support from a moiety to a third.

Brasidas however the same summer, without loss of time, continued the operations of war; and, a little before the vintage, being attended by the Chalcideans, marched towards Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. The inhabitants of this place were embroiled in a sedition about his reception: a party who co-operated with the Chalcideans were for it; but the people opposed. Yet, fearing the loss of their fruit, which was not quite got in, the people were at last prevailed on by Brasidas to grant entrance to himself without any attendants, and after giving him audience to resolve for themselves. Brasidas was admitted; and standing

forth in the presence of the people, for though a Lacedæmonian, he was an able speaker, he harangued them thus :

‘ My commission from the Lacedæmonians and the march of their troops hither under my command verify, O ye Acanthians ! the declaration made by us, when first we began this war against the Athenians, that we were going to fight for the liberties of Greece. But if our appearance here has been too long deferred it should be ascribed to the unexpected turns of war nearer home, where, as we hoped to demolish the Athenians speedily without endangering you, we ought to be exempted from any censure here : for now, you behold us opportunely at hand, and intent in conjunction with you to pull these tyrants down.

‘ I am surprised indeed that your gates should be barred against me, or that my presence should any way chagrin you : for we Lacedæmonians, imagining we were going to confederates, whose wishes were fastened on us before their eyes could behold us, and from whom we might depend on the most cordial reception ; we, I say, have pierced forward through a series of dangers, marching many days together through hostile territories, and surmounting every obstacle by a zeal of your service. If therefore your affections are alienated from us, or if you act in opposition to your own, and to the liberty of the rest of Greece, your conduct must terribly distress us. And that, not only because you yourselves reject us, but may by such a step deter all others, to whom I shall afterwards apply, from co-operating with me. Such obstacles you will raise before me, if you, to whom first I have addressed myself, you who are masters of a city of great importance, and are in esteem for your good sense and discretion, should refuse to receive me. I

shall be utterly unable to put a plausible color on such a refusal, and shall be exposed to reproach, as if I meant injustice under the cloak of liberty, or came hither too weak and impotent to make head against the Athenian strength, should it be exerted against me.

‘ And yet with that force, of which at this very moment I am honored with the command, I marched myself to the succor of Nisaea, and openly defied a superior number of Athenians, who declined the encounter. It is not therefore probable that they can send hither a force to our annoyance equal to that armament they employed at Nisaea: nor am I sent hither to execute the schemes of oppression, but to farther the deliverance of Greece. I have the security of most solemn oaths, sworn by the magistrates of Lacedæmon, that whatever people I bring over to their alliance shall remain in free possession of their own liberties and laws. And farther, we are forbid the use of violence and fraud as the means of rendering you dependant on us; but, on the contrary, are to act in support of you who are oppressed with Athenian bondage. On reasons so valid do I insist on it, that I am no longer suspected by you, having given you the strongest assurances that I am no impotent avenger, and that you may boldly abet my cause.

‘ If there be any person in this assembly who hesitates on the apprehension that I may betray the city into the hands of a private cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and distinguish himself in open confidence. I came not hither to be the tool of faction; I am convinced that liberty can never be re-established by me, if disregarding ancient constitutions, I enslave the multitude to the few, or the few to the crowd. Such things would be more grievous than the yoke of foreign dominion. And should we Lacedæmonians proceed in

this manner, our labors could never merit a return of gratitude, but, instead of honor and glory, foul reproach would be our portion. The crimes on which we have grounded this war against the Athenians would then appear to be our own, and more odious in us for having made parade of disinterested virtue, than in a state which never pretended to it: for it is more base in men of honor to enlarge their power by specious fraud, than by open force. The latter, on the right of that superior strength with which fortune had invested it, seized at once on its prey: the other can only compass it by the treachery of wicked cunning.

' It is thus that in all concerns of more than ordinary importance we are accustomed to exert the utmost circumspection. And besides the solemn oaths in your favor, you can receive no greater security of our honest intention than the congruity of our actions with our words, from whence the strongest conviction must result, that with what I have suggested you are obliged in interest to comply. But if my promises are unavailing, and you declare such compliance impossible; if professing yourselves our sincere well-wishers, you beg that a denial may not expose you to our resentments; if you allege that the dangers through which your liberty must be sought to overbalance the prize; that in justice it ought only to be proposed to such as are able to embrace the offer, but that no one ought to be compelled against his own inclinations;—I shall beseech the tutelary gods and heroes of this island to bear me witness, that whereas I come to serve you, and cannot persuade, I must now, by ravaging your country, endeavor to compel you. And, in acting thus, I shall not be conscious to myself of injustice, but shall justify the step on two most vent motives: for the sake of the Lacedæmonians;

lest whilst they have only your affections, and not your actual concurrence, they may be prejudiced through the sums of money you pay to the Athenians: for the sake of all the Grecians; that they may not be obstructed by you in their deliverance from bondage. This is the end we propose, and this will justify our proceedings: for without the purpose of a public good, we Lacedæmonians ought not to set people at liberty against their wills. We are not greedy of empire, but we are eager to pull down the tyranny of others. And how could we answer it to the body of Greece, if when we have undertaken to give liberty to them all, we indolently suffer our endeavors to be traversed by you?

‘Deliberate seriously on these important points, and animate yourselves with the glorious ambition of being the first who enter the lists for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an eternal renown, of securing the uninterrupted possession of your private properties, and investing the state of which you are members with the most honorable of all titles.’¹

Here Brasidas concluded. And the Acanthians, who had already heard this affair largely discussed on both sides, and secretly declared their votes, the majority, because the arguments of Brasidas were prevailing, and because they dreaded the loss of their fruit, resolved to revolt from the Athenians. Then they required of Brasidas himself to swear the oath of their security, which the Lacedæmonian magistrate had at his departure enjoined him to take, that whatever people was brought over into their alliance by him should remain in possession of their own liberties and laws; and this done, they received his army. Not long after Stagyrus also, another colony of the Andrians, re-

¹ Free.

volted. And thus ended the transactions of this summer.

Very early in the succeeding winter, when the strong places of Boeotia were to have been betrayed to Hippocrates and Demosthenes the Athenian commanders, preparatory to which Demosthenes was to show himself with his fleet before Siphæ, and the other to march to Delium, there happened a mistake about the days prefixed for execution. Demosthenes indeed, who steered towards Siphæ, and had on board the Acarnanians, and many of the confederates of that quarter, was totally disappointed. The whole scheme had been betrayed by Nicomachus the Phocian of Phanotis, who gave information of it to the Lacedæmonians, and they to the Boeotians. All Boeotians now taking up arms to prevent consequences, for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to distress them on that side, Siphæ and Clæronea are secured in time. And so soon as the conspirators perceived that things went wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of exciting commotions in the cities.

Hippocrates, having summoned into the field the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as sojourners, not excepting even foreigners who chanced at that time to be there, arrived too late before Delium, not before the Boeotians were returned home again from Siphæ. He encamped his forces, and set about fortifying Delium, the temple of Apollo, in the following manner. Round about the temple and its precincts they sunk a ditch : of the earth thrown up they formed a rampart instead of a wall. They drove into the ground on each side a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines they cut from within the precincts of the temple. They did the same by the stones and bricks of the adjacent buildings which had been de-

molished, and omitted no expedient to give height and substance to the work. They erected wooden turrets on such spots as seemed most to require it. No part of the old pile of the temple was now standing : the portico, which stood the longest, had lately fallen down. They began the work the third day after their marching out from Athens. That day they plied it, and the following, and continued it on the fifth till the time of repast. Then, the work being for the most part completed, they drew off their army to the distance of about ten stadia¹ from Delium, in order to return home. Their light-armed indeed, for the most part marched off directly ; but the heavy-armed halting there, sat down on their arms.

Hippocrates stayed behind for the time necessary to post the proper guards, and to put the finishing hand to those parts of the fortification which were not yet perfectly completed. But during all this space, the Boeotians had been employed in drawing their forces together to Tanagra. When the quotas from the several cities were come up, and they perceived the Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the other rulers of Boeotia, for they were eleven in all, declared their resolution not to engage, since the enemy was no longer on Boeotian ground ; for the Athenians, when they grounded their arms, were within the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas the son of Æoladas, one of the Boeotian rulers in the right of Thebes, and at this time in the supreme command, in concert with Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged it expedient to hazard an engagement ; and addressing himself to every battalion apart, lest calling them together might occasion them to abandon

¹ About an English mile.

their arms, he prevailed on the Boeotians to march up to the Athenians, and to offer battle. His exhortation to each was worded thus :

' It ought never, ye men of Boeotia, to have entered into the hearts of any of your rulers that it is improper for us to attack the Athenians, because we find them not on our own soil : for they, out of a neighboring country, have rushed into Boeotia, and have fortified a post in it, from whence they intend to ravage and annoy us. And our enemies in short they are, in whatever place we find them, from what place soever they march to execute hostilities against us. Now therefore let him, who has judged this step we are taking hazardous and insecure, acknowledge and forego his error. Cautious and dilatory measures are not to be adhered to by men who are invaded, and whose all is at stake ; they are expedient only for those whose properties are secure, and who bent on rapine, exert their malice in the invasion of others. But it is eternally the duty of you Boeotians to combat such foreigners as presume to invade you, either on your own or your neighbors' ground, no matter which. And this above all must be done against Athenians, not only because they are Athenians, but because they are the nearest borderers on us : for it is a maxim allowed, that no state can possibly preserve itself free unless it be a match for its neighboring powers.

' Let me add, farther, that when men are bent on enslaving, not neighbors only, but even such people as are more remote, how can it be judged improper to encounter such, so long as we can find ground whereon to stand ? Call to mind, for your present information, the Eubœans, situated in yon island opposite to us ; call to mind the present disposition of the bulk of Greece, in regard to these Athenians. Why should

we forget, that neighboring states so often battle one another about settling their various boundaries; whereas, should we be vanquished, our whole country will be turned merely into one heap of limitation, and that never again by us to be disputed? For when once they have entered on it, they will remain the masters of it all, beyond control. So much more have we to fear from these neighbors of ours than any other people.

'Those again, who in all the daring insolence of superior strength are wont to invade their neighbors, as these Athenians now do us, march with extraordinary degrees of confidence against such as are inactive, and defend themselves only on their own soil. His schemes are more painfully completed, when men sally boldly beyond their borders to meet the invader, and if opportunity serves, attack him first. Of this truth our own experience will amply convince us: for ever since the defeat we gave these very men at Coronea, when, taking the advantage of our seditions, they had possessed themselves of our lands, we have kept Boeotia quiet from every alarm till the present. This we ought now to remember, that the seniors among us may proceed as they then began; that the juniors, the sons of those sires who then displayed such uncommon bravery, may exert themselves to preserve unblemished their hereditary virtues. We ought all to be confident that the god will fight on our side, whose temple they pollute by raising ramparts, and dwelling within its verge: and, as the victims we have offered are fair and auspicious, we ought at once to advance to the charge of these our foes, and make them know, that their lust and rapine they only then can gratify when they invade such cowards as abandon their own defence: but from men, who were born to vindicate

their own country for ever by the dint of arms, and never unjustly to enslave another, that from such men they shall not get away without that struggle which honor enjoins.'

In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Boeotians and persuaded them to march against the Athenians. He put them instantly in motion, and led them toward the enemy; for it was now late in the day. When he had approached the spot on which they were posted he halted in a place from whence, as an eminence lay between, they could have no view of one another. There he drew up his men, and made all ready for the attack.

When the news was brought to Hippocrates, who was yet at Delium, that 'the enemy is advancing to the charge,' he sent orders to the main body to form into the order of battle. And not long after he himself came up, having left about three hundred horse at Delium, to guard that place in case an attempt should be made on it, or seizing a favorable opportunity to fall on the rear of the Boeotians during the engagement: not but that the Boeotians had posted a party of their own to watch their motions, and find them employment. When therefore the whole disposition was perfected, they showed themselves on the top of the eminence, and there grounded their arms, remaining still in the same order in which they designed to attack; being in the whole about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, a thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The right wing was composed of Thebans and those who ranked with them; the centre, of the Haliartians, Coroneans, and Copiensians, and others that live about the lake Copais; and the left, of Thespiensians, Tanagreans, and Orchomenians: in the wings were posted the cavalry

and light-armed. The Thebans were drawn up in files of twenty-five ; the others variously, as circumstances required. And such was the order and disposition of the Boeotians.

On the Athenian side, the heavy-armed, being in number equal to their enemies, were drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. Their cavalry was posted on either wing ; but light-armed soldiers, armed as was fitting, the Athenians had none at this juncture neither in the field nor in the city. The number which had taken the field at first to attend this expedition exceeded many times over the number of the enemy ; but then most of them had no arms at all, since the summons had been extended to all who resided in Athens, both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of these, so soon as ever the route was pointed home-wards, were, excepting a few, gone speedily off : but, when they were drawn up in the order of battle, and were every moment expecting the charge, Hippocrates, the general, showing himself in the front of the Athenians, animated them with the following harangue :—

‘ The admonition, Athenians, I intend to give you will be very concise, but such a one is sufficient to the brave : I pretend not to encourage Athenians, but merely to remind them of their duty. Let the thought be a stranger to every heart amongst you, that we are going to plunge into needless hazards in the territory of a foe. Be it the territory of a foe, yet in it you must fight for the security of your own : and, if we conquer now, the Peloponnesians will never again presume, without the aid of the Boeotian horse, to repeat their inroads into Attica. By one battle therefore you acquire this, and secure your own land from future annoyance. Charge therefore your enemies, as you ought, with a spirit worthy of the state of Athens, that

state which every soul amongst you boasts to be the first of Greece; and worthy of your forefathers, who formerly at Oenophyta, under the conduct of Myronides, defeated these people in the field, and possessed for a time all Boeotia as their prize.'

Hippocrates had not gone along half the line encouraging them in this manner, when he was compelled to desist, and leave the greater part of his army undressed: for the Boeotians, to whom Pagondas also had given but a short exhortation, and had this moment finished the paeon of attack, were coming down from the eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet them, and both sides came running to the charge. The skirts of both armies could not come to an engagement, as some rivulets that lay between stopped them equally on both sides. The rest closed firm in a stubborn fight, and with mutual thrusts of their shields. The left wing of the Boeotians, even to the centre, was routed by the Athenians, who pressed on those who composed it, but especially on the Thespians: for, the others who were drawn up with them giving way before the shock, the Thespians were inclosed in a small compass of ground, where such of them as were slaughtered defended themselves bravely till they were quite hewn down. Some also of the Athenians, disordered in thus encompassing them about, knew not how to distinguish, and slew one another. In this quarter therefore the Boeotians were routed, and fled towards those parts where the battle was yet alive. Their right wing, in which the Thebans were posted, had the better of the Athenians. They had forced them at first to give ground a little, and pressed on them to pursue their advantage. It happened that Pagondas had detached two troops of horse, which motion was not perceived, to fetch a compass round

the eminence and support the left wing, which was routed. These suddenly appearing in sight, the victorious wing of the Athenians, imagining a fresh army was coming up to the charge, was struck into consternation. And now being distressed on both sides by this last turn, and by the Thebans, who pursued their advantage close, and put them into a total disorder, the whole Athenian army was routed, and fled. Some ran towards Delium and the sea, others to Oropus, and others towards Mount Parnes; all to whatever place they hoped was safe. But the Boeotians, especially their horse, and the Locrians, who had come up to the field of battle just as the rout began, pursued them with great execution: but the night putting an end to the chase, the bulk of the flying army preserved themselves more easily.

The day following, such of them as had reached Delium and Oropus, leaving behind a garrison in Delium, which still remained in their possession, transported themselves by sea to Athens. The Boeotians, also, having erected a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and having posted a guard on the field of battle, retired to Tanagra, and called a consultation about the method of assaulting Delium.

A herald, farther, despatched by the Athenians about their dead, met on his way a herald of the Boeotians, who turned him back, by assuring him that his errand would be fruitless till he himself should be again returned. The latter, being come to the Athenians, declared to them in the name of the Boeotians,

'That by their late proceedings they had enormously violated the laws of the Grecians; amongst whom it was an established rule, that amidst their mutual invasions religious places should be ever spared; whereas

the Athenians had not only fortified, but had made Delium a place of habitation ; and whatever profanations mankind can be guilty of had been there by them committed : that the water, which it would even be impious for the Boeotians themselves to touch, unless by way of ablution, before they sacrificed, had been profanely drawn by them for common use : that for these reasons the Boeotians, in the cause of the god and in their own, invoking the associated demons and Apollo, gave them this early notice to evacuate the sacred place, and clear it of all incumbrances.'

This message being thus delivered by the herald, the Athenians returned this answer to the Boeotians by a herald of their own :—

' That they were hitherto guilty of nothing illegal in regard to the holy place, nor would willingly be so for the future. They had no such intention when they first entered into it, and their view was merely to give an ejection from thence to persons who had basely injured them. It was a law among the Grecians for those who were masters of any district, whether great or small, to be also proprietors of its temples, which are to be honored by them with the usual forms, and with what additional ones they may be able to appoint. Even the Boeotians, as well as many other people, who this moment were possessed of lands from which they had ejected the old proprietors, made a seizure first of those temples which had belonged to others, and continued in the free possession of them. For their own parts, could they conquer more of their territory, they should manfully retain it ; and as to the spot they now occupied, their position there was voluntary, and as it was their own, they would not quit it. It was necessity alone made them use the water, which ought not to be ascribed to any insolent or profane motive, but to the

preceding invasions their enemies had made; self-preservation against which laid them under a present necessity of acting as they did. It might with reason be hoped, that every proceeding to which war and violence indispensably obliged, would obtain forgiveness from the god: for the altars are a refuge to involuntary offences, and transgression is imputed only to those who are bad without compulsion, and not to such as urgent necessities may render daring. The guilt of impiety belonged more notoriously to such as insisted on the barter of temple for the bodies of the dead, than to those who are content to lose their just demands rather than submit to so base an exchange.' They farther enjoined him in their name to declare, that 'they would not evacuate Boeotia, since the ground which they occupied in it belonged to no Boeotians, but was now their own property, acquired by dint of arms. All they required was a truce for fetching off their dead, according to the solemn institutions of their common country.'

The Boeotians replied thus: 'If they are now in Boeotia, let them quit the ground which belongs to us, and carry off what they demand. But, if they are on ground of their own, they themselves know best what they have to do.' They judged indeed that Oropia, on which it happened that the bodies of the dead were lying, as the battle had been fought on the lines of partition, belonged to the Athenian jurisdiction, and yet that it was impossible for them to be carried off by force; and truce farther they would grant none, where the point related to Athenian ground; that it was therefore the most proper reply, 'they should quit their territory, and so obtain their demands.' The herald of the Athenians having heard this, departed without effect.

Immediately after, the Boeotians, having sent for darters and slingers from the Melian bay, and being reinforced by two thousand heavy-armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and a party of Megareans, all which had joined them since the battle, marched against Delium, and assaulted the fortification. They tried many methods, and took it at last by the help of a machine of a very particular structure. Having split asunder a large sail-yard, they hollowed it throughout, and fixed it together in a very exact manner, so as to resemble a pipe. At its extremity they fastened a chaldron by help of chains, into which a snout of iron was bent downwards from the yard. The inside, farther, of this wooden machine was lined almost throughout with iron. They brought it from a distance to the fortification on carriages, and applied it where the work consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And when near enough, they put a large bellows to that extremity of the yard which was next themselves, and began to blow. But the blast, issuing along the bore into the chaldron, which was filled with glowing coals, and sulphur, and pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This set fire to the work, and burnt with so much fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay on it, but to a man they abandoned it, and fled away amain: and in this manner was the fortress carried. Of the garrison, some were put to the sword, but two hundred were made prisoners. The bulk of the remainder, throwing themselves on board their vessels, escaped in safety to Athens.

It was the seventeenth day after the battle that Delium was taken. And not long after, a herald despatched by the Athenians came again, but quite ignorant of this event, to sue for the dead, which were now

delivered by the Boeotians, who no longer laid any stress on their former reply.

In the battle, there perished of the Boeotians very little under five hundred ; of the Athenians, few less than a thousand, and Hippocrates, the general ; but of light-armed and baggage-men a considerable number indeed.¹

Somewhat later in time than this battle, Demosthenes, who, on his appearance before Siphæ, had been disappointed in his hope of having it betrayed to him, having the land-force still on board his fleet, consisting of four hundred heavy-armed Acarnanians, and Agræans, and Athenians, made a descent on Sicyonia ; but before all his vessels could land their men the Sicyonians had marched down to make head against

¹ The Athenians received in truth a terrible blow on this occasion. The Boeotians, a people heavy and stupid to a proverb, continued even after the terror of the Athenians, the politest and most enlightened people on the earth. Nay, that gross and stupid people had, this day, well-nigh completed the destruction of all that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time on earth ; and done an irreparable mischief to sound reason and good sense for ever after. When the two troops of horse, after fetching a compass round the hill, had completed the rout of the Athenians, who were now flying away with the utmost speed, the divine Socrates was left almost alone, facing the enemy, and fighting and retreating like a lion overpowered. Alcibiades, who served in the cavalry, was making off on horseback ; but, seeing Socrates in such imminent danger, he rode up to him, covered his retreat, and brought him off safe. He thus repaid him the great obligation he had formerly received from him at Potidæa. Strabo relates farther (*Geog.* i. 9) that Xenophon also the same day owed his life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horse, and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took him on his shoulders, and carried him to a place of safety. On the whole, brutal strength and mere bodily merit were never so near getting a total conquest over all the light and understanding which human nature has to boast of, that did not come directly down from heaven.

them. They defeated those that were landed, and chased them again on board. Some they killed, and some they took alive : and after erecting their trophy, they delivered up the dead by truce.

During the former transactions at Delium, Sitalces also, king of the Odrysians, was killed in an expedition he had formed against the Triballians, who encountered and vanquished him. And Seuthes, the son of Sparadocus, his nephew by the brother, succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of Thrace over which he had reigned.

The same winter Brasidas, in conjunction with the allies of Thrace, marched against Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the river Strymon.

The spot of ground on which the city now stands Aristagoras, the Milesian, formerly, when he fled from king Darius, had endeavored to plant, but was beaten off by the Edonians. Two-and-thirty years after, the Athenians made the same attempt, having sent thither a colony consisting of ten thousand of their own people, and such others as voluntarily came in, all of whom were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus ; but, after an interval of twenty-nine years, the Athenians came hither again with a fresh colony led by Agnon, the son of Nicias, who, having driven away the Edonians, built this city on that spot of ground which had formerly been called the Nine Roads. They rushed to the seizure from Eion, a maritime emporium situated at the river's mouth, and belonging to them. Eion is distant twenty stadia¹ from the spot where the city now stands, and which by Agnon was named Amphipolis, because it is almost surrounded by the Strymon, which flows along it on both sides. Running

¹ About two English miles.

therefore a wall from the river to the river, he planted his colony on a spot conspicuous both to the land and to the sea.

Against this place Brasidas, decamping from Arne of Chalcidica, advanced with his army. About sunset he arrived at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe issues into the sea. From hence, after taking the evening repast, he continued his march by night. It was winter, and snow was falling. This favored and encouraged his enterprise, as he intended to surprise the people of Amphipolis, except such as were privy to his design: for there resided in the place a body of Argillians, who are an Andrian colony, and others who acted in combination with him, some of them at the instigation of Perdiccas, and others at that of the Chalcideans: but in a more particular manner the Argillians, who had a place of residence very near it, who farther had ever been suspected by the Athenians, and were really intent on the ruin of the place, when now a fair opportunity was within their reach; and Brasidas at hand, who long before had been tampering with these inhabitants of foreign mixture, in order to have the city betrayed to him. The Argillians at this juncture received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, led his army forwards that very night to the bridge laid over the Strymon. The city is seated at some distance from this pass; and it was not then defended by a fort as it is now, but was only the station of a small party of guards. Brasidas therefore easily forced the guard, being favored in some degree by treachery, not a little also by the season and his own unexpected approach. He then passed the bridge, and was immediately master of all the effects of those Amphipolitans who reside in all the tract without the walls. This passage was so

sudden, that those within the city had no notice of it ; and as to those without, many of them being seized, and others flying for preservation within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into vast confusion, increased by their mutual suspicions of one another. And it is said, that if Brasidas, instead of permitting his troops to disperse for plunder, had advanced directly against the city, it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands ; but he, on the contrary, having ordered them to halt, employed himself in the ravage of what lay without ; and, finding nothing effectuated in his favor by accomplices within, he for the present desisted ; but those his accomplices were overpowered in number by the opposite party, who prevented their opening the gates immediately to Brasidas ; and, acting in concert with Eucles, their commandant, who resided there by the orders of the Athenians to guard the place, they despatched a messenger to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides, the son of Olorus, who compiled this history, and was then in Thasus, an island colony of the Parians, and distant about half a day's sail from Amphipolis, pressing him to come instantly to their relief.

Thucydides no sooner received this notice, than with the utmost expedition he put to sea with seven ships that happened to be at hand. He designed nothing so much as to prevent if possible the loss of Amphipolis ; or, if that was impracticable, to throw himself into Eion, and secure it in time.

Brasidas in the meanwhile, fearing at the approach of this succor from Thasus, informed besides that Thucydides drew an ample revenue from the working of his gold mines in this quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of great credit amongst the principal persons of this part of the continent, tried all possible ex-

pedients to get possession of the city before his arrival, lest his appearance amongst them might animate the Amphipolitans with the hope of succor by sea and from Thrace, which the credit of Thucydides might easily obtain for their effectual preservation, and in pursuance of this they might refuse to capitulate. He sent them therefore very moderate terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that ‘the Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city should, if they desired it, be continued in the free possession of all their property, rights and liberties whatever: but those who refused to stay should have the space of five days allowed them to quit the town and remove their effects.’

This proposal was no sooner heard than the inclinations of the many took a new turn. The Athenian interest had but a few supporters in the city: the bulk of the inhabitants were a mixture of foreign nations. There were also within many persons, relations of those who had been made prisoners without. And thus, in their present consternation, the proposal was generally received as mild and gentle. The Athenians, for their part, who thought themselves more exposed to danger than the rest, and had besides no hope of speedy relief, were delighted with the offer of quitting the place. So also were all the rest, that they were not to lose their rights and liberties as citizens, and should thus escape the danger they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. On this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated only on the mildness and generosity of the terms he had offered, because now they perceived that the multitude had altered their sentiments, and would no longer hearken to the Athenian commandant. In short, an accommodation was perfected, and they opened the gates to Brasidas, on the conditions he had

proposed by his herald. And in this manner did the inhabitants deliver up Amphipolis.

But in the evening of the same day Thucydides and the squadron came over to Eion. Brasidas was already in possession of Amphipolis, and designed that very night to seize Eion also. And unless this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost.

Thucydides instantly took care to put Eion in a posture of defence, in case Brasidas should attack it; and to provide farther for its security, when he had opened a refuge there for such as were willing to remove thither from Amphipolis, according to the articles of the late surrender.

But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river with a large number of boats towards Eion, designing, if possible, to seize the point of land that juts out from the walls, which would have given him the command of the river's mouth. He endeavored at the same time also to assault it by land, but was repulsed in both attempts. And now he effectually employed his care in resettling and securing Amphipolis.

Mercinus also, a city of Edonia, revolted to him on the death of Pittacus, king of the Edonians, who was killed by the sons of Gosaüs, and his own wife Braures. Gapselus soon after did the same, and Oesyme: they are colonies of the Thracians. These events were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who came thither in person immediately after the surrender of Amphipolis.

The loss of that city cast the Athenians into great consternation; and with reason, because it was a place of great importance to them, since from thence they had materials for building ships and a pecuniary revenue; and farther, because, after a safe conduct

through Thessaly, the route was now open to the Lacedæmonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy their dependents. Yet, had they not possessed themselves of the bridge, the large lake formed above by the river, and the check given by the triremes stationed at Eion, would have hindered the Lacedæmonians from penetrating farther. But all obstacles appeared to the Athenians now quite easy to be surmounted ; and their apprehensions that their dependents would revolt alarmed them much. For Brasidas in the rest of his conduct gave constant proofs of an excellent temper ; and the declaration was ever in his mouth, ‘ that he had been sent thither to restore the liberty of Greece.’ Accordingly the cities which were subject to the Athenians had no sooner heard of the surrender of Amphipolis, together with the brave exploits and the mild engaging deportment of Brasidas, than they conceived the most ardent inclination to shake off the yoke. They secretly despatched their agents to him, earnestly desiring a visit from him, with respective assurances from each that they would be the first to revolt. They judged there was no longer room to apprehend any bad consequences from such a step ; falsely estimating the Athenian power to be much less considerable than it afterwards appeared. But this their judgment was founded more on uncertain presumption than deliberate prudence. It is the turn of mankind when their passions are warm, to give themselves up to blind and sanguine hope, and to throw aside with despotic scorn whatever seemeth to be counter to their wishes. It was but lately that the Athenians had been vanquished by the Boeotians ; and Brasidas had been making such recitals as might persuade, though in fact they were collusive, that at Nisaea with his single force he offered battle to the

Athenians, and they declined it. This made them confident, and they became perfectly convinced that there was no longer a strength sufficient to chastise them. But what had the greatest influence on their thoughts, and disposed them intirely to run all hazards, was the immediate pleasure they promised themselves in a change, and that now they were going for the first time to experience the sweets of Lacedæmonian friendship.

These inclinations were perceived by the Athenians, who sent garrisons into each of these cities in order to curb them, with as much expedition as the shortness of the time and the wintry season would permit.

Brasidas also had sent to Lacedæmon, soliciting a speedy reinforcement, and was busy himself in providing materials to build triremes in the Strymon: But the Lacedæmonians neglected to supply him, partly through the envy which the leading men of Sparta had conceived against him, and partly because their attention was principally confined to the recovery of their people made prisoners in Sphacteria, and to bring the war to a conclusion.

The same winter, the Megareans having recovered their long walls, which were in the possession of the Athenians, levelled them with the ground.

Brasidas, thus master of Amphipolis, gathered together the allies, and led them into the district called Acte. It is the tract which stretches out into the sea from the canal which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the highest mountain in Acte is its utmost verge on the Ægean sea. The cities in it are ; Sane, a colony of Andrians, seated close to the canal, and on that part which faces the sea towards Eubœa ; Thyssus farther, and Cleone, and Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Diium, which are promiscuously inhabited by various

sets of barbarians, who speak both languages. There is also a small number of Chalcideans amongst them; but the bulk are Pelasgians, the issue of those Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians, and Crestonians, and Edonians: they reside in small fortresses. Most of them went over to Brasidas: but Sane and Dium stood out. He therefore made his army halt on their lands, and laid them waste. Yet as this had no effect, he marched from thence to Torone of Chalcidica, then possessed by the Athenians. He hastened thither at the invitation of a small party, who were ready to betray the city to him. Being arrived whilst yet it was dark, he sat down about break of day with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, which lies not at most above three stadia¹ from the city. The bulk of the Toroneans and the Athenian garrison were ignorant of his approach: but the accomplices, who knew he would be punctual, sent some of their body unperceived to observe his approach. When these were thus certainly assured he was at hand, they conducted back with them to their friends seven men armed only with daggers. Twenty had at first been selected for this service, but only seven of them now had the courage to proceed: Lysistratus the Olynthian was the person who commanded. They got in by the wall towards the sea without making an alarm, and ascending from thence, slaughtered the guard in the citadel, which is seated on the most eminent spot, the whole city being built on the declivity of a hill, and burst open the postern towards Canastræum. Brasidas, having since advanced a little with the rest of his force, halted again. But he ordered a hundred targeteers to go

¹ Above a quarter of a mile.

before, that, when the gates should be opened and the signal given which was before agreed on, they might break in first. These after an interval of time wondered at the delay, and by gradually advancing were got close to the city. Such of the Toroneans within as acted in concert with those who had entered, when once the postern was burnt, and the gates leading to the forum were thrown open after bursting the bar, in the first place conducting some of them about, let them in at the postern, that they might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant inhabitants when attacked in rear, flank, and on all sides. This done, they lifted up the appointed signal of fire, and gave instant admittance to the rest of the targeteers through the gates which led to the forum.

Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, roused up his army, and led them running towards the place, shouting all at once aloud, and thus striking the greatest consternation into the inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at the gates ; others mounted over the square wooden machines, which, as the wall had lately fallen down, and was now rebuilding, lay close to it, for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with the bulk of his force, betook himself immediately to the upper parts of the city, intending to seize the eminence, and possess himself effectually of the place. The rest dispersed themselves equally through every quarter.

Amidst this surprisal, the majority of the Toroneans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in vast confusion : but the agents in it, and all their party, were quickly ranged with the assailants. The Athenians, (for of them there were about fifty heavy-armed asleep in the forum,) when they found what was done, some few excepted who were slain instantly on the spot, fled away for preservation ; and some by land ; others in the

guard-ships stationed there got safe into Lecythus, a sort of their own.. They kept this in their own hands, as it was the extremity of the city towards the sea, stretched along on a narrow isthmus. Hither also those of the Toroneans who persevered in their fidelity fled to them for refuge.

It being now broad day, and the city firmly secured, Brasidas caused a proclamation to be made to those Toroneans who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, that ‘such as were willing might return to their old habitations, and should enjoy their rights without any molestation.’ But to the Athenians a herald was sent expressly, commanding them ‘to evacuate Lecythus, which rightfully belonged to the Chalcideans, and a truce should be granted them to remove themselves and their baggage.’ An evacuation they absolutely refused, but requested one day’s truce to fetch off their dead: he solemnly accorded two. During this space he was very busy in strengthening the houses adjacent to Lecythus, and the Athenians did the same within.

He also convened the Toroneans to a general assembly, and harangued them very nearly in the same manner as he had done at Acanthus, that ‘it was unjust to look on those who had been his coadjutors in the surprisal of the city as men worse than their neighbors, or as traitors; they had no enslaving views, nor were biassed to such a conduct by pecuniary persuasions; the welfare and liberty of the city had been their only object. Neither should they, who had no share in the event, be more abridged than those who had. He was not come thither to destroy the city, or so much as one private inhabitant of it: for this very reason he had caused the proclamation to be made to those who had sheltered themselves amongst the Athenians, because

such an attachment had not in the least impaired them in his esteem; since it was intirely owing to their ignorance that they had thus undervalued the Lacedæmonians, whose actions, as they were always more just, would for the future intitle them much more to their benevolence; their terror hitherto had been merely the result of inexperience.' He then exhorted them in general 'to take care for the future to be steady and firm allies; since, should they henceforth offend, they would be made answerable for the guilt. They were not chargeable for the past, as they had rather been sufferers themselves from superior force; the preceding opposition therefore deserved forgiveness.'

Having spoken thus, and revived their spirits, when the truce was expired he made assaults on Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from a paltry rampart and battlements of the houses. One whole day they effectually repulsed them: but on the following, when a machine was to be planted against them by the enemy, from whence they intended to throw fire on their wooden fences, and the army was now approaching to the spot which seemed convenient for lodging their machine, and whence it might be played off with effect, they raised for prevention a wooden turret, the base of which was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and carried up many buckets, tubs of water, and heavy stones; and on it also many defendants were mounted: but the edifice, too heavily laden, on a sudden was crushed by the weight. The crush with which it fell was great; and those of the Athenians who stood near and saw it were rather concerned than terrified: but those at a distance, and especially such as were most remote, imagining the place was already taken in that quarter, fled amain to the sea and to their vessels.

When Brasidas perceived they were quitting the battlements, and had himself beheld the accident, he led his army to the assault, and immediately carried the fortress. Such as were found within it were instantly destroyed: and the Athenians, in boats and ships, after having thus abandoned it to the enemy, crossed over to the Pallene.

But Brasidas (for in Lecythus there is a temple of Minerva; and before he proceeded to the assault he had publicly proclaimed that a reward of thirty minæ of silver¹ should be given the man who first mounted the rampart), concluding now that it was taken less by human than some other means, reposed the thirty minæ in the temple, as an offering to the goddess: and having demolished Lecythus and cleared all away, he consecrated the whole spot as sacred to her. During the remainder of the winter he provided for the security of the places already in his possession, and was planning future conquests. And with the end of this winter the eighth year of the war expired.

YEAR IX.—Very early in the spring of the ensuing summer the Athenians and Lacedæmonians made a truce to continue for a year. The motives on the Athenian side were these: ‘that Brasidas might no longer seduce any of their towns to revolt, before they were enabled by this interval of leisure to act against him; and besides, that if they reaped any advantage from this truce, they might proceed to a farther accommodation.’ On the Lacedæmonian side it was imagined that ‘the Athenians were under such terrors as in fact they were; and, after a remission of calami-

¹ Ninety-six pounds fifteen shillings.

ties and misfortunes, would more eagerly come into some expedients for a future reconciliation ; of course, would deliver up to them their citizens, and come into a truce for a larger term.' The recovery of the Spartans was a point on which they laid a greater stress than ever, even during the career of success which attended Brasidas. They foresaw, and in case he extended his conquests, and even brought them to a balance with their foes, of those they must for ever be deprived ; and the conflict then proceeding on equal advantages, the dangers also would be equal, and the victory still in suspense.

On the motives, both parties and their allies agreed to a truce of the following tenor :—

' As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it seems good unto us that access be granted to all who desire it, without fraud and without fear, according to the laws of our country. The same is approved of by the Lacedæmonians and their allies now present ; and they promise to send heralds on purpose, and to spare no pains to procure the consent of the Boeotians and Phocians.

' As to the treasure belonging to the god, care shall be taken by us to find out those who have presumed to embezzle it ; and this fairly and honestly, according to the laws of our country, both by you, and by us, and by all others who are willing ; all proceeding respectively according to the laws of their several constitutions.

' It has farther seemed good to the Lacedæmonians and their other allies, if the Athenians agree to the truce, that both parties shall keep within their own bounds, and hold what we are at present respectively possessed of : that is to say, the former to keep in

Coryphasium,¹ within the mountains of Bouphras and Tomeus; the latter of Cythera; without enlarging the communication for the procuring of alliance, neither on our side against you, nor on your side against us. That those in Nisaea and Minoa pass not beyond the road that leads from the gates of Megara adjacent to the temple of Nisus towards the temple of Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune carries directly to the bridge laid across to Minoa: that neither the Megareans nor their allies pass beyond the same road, nor into the island which the Athenians have taken; both keeping within their bounds, and on no occasion whatever to have any intercourse with one another: the Megareans still to retain what they possess in Troezen, and whatever they hold by compact with the Athenians; to have, farther, the free use of the sea on their own coasts, and those of their allies.

‘That the Lacedæmonians and allies shall not navigate the sea in a long ship;² but in any other vessels rowed with oars, and of no larger burden than five hundred talents.³

‘That by virtue of this truce safe conduct be granted both of passage and repassage, either by land or sea, either to Peloponnesus or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassadors, and their whole retinue, however numerous, commissioned to negotiate the determination of the war, or to get controverted points adjudged.

‘That so long as this truce be in force no deserters be entertained, neither by you nor by us, whether they be freemen or slaves.

‘You shall do justice in our causes, and we shall do the same for you, according to the laws of our respec-

¹ In which stood the fort of Pylus.

² A ship of war. ³ Five-and-twenty tons.

tive constitutions, to the end that all controversies may be judicially settled without a war.

‘These articles have the approbation of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. But, if any thing more honorable or more just occurs to you, you are to repair to Lacedæmon, and propose it there: for whatever points you may demonstrate to be just, will in no degree whatever be rejected, neither by the Lacedæmonians nor by their allies: provided the persons charged with these new commissions be sent with full powers to put to them the finishing hand, in the same manner as you require the same conditions from us.

‘This truce shall be in force for a year.’

Ratified by the people.

The Acamantine tribe presided. Phanippus was the notary public. Nicias was in the chair. Laches pronounced—‘Be it for the welfare and prosperity of the Athenians, that a suspension of arms is granted on the terms offered by the Lacedæmonians and allies.’

Agreed in the public assembly of the people,

‘That this suspension shall continue for a year.

‘That it shall take place this very day, being the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion.

‘That during this interval ambassadors and heralds shall pass between them, to adjust the terms on which the war should be definitively concluded.

‘That the generals of the state and the presidents in course shall first at Athens convene an assembly of the people, to adjust the terms on which their embassy should be empowered to put an end to the war. And,

‘That the ambassadors, who were now present in the assembly, shall give a solemn ratification that they will punctually abide by this truce for a year.’

The Lacedæmonians and their allies agreed to these articles, and pledged their oath for the observation of them to the Athenians and their allies at Lacedæmon, on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius.

The persons who settled the articles and assisted at the sacrifice were,

For the Lacedæmonians—Taurus, the son of Echetimidas, Athenæus, the son of Periclidias, Philocharidas, the son of Eryxidaïdas. For the Corinthians—Æneas, the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas, the son of Aristonymus. For the Sicyonians—Damotimus, the son of Naucrates, Onasimus, the son of Megacles. For the Megareans—Nicasus, the son of Cecalus, Menebrates, the son of Amphidorus. For the Epidaurians—Amphias, the son of Eupæidas. For the Athenians—Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephe, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, Autocles, the son of Tolmæus, generals of the state.

In this manner was a suspension of arms concluded, during which they continued without interruption to hold conferences with one another about settling the terms of a firm and lasting peace.

During the interval these matters were thus in agitation, Scione, a city in the Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scioneans indeed in the Pallene give out that they are of Peloponnesus; that their ancestors who settled in these other seats were driven there originally by a storm, which in their return from Troy dispersed the Achæans. When they had notified their revolt to him, Brasidas passed over to Scione by night. A party of his friends sailed before him in a trireme, and he followed at some distance in a fly-boat, to the end that if he should fall in with any vessel larger than this boat, the trireme might make head against her; but if another trireme

of equal strength should come up to them, he judged she would neglect his smaller boat, and would attack the ship, which would give him time to complete his passage in security.

When he was safe landed, and had convened an assembly of Scioneans, he harangued them as he had done before at Acanthus and Torone. But he added farther, that ' they were a people most deserving of applause, since, though the communication with the Pallene, as being an isthmus, was cut off by the Athenians, who were masters of Potidaea, and they were by this means become islanders to all intents and purposes ; yet they had, without prior solicitation, advanced boldly towards liberty, nor could bear to lie in cowardly inactivity till necessity forced them to such measures as tended to their manifest welfare. This was ample proof that they were ready to undergo the greatest perils to obtain the wished-for settlements of their state. He therefore regarded them as in truth the most gallant friends of the Lacedæmonians, and would in all respects do proper honor to their worth.'

The Scioneans were elevated by these handsome commendations. All of them became full of spirits, not even those excepted to whom the prior steps had been by no means agreeable. They cheerfully determined to sustain all future war, and in every shape gave Brasidas honorable entertainment. By public vote they placed on his head a golden crown as the deliverer of Greece, whilst every single Scionean was busy in adorning him with ribbons, and caressing him like a victor in the solemn games. His stay at present was short ; he only placed a small party in the town to secure it, and then repassed to Torone. But soon after he transported thither the greater part of his force, designing with the aid of the Scioneans to make

attempts on Mende and Potidea. He concluded however that the Athenians would lose no time in throwing in a succor as into an island, and so he endeavored to be beforehand with them.

He had already formed an intelligence to the prejudice of those cities to get them betrayed; and he was now intent on executing his schemes against them. But during this pause Aristonymus, despatched by the Athenians, and Athenaeus by the Lacedæmonians to circulate the news, arrived in a trireme, and notified to him the suspension of arms. His forces were then transported back to Torone.

The persons employed communicated the articles of the truce to Brasidas, and all the Lacedæmonian confederates in Thrace declared their acquiescence in what had been done. Aristonymus was well satisfied in other respects; but finding, by computing the days, that the revolt of the Scioneans was too late in point of time, he protested against their being intitled to the benefit of the truce. Brasidas, on the other hand, urged many arguments to prove it prior in time, and refused to restore that city. When therefore Aristonymus had reported this affair at Athens, the Athenians in an instant were ready to take up arms again for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacedæmonians, by an embassy purposely despatched, remonstrated that ‘they should regard such a proceeding as a breach of the truce;’ and asserted ‘their right to the city, as they reposed intire credit on Brasidas: however, they were ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration.’ The others refused to abide by so hazardous a decision, but would recover it as soon as possible by force of arms. They were irritated at the thought that persons seated as it were on an island should presume to revolt from them, and place such confidence in the unprofitable

land-power of the Lacedæmonians. There was, farther, more truth in the date of the revolt than at present the Athenians could evince: for, in fact, the Scioneans revolted two days too late. But at the instigation of Cleon they immediately passed a decree, that 'the Scioneans should be reduced by force, and then put to the sword.' And their attention was recalled from all other points to expedite the needful preparations for the execution of this.

In the mean time Mende, also a city in the Pallene, and a colony of Eretrians, revolted from them. Brasidas received them into his protection, thinking himself justified; as they had openly come over to him in the time of truce. Besides, he had himself some reasons to recriminate on the Athenians, as violators of the articles. On this account the Mendeans were more encouraged to the step, as they saw Brasidas was determined to support them, and were convinced, by the affair of Scione that he would not abandon them. The design farther had been originally set on foot by the few; who, though they delayed it for a time, were resolved to push it into execution; for they apprehended that a discovery might prove fatal to themselves, and so forced the bulk of the people to act against their inclination. But the Athenians, who had a quick intelligence of it, were now exasperated much more than before, and redoubled their preparations against both those places.

Brasidas, who soon expected the arrival of their armament, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scioneans and Mendeans to Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escorted thither by five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians, and three hundred Chalcidic targeteers: the commander of the whole escort was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expecting soon

to be visited by the Athenians, united their endeavors to get things in good order for their reception.

In the interval, Brasidas and Perdiccas marched together a second time into Lyncus against Arribæus. They commanded their separate bodies ; one, the forces of the Macedonians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed Grecians who dwelt amongst them ; the other, the remainder of his own Peloponnesians reinforced by Chalcideans and Acanthians, and quotas from other cities such as they were able to furnish. The number of heavy-armed Grecians computed together amounted to about three thousand : the cavalry that attended, both of Macedonians and Chalcideans, was on the whole little less than a thousand : and the remaining crowd of barbarians was great.

Breaking thus into the territory of Arribæus, and finding the Lyncestians already in the field to oppose them, they also sat down and faced them. The infantry on each side were posted on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. This yielding room for the excursions of the horse, the cavalry of both began a skirmish first. But then Brasidas and Perdiccas, so soon as the Lyncestian heavy-armed were moving first from the eminence to the aid of their cavalry, and were ready to engage, marched also down into the plain to oppose them, where they charged and routed the Lyncestians. A large number of the latter were slain ; the rest fled for preservation to the eminences, and there stood quiet.

The victors after this, having erected a trophy, continued for two or three days in the same post, waiting for the Illyrians who were coming up to join Perdiccas for a stipulated pay. And then Perdiccas intended to advance farther against the villages of Arribæus, and sit no longer inactive. Mende however

was still uppermost in the care of Brasidas: that place must be lost, should the Athenians arrive before it in the interval: the Illyrians besides were not yet come up. He relished not the project, and was more inclined to go back. This engendered some disputes between them, in the midst of which the news was brought that the Illyrians had deserted Perdiccas, and joined themselves with Arribæus. On which it was soon resolved between them to retire, as there was reason to dread the accession of men so renowned for military valor. Yet the disagreement between them prevented their fixing on any certain time for filing off: Night came on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd of barbarians being struck with a sudden panic, as numerous armies are apt to be, without any certain cause, and imagining that much larger numbers were coming against them than in fact was true, and that they were near enough to attack them, they instantly took to their heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas for a time knew nothing of the matter, and when informed of it, was compelled by the flying troops to dislodge in their company, without being able to get a sight of Brasidas: for they were encamped at a distance from each other.

At the dawn of day Brasidas perceived that the Macedonians had dislodged, and that the Illyrians and Arribæus were approaching to attack him. He therefore drew his forces together, forming a square with his heavy-armed, in the centre of which he disposed all the crowd of light-armed; and in this form he intended to retreat. He appointed the youngest men to sally out, in case the enemy any where attacked them; and he himself, with a picked body of three hundred, determined to bring up the rear in person, in order to sustain and make good their retreat against the van of

the enemy who should press on their rear: And before the enemy came near, as well as the hurry would admit, he animated his soldiers thus:

‘ Did I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, that thus abandoned as you are, and ready to be attacked by barbarians, and those numerous too, who were in some consternation, I should judge it needless to instruct or to encourage you. But now, against this desertion of our friends, and this multitude of our enemies, I shall endeavor by a short admonition and exhortation to raise within you the full grandeur of your souls. On you it is incumbent to behave with gallantry in every martial scene; on the account, not merely of acting in the open field in the presence of so many confederates, but of your own hereditary valor. Your souls ought not to be dismayed at a multitude of foes, since you were not born under governments where the many control the few, but where the few command the army. And the only means, by which you acquired this noble privilege, was victorious perseverance in the fields of battle. Yet of these barbarians, your fears of whom are the result of your ignorance, you ought to be informed, from what you have learned yourselves in former conflicts against them with the Macedonians, as well as from what I conjecture, and what I depend on from the accounts of others, that in action they will be by no means terrible: for when an hostile force, though in reality weak, carries with it the appearance of strength, a true discovery of its state is no sooner obtained than it redoubles the courage of their opponents. But men, in whom valor is firmly implanted, none can assault with extraordinary spirit but such as know them not. These enemies of yours are dreadful for a while, merely till brought to trial. Their multitude

renders them terrible to the sight: the loudness of their shouts is insupportable to the ear. Their weapons, brandished about, and clashing in the air, have a frightful and menacing look. But their spirit will not answer their show, when charging against such as will sustain their shock. They are not drawn up with skill, nor will they blush when compelled to quit their ground. To fly from or to fly after an enemy is equally a matter of glory to them: by such things is their valor established and rescued from reproach. For a battle, where every combatant is his own commander, leaves a spacious and handsome opportunity to each of providing for his safety. They this moment judge it more safe to intimidate us at a distance than to run to the charge; for otherwise, before this day they had attacked us. And you plainly see that all the terror which now runs before them will vanish at the onset, as terrible only to sight and hearing. When therefore they advance to the charge, sustain it, and repulse them; and when opportunity serves, fall back into your ranks again with regularity and order. You shall thus the sooner secure your retreat, and be convinced for the time to come that such rabbles, to men who can stand the first fury of their onset, have only made at a distance, and by their pausing, a vain and menacing parade of valor; but such as will give ground and fly before them, they pursue with eagerness, and are excellently brave when there is no resistance.'

After this exhortation Brasidas caused his army to file leisurely off. The barbarians perceiving it, pressed forwards with great noise and clamor, supposing that he fled, and that they might intercept and cut him off. But when the appointed parties sallied out from all quarters to receive them, and Brasidas himself, with his picked body, sustained their charge, they repulsed

them at their first assault, to the great surprise of the enemy. Afterwards, receiving every repeated attack, they beat them off continually; and then, during the intervals of pause, retreated in good order, till at length the bulk of the barbarians discontinued their efforts in the plain against the Greeks under Brasidas, and leaving only a part of their body to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying Macedonians, and such as they overtook they slaughtered. To the narrow pass farther between two hills, which was the entrance into the territories of Arribæus, they hurried before in order to secure it, knowing it to be the only route by which Brasidas could retreat. He was now drawing near it, and in the most difficult part of the passage they were spreading themselves circularly to encompass him on all sides. But Brasidas perceiving their design, ordered the three hundred that marched with him to advance full speed up that hill which he thought was most practicable, and possess themselves of it; and this with the utmost expedition, each as he was able, without regarding form, and endeavor to drive the barbarians thence, who were already posting themselves on it, before they were joined by larger numbers, and could invest him on all sides. They did so, attacked, and made themselves masters of the hill, which enabled the main body of the Grecians to march up without obstruction: for now the barbarians were thrown into consternation, when their detachment had in this manner been beaten off from the eminence. And here they discontinued the pursuit, imagining the enemy had already passed the frontier, and secured their retreat.

Brasidas, when once he was master of the eminences, marched on without molestation; and the very same

day reached Arnissa, the first place within the dominions of Perdiccas. His soldiers indeed, who were exasperated against the Macedonians for having thus precipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of oxen they met with on their route, or whatever baggage lay dropped on the ground, (as such things it was likely should happen in a retreat by night, and confused by fear,) the former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and secreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as his enemy, and ever after forced himself against his inclinations to hate the Peloponnesians; not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athenians, but prevailed on by the exigences of his own affairs, he cast about for the means of being again reconciled to the latter, and disentangling himself from the former.

Brasidas, having retreated through Macedonia to Torone, found the Athenians already in possession of Mende. Judging it impossible now to pass over into the Pallene and drive out the enemy, he chose to remain there and securely to garrison Torone: for, during the time of the expedition into Lyncus, the Athenians had put to sea against Mende and Scione, with the armament they had provided, consisting of fifty ships, ten of which were Chian, of a thousand heavy-armed of their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thousand mercenary Thracians, and a body of targeteers furnished by their adjacent dependants: Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephe, had the command of the whole. They weighed from Potidea, and landing at the temple of Neptune, marched directly for Mende. The Mendeans, with their own force and three hundred Scioceans who were come to their succor, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, in all seven hundred heavy-

armed, under the command of Polydamidas, were encamped without the city on a strong eminence. Nicias taking with him a hundred and twenty light-armed Methoneans and sixty picked men of the heavy-armed Athenians, and all the archers, attempted to mount by a path that led up the eminence ; but, being galled by the enemy, was not able to force the ascent. Nicostratus, with all the rest of the force, having fetched a compass about, in order to mount in a remote quarter, where the ascent was impracticable, was quite thrown into disorder, and thus the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped a total defeat. As therefore the Mendeans and allies maintained their post the whole day, the Athenians drew off and encamped : and when night came on the Mendeans withdrew into the city.

The next day the Athenians sailing round to the Scione side, possessed themselves of the suburbs, and spent the whole day in ravaging the country, as not a soul sallied out to obstruct them ; for some bustles now were on foot in the city inclining to a sedition. The three hundred Scioneans departed also in the succeeding night to their own home : and the day following Nicias, advancing with a moiety of the force within their frontier, ravaged the district of the Scioneans ; whilst Nicostratus, with the remainder, sat down before the upper gates of Mende, from whence the road leads to Potidæa. But Polydamidas, as the Mendeans and the auxiliaries had chanced to ground their arms in this quarter within the wall, drew them up in order of battle, and exhorted the Mendeans to sally out. It was replied in a seditious manner by one of the popular faction, ‘that they would not sally, and would have nothing to do with the war.’ At such a refusal Polydamidas having laid hands on the per-

son, a tumult at once ensued, in which the people ran immediately to arms, and, furious with anger, made towards the Peloponnesians, and all those of the opposite faction who sided with them. They fell on and routed them in an instant, terrified as they were at this sudden assault ; and the gates were thrown open at the same time to the Athenians. They supposed this insurrection had been made against them in consequence of some previous combination ; and as many as escaped out of the scuffle with life fled away to the citadel, which was before in their possession.

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now returned before the city) bursting into Mende, (for it was not opened by composition,) with their whole united force, plundered it as though taken by storm ; nay, the generals had some difficulty to restrain their soldiers from putting the inhabitants to the sword. And after this they issued their commands to the Mendeans to continue their government in the usual form, and to proceed judicially against those of their body whom they esteemed the principal authors of the revolt. Those in the citadel they shut up with a wall extending on both sides to the sea, and posted a guard to secure the blockade.

When in this manner they had possessed themselves of Mende, they marched against Scione. The inhabitants, with the Peloponnesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted themselves on a strong eminence before the city ; which, unless the enemy could take it, would infallibly prevent their walling them about. But the Athenians stormed the post, and after an engagement forcing them to dislodge, they formed their camp, and having erected a trophy, got every thing in readiness for the circumvallation. And no long time after, whilst they were busied in this work, the

auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mende, having forced the guard posted near the sea, got away by night ; and the major part of them, escaping privily through the Athenian camp before Scione, got safe into that town.

When the circumvallation of Scione was in hand, Perdiccas, having despatched a herald for the purpose to the Athenian generals, entered into a new treaty with the Athenians. He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasidas, arising from the retreat out of Lyncus ; and had begun from that time to act in their favor : for it happened that at this very juncture of time Ischagoras the Lacedæmonian was bringing up by land a reinforcement to Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance, commanded him to give some conspicuous proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as to gratify his own resentment, in refusing the Peloponnesians a passage through his dominions, had gained the concurrence of his Thessalian friends ; since with the chief persons of that country he had ever been closely united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped the reinforcement and their convoy, that they dared not attempt to pass through Thessaly. Ischagoras, however, and Aminias, and Aristeus, reached Brasidas in person, being commissioned by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the posture of their affairs, and brought with them some young men of Sparta, though contrary to their laws, who were to take on them the government of the cities which were no longer to be trusted to their former managers. In effect, Clearidas, the son of Cleonymus, they placed as governor in Amphipolis, and Epitelidas, the son of Hesander, in Torone.

This same summer the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespensians ; alleging as the reason, that they

were practising with the Athenians. This demolition had ever been intended ; but its execution was now become more easy, as the flower of their youth had perished in the late battle fought against the Athenians.

This summer also the temple of Juno at Argos was destroyed by fire. Chrysis the priestess had placed a burning torch too near the garlands, and unawares fell fast asleep. The flames broke out, and were raging all around before they were perceived. Chrysis indeed instantly, for fear of the Argives, fled away by night to Phlius. They, according to the law enacted for that purpose, appointed another priestess in her room, whose name was Phacinis. Eight years of this war had elapsed, and it was the middle of the ninth when Chrysis fled.

The circumvallation of Scione also was completed about the close of this summer ; and the Athenians, leaving behind a sufficient body to guard it, drew off the rest of their army.

In the ensuing winter things were quiet between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, because of the suspension of arms. But the Mantineans and Tegeatæ, and the confederates on both sides, engaged at Laodicea of Orestis ; but the victory was doubtful. Each party routed a wing of their opponents, and both sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils to Delphi. Many however were slain on both sides, and the battle was drawn, the night putting an end to the contest. The Tegeatæ indeed passed the night on the field, and immediately erected a trophy : but the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards erected their trophy in opposition.

In the close of this winter, and when the spring was already approaching, Brasidas farther made an attempt on Potidæa. Having approached it in the night, and

applied his ladders, so far he proceeded without causing an alarm: for the bell being passed by, during that interval, before he that carried it forwards could return, the moment was seized for applying them.¹ However, the alarm was taken before he could possibly scale; on which he drew off his army without loss of time, not caring to wait for the return of day. And thus ended the winter; and with it the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history.

¹ The officers regularly went their rounds to see that all the sentinels were at their posts. When they approached any of them, a little bell was rung, to which the sentinel was to answer, in proof that he was at his post and awake. The interval between the rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the sentinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relaxed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme.

BOOK V.

YEAR X. B.C. 422.—IN the following summer, the truce, made for a year, expired, of course, at the time of the Pythian games: and, during this relaxation from war, the Athenians caused the Delians to evacuate the isle of Delos; imagining that, on the taint of some crimes long since committed, they were not sufficiently pure to perform due service to the god, and that this yet was wanting to render that work of purgation complete, in which, as I have already related, they thought themselves justified in demolishing the sepulchres of the dead. The Delians settled again, as fast as they could remove themselves thither, at Atramyttium, bestowed on them for this purpose by Pharnaces.

Cleon,¹ having obtained the commission from the

¹ Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced that he is a very hero, and has prevailed on a majority of the people of Athens to be of the same mind, since, seriously and deliberately, they intrust him with a most important and delicate commission. He now imagines he can carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Brasidas from the head of that accomplished Spartan, even without having Demosthenes for his second. We may guess to what a height of insolence he was now grown from the ‘Knights’ of Aristophanes. And, to set it in the most ludicrous view, the poet opens his play with Nicias and Demosthenes, whom he paints in a very injurious manner; and, no doubt, it must have been very grating to them to see themselves represented in so low buffoonery on the stage at Athens. ‘Demosthenes begins with a shower of curses on that execrable Paphlagonian, Cleon; Nicias seconds him; and then, both of them howl together in a most lamentable duetto. They next lay their heads together about some means of redress. Demosthenes proposes getting out of their master, Cleon’s, reach. ‘Let us go, then,’ says Nicias.

Athenians, went by sea into the Thracian dominions, so soon as the suspension of arms expired, having under his command twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred horsemen, and larger numbers of their allied forces. His whole armament consisted of thirty sail. Touching first at Scione, yet blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy-armed, stationed there as guards; and standing away, entered the haven of the Colophonians, lying at no great distance from Torone. Being here informed by the deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants able to make head against him, he marched his forces by land towards that city, and sent ten of his ships about, to stand in for the harbor. His first approach was to the new rampart, which Brasidas had thrown up quite round the city, in order to inclose the suburbs within its cincture; and thus, by the demolition of the old wall,

'Ay; let us go,' cries Demosthenes. 'Say no more,' says Nicias, 'let us go over to the enemy.'—'Ay, over to the enemy,' adds the other. 'But first,' says Nicias, 'let us go and prostrate ourselves before the images of the gods.'—'What images?' says Demosthenes; 'dost thou think then there are any gods?'—'I do.'—'On what grounds?'—'Because I am undeservedly the object of their hatred.' Such are the daring misrepresentations Aristophanes makes of characters that by no means deserve it! Demosthenes afterwards describes the arrogance of Cleon thus: 'He has one foot fixed in Pylus, and the other in the assembly of the people. When he moves, he struts and stretches at such a rate, that his body is in Thrace, his hands in Ætolia, and his attention amongst the tribes at home.' Nicias then proposes poisoning themselves by drinking bull's blood, like Themistocles:—'Or rather,' says Demosthenes, 'a dose of good wine.' This is agreed on, in order to cheer up their spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon, and play off against him the seller of black-puddings. Nicias accordingly goes and steals the wine. Yet, in spite of the most outrageous ridicule, and the opposition of all wise and honest men at Athens, we see Cleon now at the head of an army, to stop the rapid conquests of Brasidas.

had rendered it one intire city. When the Athenians came to the assault, Pasitelidas, the Lacedæmonian (who was commandant), and the garrison under his command, exerted themselves in its defence. But when they could no longer maintain it, and at the same time the ships, sent round on purpose, had entered the harbor, Pasitelidas, fearing lest the ships might take the town, now left defenceless, and when the rampart was carried by the enemy, he himself might be intercepted, abandoned it immediately, and retired with all speed into the town ; but the Athenians were already disembarked, and masters of the place. The land force also broke in instantly at his heels, by rushing along through the aperture in the old wall ; and some, as well Peloponnesians as Toroneans, they slew in the moment of irruption. Some also they took alive, amongst whom was Pasitelidas, the commandant. Brasidas was indeed coming up to its relief, but, receiving intelligence on his march that it was taken, he retired ; since he was forty stadia¹ off, too great a distance to prevent the enemy.

But Cleon and the Athenians now erected two trophies ; one on the harbor, the other at the rampart. They farther doomed to slavery the wives and children of the Toroneans. The male inhabitants, together with the Peloponnesians and every Chalcidean that was found amongst them, amounting in all to seven hundred, they sent away captives to Athens. The Peloponnesians indeed were afterwards released, by virtue of the subsequent treaty : the rest were fetched away by the Olynthians, who made exchanges for them, body for body.

¹ About four miles.

About the same time the Boeotians, by treachery, got possession of Panactum, a fort on the frontier, belonging to the Athenians.

As for Cleon, having established a garrison at Torone, he departed thence, and sailed round Athos, as bound against Amphipolis.

But two vessels about this time, bound for Italy and Sicily, sailed out of the harbor of Athens, having on board Phœax, the son of Erasistratus, with whom two other persons were joined in commission, to execute an embassy there: for the Leontines, after the departure of the Athenians from Sicily, in consequence of the joint accommodation, had inrolled many strangers as denizens of their city, and the populace had a plan in agitation for a distribution of the lands. The noble, alarmed at this, gain the concurrence of the Syracusans, and eject the commons. They were dispersed, and wandered up and down as so many vagabonds; whilst the nobles, making an agreement with the Syracusans, abandoned and left in desolation their own city, settling at Syracuse as free citizens of that place. And yet, soon after, some of this number, dissatisfied even here, forsook Syracuse again, and seized on Phocea, a quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and on Brictinniæ, which is a 'fortress in the Leontine. Hither the greater part of the ejected commons resorted to them; and, adhering firmly together, from these strongholds they annoyed the country by their hostilities.

When the Athenians had intelligence of this, they sent out Phœax, to persuade, by all proper methods, their old allies in that country, and to gain, if possible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians to take up arms, for the preservation of the people of Leontium, against the encroaching power of the Syracusans. Phœax, on his arrival, recommended the scheme successfully to

the Camarineans and Agrigentines. But his negotiations meeting with some obstacles at Gela, he desisted from addressing himself to the rest, since he was assured he could not possibly succeed. Retiring therefore through the district of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on his road at Bricinniæ, and having encouraged the malcontents there to persevere, he departed. Not but that, in this Sicilian voyage, both passing and re-passing, and also on the coast of Italy, he had urged to several cities ‘ how expedient for them was the Athenian friendship.’

He met also in his course with those Locrians who were going to another settlement, after expulsion from Messene. They had been driven to this necessity by seditious factions at Messene, one of which had invited them thither since the joint accommodation among the Sicilians ; and now they were forced to shift again, though Messene had for a time been intirely in their power. Phœax therefore, meeting with these in their removal, gave them no annoyance ; for the Locrians had been at a conference with him, to concert the measures of an agreement with the Athenians. These, however, were the only party of all the confederates who, when the Sicilians had amicably ended their disputes, refused to treat with the Athenians, and were brought to such submission since merely by a war, in which they were embroiled against the Itonians and Meleans, who bordered on them, and were colonies of their own. And, some time after this, Phœax truly returned to Athens.

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone about by sea against Amphipolis, marching away from Eion, made an assault on Stagirus, a colony of Andrians, but without success ; yet Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he took by storm. He sent farther ambassadors to

Perdiccas, to summon his attendance in the expedition, according to the tenor of the new alliance. He sent others into Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, that he would hire as large a body of Thracians as could be got, and bring them up under his own orders. And during this interval he himself lay quiet at Eion.

But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, placed himself in an opposite post at Cerdylum. This place belongs to the Argilians, and is seated on an eminence on the other side of the river, and at no great distance from Amphipolis. From hence he had a perfect view of all Cleon's motions; so that now it was impossible for the latter to make any approach with his army, from thence to Amphipolis, without being discovered. Brasidas, however, suspected that Cleon would approach, and from a contempt of his opponents, would certainly advance thither, without waiting for reinforcements.

He had, at the same time, provided himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and had assembled all the Edonian targeteers and horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and Chalcideans he had a thousand targeteers, besides those in Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy-armed of all sorts amounted to about two thousand; and he had three hundred Grecian horsemen. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself at Cerdylum; the rest were left in Amphipolis, under the orders of Clearidas.

Cleon remained without stirring for the present, but was soon forced to such a step as Brasidas expected. The soldiers were chagrined at their inactivity, and were disparaging his conduct by invidious parallels, ‘against how much skill and courage, with how much

unskilfulness and cowardice, he was matched ;' and that, 'with the highest regret they had attended him from Athens on this expedition.' Sensible of their discontent, and unwilling to disgust them more, by too long a continuance in the same post, he drew them up and led them on. He acted now, on the vain conceit with which his success at Pylus had puffed him up, as a man of great importance. It could not enter his mind that the enemy would presume to march out against and offer him battle. He gave out, that 'he was only advancing in order to view the place ; he waited indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if they were needful to his security, should the enemy attack him, but to enable him completely to invest the city, and to take it by storm.' Having advanced, he posted his troops on a strong eminence before Amphipolis, and went in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, and the situation of the city on the side of Thrace, how it really was. He judged he could retreat at pleasure without a battle. Not so much as one person appeared on the works, or issued out at the gates ; for they were all shut fast. He now concluded himself guilty of a mistake in coming so near the place without the machines, 'as the town must infallibly have been taken, because abandoned.'

Brasidas, however, had no sooner perceived that the Athenians were in motion, than, descending from Cerdylium, he marched into Amphipolis. He there waved all manner of sally, and all show of opposition against the Athenians. He was afraid of trusting too much to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to the enemy, not truly in numbers, for so far they were nearly balanced, but in real worth : for the Athenian force appointed for this service was composed of the very flower of Athens, and the choicest troops of the Lemnians and

Imbrians : for this reason he prepared to assail them with art ; because, in case he gave the enemy a view of his numbers, and of the sorry manner in which they were armed, he judged he should be less likely to gain a victory, than by concealing them till the moment of action, and avoiding that contempt which their real state would have inspired. Picking out, therefore, a party of one hundred and fifty heavy-armed for himself, and appointing Clearidas to command the rest, he designed to fall suddenly on the Athenians in their retreat ; concluding he should never again find them in this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements they expected were come up. Calling therefore all his soldiers around him, as he was desirous of animating them, and letting them into his scheme, he harangued them thus :

‘ Ye men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice that I briefly put you in mind that we are natives of that country which has ever by valor preserved itself free, and that you of the Doric are now going to attack your opponents of the Ionic descent, whom you are inured to defeat. My words are chiefly designed to inform you in what manner I have planned the method of attack, lest hazarding the event with so small a party, and not with our intire force, may seem unequal to the work, and may too much dispirit you. The enemy, I conjecture, from an utter contempt of us, and a strong presumption that we durst not go out into the field against them, have shown themselves before this city ; and this very moment, disorderly, scattered as they are to view the situation, they heartily despise us. The leader, therefore, who has the most acuteness in detecting such plunders in a foe, and then seizes the proper moment to fall on them, as best enabled by his own strength ; not so much in the open and regular

manner of a methodical fight, as with a surprise, most advantageous in the present juncture; such a leader may, for the most part, be assured of success. Such stealths as these draw after them the highest glory: by these, the man, who overreaches his enemy the most, performs the most substantial service for his friends. Whilst, therefore, haughtily presuming on their own worth, they remain thus disordered, and, by what appears to me, are bent more on drawing off than remaining here; during this their intermission of purpose, and before their resolutions can be regularly adjusted, I myself, at the head of my chosen party, will be amongst them, if possible, and will rush with vigor into the centre of their army. And then, Clearidas, when once you perceive that I am engaged, and as in probability it must be, have thrown them into disorder; then, at the head of yours, accompanied by the Amphipolitans and the rest of the confederates, throw open the gates on a sudden for your sally, and advance with your utmost speed to the charge. And thus, it may confidently be hoped, the enemy must be thrown into the utmost consternation; because a second body, thus running to the charge, is more terrible to the foes than the present which is already engaged. And show yourself now, Clearidas, that gallant man, which in honor, as a Spartan, you ought to be.

' You in general, ye confederates, I exhort to follow with manly resolution, and to remember that good soldiers are bound in duty to be full of spirit, to be sensible of shame, and to obey commanders; that this very day, if you behave with valor, you are henceforth free, and will gain the honorable title of Lacedæmonian allies; otherwise must continue to be the slaves of the Athenians; where the best that can befall you, if neither sold for slaves nor put to death as

rebels, will be a heavier yoke of tyranny than you ever yet have felt, whilst the liberty of the rest of Greece must by you for ever be obstructed. But so dastardly behavior I conjure you to scorn, as you know for what valuable prizes you are to enter the lists. I myself shall convince you, that I am not more ready to put others in mind of their duty, than personally to discharge my own through the whole scene of action.'

Brasidas, having ended his harangue, prepared to sally out himself, and placed the main body under the orders of Clearidas, at the gates which are called the Thracian, to be ready to rush out at the appointed time.

To Cleon now, for Brasidas had been plainly seen coming down from Cerdylion; and, as the prospect of the city lay open to those without, had been seen also when sacrificing before the temple of Minerva, and forming the proper dispositions: to Cleon, I say, who was now in a remote quarter to view the posts, advice was brought, that 'the whole force of the enemy was visibly drawn up within the city, and that under the gates, many feet of horses and men might be discerned, as ready for a sally.' On hearing this he went to the place, and was convinced by his own sight. He determined, however, not to hazard a battle before his succors were arrived; and though he knew his motions could not be concealed, he went off, and ordered the signal to be given for a retreat; commanding farther that the left wing should file off first, which indeed was the only method of drawing off securely to Eion. But as they seemed to him to be long about it, he wheeled off himself at the head of the right; and thus exposing his men to the missive weapons of the enemy, was drawing off his army.

At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was time to attack, since the army of the Athenians was already in motion, said to those about him, and to all that were near, ‘ These gentlemen wait not for us ; that plainly appears by the shaking of their spears and heads ; for those who make such motions are not used to stay for the enemy’s approach. But let somebody throw me open the appointed gates, and let us boldly and with all speed sally out against them.’ In effect, Brasidas, issuing at the gates of the intrenchment, and the first of what was then the long wall, advanced with all speed directly along the road, where now stands the trophy, to be seen by those who pass along by the strongest part of the town, and falling on the Athenians, dismayed not only at their own irregular situation, but also terrified at his bold attack in the very centre of their army, he put them to the rout. And now Clearidas, sallying out according to order at the Thracian gates, was advancing to second him. The consequence was, that by such an unexpected and sudden assault on both sides, the Athenians were thrown into the highest confusion. Their left wing, which inclined the most towards Eion, as having filed off first, was instantly broken, and fled. These were no sooner dispersed in flight than Brasidas, advancing to the attack of the right, was wounded : he dropped, but the Athenians were not sensible of it. Those who were near him took him up, and carried him off. This accident, however, enabled the right wing of the Athenians to maintain their ground the longer ; though Cleon, who from the first had never intended to stand an engagement, fled instantly away ; and being intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, was slain. But his heavy-armed embodying together, and gaining an eminence, repulsed Clearidas, who twice or thrice attacked

them, and maintained their ground till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry and the targeteers, surrounding and pouring in their darts on them, compelled them to fly. Thus the whole Athenian army was distressed in a laborious flight: they ran different ways amongst the mountains; numbers had been destroyed in the charge, others by the Chalcidic horse and targeteers; but the remainder escaped in safety to Eion.

Those who took up Brasidas, when he dropped in the action, and bore him off, carried him into the city yet alive. His senses remained till he heard his party were victorious, and soon after that he expired.¹

The rest of the army, with Clearidas, being come back from the pursuit, rifled the dead, and erected a trophy.

This done, all the confederates assisted under arms at the funeral of Brasidas, whom they interred at the public expense within the city, near the place where the forum now stands: and afterwards the Amphipolitans, having inclosed his monument, performed sacrifice to him as a hero. They also enacted solemn games in his honor, and annual sacrifices. Nay, they ascribed their colony to him as founder, after demolishing the edifices of Agnon, and defacing every memorial which might continue the memory of his foundation. They acted thus, partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at

¹ The first embassy, which came from the Grecians in Thrace to Sparta, after the death of Brasidas, made a visit to his mother Argileonis. The first question she asked them was, ‘Did my son die bravely?’ And when the ambassadors expatiated largely in his praise, and said, at last, ‘There was no such another Spartan left alive.’—‘You mistake, gentlemen,’ said the mother, ‘my son was a good man, but there are many better men than he in Sparta.’ Plutarch’s Laconic Apophthegms.

this juncture to show their high respect for the Lacedæmonian alliance, as they stood in great dread of the Athenians : for, considering their hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they thought it neither for their interest nor satisfaction to continue the honors of Agnon.

To the Athenians they also delivered the bodies of their dead. The number of them on the Athenian side amounted to six hundred, whereas the enemy lost but seven men. This was owing to the nature of the fight, which had not been carried on in a regular manner, but was rather a slaughter, in consequence of a surprise and sudden consternation. After the reception of their dead, the Athenians sailed away for Athens ; but those under the orders of Clearidas applied themselves to resettle and secure Amphipolis.

About the same time, in the close of this summer, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydias, Lacedæmonians, were conducting up, for the Thracian service, a reinforcement, consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being arrived at Heraclea, in Trachis, they regulated there such things as seemed to require an amendment ; and, during the season they halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was fought, and the summer ended.

But, early as possible in the succeeding winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of Thessaly. But the Thessalians opposing their farther passage, and Brasidas being now dead, to whom they were now conducting this supply, they returned home. They imagined that their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athenians, in consequence of their overthrow, had quitted that country ; and themselves had not sufficient ability to carry the plans into execution which Brasidas had been medi-

tating. But the principal motive of their return was their own consciousness, at setting out, that the Lacedæmonians were more inclined to peace.

It so fell out, indeed, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither of the parties meddled any longer with the operations of the war, but were more inclined to a peace. The motives on the Athenian side were these: they had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a second lately at Amphipolis: hence they no longer entertained that assured confidence of their own strength, which had formerly occasioned them to reject all accommodations; as they imagined, in their then career of success, they should soon give law to their enemies. Now also they were under apprehensions of their dependents, lest, buoyed up by the late misfortunes of Athens, they might the sooner be induced to revolt. And they heartily repented now that they had neglected the fine opportunity which their success at Pylus gave them, of bringing the dispute to a happy termination.

On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians acted on these motives: they found themselves strangely mistaken in the events of war. At its commencement, they imagined that in the space of a few years they should intirely have demolished the power of the Athenians, by laying their territory waste; but they had suffered a terrible calamity in the affair of Sphacteria, such as never before had been the lot of Sparta. Devastations now were extended over all their country, from Pylus to Cythera. Their helots had also in numbers deserted to the foe; and they lived in constant expectation that those who yet persevered in their allegiance, gained by the solicitations of those who were fled, might in the present low ebb of Sparta at-

tempt to subvert their constitution, as had formerly been the case. It happened, farther, that the thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring ; and the Argives were unwilling to renew it, unless the Cynuria was previously restored. They judged it therefore a plain impossibility to make head at the same time against both Argives and Athenians. They had also a suspicion that some cities of Peloponnesus would revolt from them to the Argives, which proved afterwards true.

Both parties then, being respectively influenced by such considerations, an accommodation was judged to be expedient. The anxiety of the Lacedæmonians about it was not the least, as they were eagerly bent on recovering their prisoners that had been taken at Sphacteria ; for they were all citizens of Sparta of the first rank, and allied to the most honorable families. They had begun to solicit their liberty as soon as ever they were taken ; but the Athenians, flushed with conquest, at that time disdained to treat. Yet, after the blow received at Delium, the Lacedæmonians, knowing then they were become more tractable, laid hold of the favorable juncture, and obtained a cessation of arms for a year ; in which space they were, by article, to hold mutual conferences, in order to settle an accommodation for a longer time. And since the Athenians had now again more lately been totally defeated at Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Brasidas was dead, both of whom had most strenuously opposed an accommodation ; the latter, because he was successful and reaped glories in war ; the former, because in a season of tranquillity his villanies must needs be detected, and his bold calumniations lose all credit : the persons who at present were chief in the management of either state were more strongly disposed than ever

to adjust disputes. These were, Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, by far the most successful general of that age. Nicias desired it, as hitherto he had never been defeated, and was bent on securing his own prosperity on a lasting foundation, on obtaining a relaxation of toils for himself, and of their present burdens for his fellow-citizens; and on leaving his name illustrious to posterity, as one who had never involved his country in calamity. These views, he judged, could only be accomplished by safety from danger, by exposing himself as little as possible to the uncertainties of fortune; and safety from danger was compatible solely with peace. Pleistoanax had been calumniated by his enemies on account of his restoration; and they invidiously suggested to his prejudice, on every loss whatever which the Lacedæmonians sustained, that such was the consequence of transgressing the laws in the repeal of his banishment: for they laid to his charge that, in concert with his brother Aristocles, he had suborned the priestess of Delphi to give one general answer to all the deputations sent by the Lacedæmonians to consult the oracle, that 'they should bring back the seed of the demi-god son of Jove from a foreign land into their own country: if not, they should plough with a silver ploughshare:' and thus, at length, so seduced the Lacedæmonians in favor of an exile, residing at Lycæum, on account of his precipitate retreat out of Attica, as though purchased by bribes from the enemy, and from a dread of his countrymen dwelling in a house, one half of which was part of the temple of Jupiter, that nineteen years after they conducted him home with the same solemn processions and sacrifices as those who were the original founders of Lacedæmon had appointed for

the inauguration of their kings. Repining therefore at these calumniations, and judging that, as peace gives no room for miscarriage, and that farther, if the Lacedæmonians could recover the prisoners, his enemies would be debarred of a handle for detraction ; whereas, whilst the chances of war subsisted, the persons at the helm of government must be liable to reproaches for every disaster, he was earnestly desirous to bring about an accommodation.

This winter therefore they proceeded to a conference ; and, at the approach of spring, great preparations were openly in hand on the Lacedæmonian side ; and a scheme for fortifying in Attica was circulated through all the states, in order to render the Athenians more compliant. Many meetings were held, and many demands, with large justifications, were urged on both sides; till at length it was agreed, that ‘ a peace should be concluded, each party restoring what they had conquered in the war ; but Nisæa to remain in the hands of the Athenians.’ Platea was redemanded by the latter ; but the Thebans urged that it had not fallen into their hands by force or by treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance of a free and voluntary surrender. And on the same plea the Athenians kept Nisæa.

Things being so far adjusted, the Lacedæmonians called together their confederates ; and all their voices, excepting those of the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, who were not at all satisfied with these proceedings, concurring for a peace, they ratified the accommodation, and solemnly pledged the observance of it to the Athenians ; who, in exchange, swore the same to the Lacedæmonians, in effect as follows :—

‘ The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and their allies, have made peace on these terms, and every state has sworn to their observance.

‘In regard to the common temples: permission is granted to all who desire it, to sacrifice, to visit, to consult the oracles, to send public deputations, in the prescribed forms of every people, both by land and sea, without any molestation.

‘That the sacred soil, and the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and Delphi itself, be ruled after its own model, be taxed at its own discretion, and be administered by its own magistrates, whose determinations to be final, both in regard to life and property, according to the primitive laws of the place.

‘That this peace continue for the space of fifty years, between the Athenians and the confederates of the Athenians on the one side, and the Lacedæmonians and the confederates of the Lacedæmonians on the other, without fraud and without molestation, both at land and sea.

‘Be it farther unlawful for either party to take up arms to the detriment of the other; neither the Lacedæmonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies; nor the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, without any fraud or evasion whatsoever. And if any difference intervene between the contracting parties, let it be adjusted according to equity and on oath, in such manner as they shall agree.

‘Agreed, farther, that the Lacedæmonians and allies deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians.

‘That whatever cities the Lacedæmonians deliver up to the Athenians, leave be given to the inhabitants to remove, at their own discretion, with all their effects.

‘That the cities, which pay the assessments rated by Aristides, enjoy all their rights and privileges whatever

And be it unlawful for the Athenians and their

allies to take up arms to the annoyance of those cities which pay that assessment, from the time that this treaty be in force. Those cities are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus : these cities to observe a strict neutrality, forming no engagements with either Lacedæmonians or Athenians. Provided, that if the Athenians can by fair means prevail on these cities, it be lawful for the Athenians to admit them confederates at their own free choice.

' That the Mecyberneans, and Saneans, and Siueans shall inhabit their own cities in the same manner as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

' Agreed, farther, that the Lacedæmonians and allies restore Panactum to the Athenians.

' That the Athenians restore to the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium,¹ and Cythera, and Methone, and Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all the Lacedæmonians, now prisoners of the state at Athens, or public prisoners in any quarter soever within the dominions of Athens : and to give leave of departure to all the Peloponnesians blocked up in Scione, and to all the confederates of the Peloponnesians, whatever, in Scione, and to all persons whatever whom Brasidas placed there. This article also to extend to any confederates of the Lacedæmonians, now public prisoners at Athens, or public prisoners in any other quarter of the Athenian dominions.

' That, in return, the Lacedæmonians and allies release all the prisoners, both Athenians and confederates, which are now in their hands.

' That, in regard to the Scioneans, Toroneans, and Sermylians, and any other city belonging, of right, to

¹ This includes the fort of Pylus, seated on the cape of Coryphasium.

the Athenians, the Athenians to proceed with the cities specified, and all the others, at their own discretion.

‘That the Athenians shall swear observance to the Lacedæmonians and their allies, separately, according to their cities. Let both sides swear, in the most solemn manner, according to the forms of each separate state; and the oath to be conceived in these words: ‘I abide by my compacts and the present articles, honestly, and without equivocation.’ Be an oath taken, to the Athenians, by the Lacedæmonians and allies to the same purport.

‘Be this oath renewed annually by the contracting parties.

‘Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pythus, at the Isthmus, at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the Amykleum, with this treaty inscribed on them.

‘If any point be in any manner or degree for the present, through forgetfulness on either side, omitted; or, if any thing, on a serious consultation holden, be judged more proper, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians are empowered, with all due regard to their oaths, to make additions and alterations, at their joint discretion.

‘Pleistolas, presiding in the college of ephori, put this treaty in force at Sparta, on the twenty-seventh day of the month Artemisius: at Athens, Alcæus, the archon, on the twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion.

‘Those who took the oath and sacrificed were,

‘On the Lacedæmonian side:—Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcianidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus.

'On the Athenian:—Lampo, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes.'

This treaty was perfected on the close of the winter, in the first commencement of the spring, immediately after the Bacchanalian festivals at Athens. Ten complete years, and some few days over, were elapsed since the first irruption into Attica, and an open commencement of the war. And let him, that would be assured of the truth, compute only by the seasons of the year, and not by those who, in the contending states, were either archons, or, by the offices they bore, had events distinguished by enumeration of their names: for it cannot be exactly known in what determinate part, whether in the beginning or middle, or any other portion of a magistracy, any important event occurred. But, if the computation proceed by summers and winters, which method I have observed, such an inquirer will find that these two halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten complete summers, and the same number of winters, elapsed in the course of this first part of the war.

The Lacedæmonians, for to them it fell by lot to make the first restitutions, released immediately what prisoners they had in their hands; and having despatched Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, in the quality of their ambassadors to the cities of Thrace, ordered Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and all the confederates there to submit to the terms of the treaty according to the stipulation given for them. But this they positively refused, as they judged the treaty prejudicial. Clearidas also, to ingratiate himself with the Chalcideans, would not deliver up Amphipolis, alleging, that without their con-

currence he could not possibly do it. He himself returned in person soon after with the ambassadors, in order to make his defence at Lacedæmon, should Ischagoras accuse him there of disobeying orders. His view was, farther, to try if the accommodation could by any means be evaded. But when he found it fast confirmed, he posted back with all speed to his government, having express orders from the Lacedæmonians to deliver up Amphipolis; or, if that was beyond his power, to cause all the Peloponnesians within that garrison instantly to evacuate the place.

The confederates happened, at this juncture, to be at Lacedæmon, where such of them, as had hitherto refused to accept the treaty, were ordered by the Lacedæmonians to accede to it. But this they positively refused, alleging the same reason as before; and plainly affirming, that ‘they would not come in till better terms than the present were obtained for them.’ Their remonstrance had no effect on the Lacedæmonians, who sent them away without redress, and struck up forthwith an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Athenians. They had reason to conclude that ‘the Argives would come to no agreement with them;’ since they had lately declared a negative to their ambassadors, Ampelidas and Lichas; ‘and yet these Argives,’ they judged, ‘could be no dreadful foe without the Athenians; and that the rest of Peloponnesus would not now presume to interfere, who, without this method of prevention, would certainly have gone over to the Athenians.’ An Athenian embassy, therefore, being at this crisis resident amongst them, a conference was holden, and the terms completely adjusted. The ratification was made by solemn oath, and the articles of this alliance, offensive and defensive, were these:

‘ The Lacedæmonians enter into this alliance for the term of fifty years: provided that,

‘ If any enemy enter the territories of the Lacedæmonians, and commit any manner of hostilities to their prejudice, the Athenians march forthwith to their succor, with all possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

‘ And, in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the state under which they acted be declared an enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that state; nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting states.

‘ These terms to be observed with honor, with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever.

‘ Provided farther; that, if any enemy enter the territories of the Athenians, and commit hostilities to the prejudice of the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians march forthwith to their succor, with all the possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

‘ And in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the state under which they acted be declared an enemy both to Lacedæmonians and Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that state, nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting states.

‘ These terms also to be observed with honor, with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever.

‘ Provided farther; that, if there happen any insurrection among the helots, the Athenians march to the succor of the Lacedæmonians with their whole strength, to the full extent of their power.

‘ The same persons, on both sides, shall swear to the observance of these articles, who swore to the former treaty.

‘The oaths to be annually renewed; for which purpose the Lacedæmonians shall give their attendance at Athens, at the Bacchanalian festival; and the Athenians theirs at Lacedæmon, at the Hyacinthian.

‘Both parties to erect their pillar; one at Lacedæmon, near Apollo’s, in the Amycleum; the other at Athens, near Minerva’s, in the citadel.

‘And, in case the Lacedæmonians and Athenians think proper to make any additions or alterations in the terms of this alliance, the same lawfully to be done by both, at their joint discretion.

‘The oath of observance was sworn,

‘On the Lacedæmonian side by Pleistoanax,¹ Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus.

‘On the Athenian side by Lampo, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtillus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes.’

This alliance was concluded in a very little time after the treaty of peace: and the Athenians now released to the Lacedæmonians their Spartans who were made prisoners at Sphacteria. The summer also of the eleventh year was now begun; and so far the transactions of these first ten years of this war, closely carried on, have been regularly compiled.

YEAR XI.—After the treaty of peace and the alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, both which were concluded after the ten years’ war, at the time when Pleistolas presided

¹ The kings signed this alliance, but did not sign the former treaty.

in the college of ephori at Sparta, and Alcæus was archon at Athens, the peace became in force amongst the acceding parties. But the Corinthians and some of the Peloponnesian states were endeavoring the overthrow of all these proceedings: and immediately there arose another great tumult amongst the confederates, against Lacedæmon. More than this, as time advanced, the Lacedæmonians became suspected by the Athenians, as they showed no great punctuality in executing the conditions of the peace. For the space of six years and ten months, they refrained indeed from entering one another's territory in a hostile manner: but, during such a correspondence, which abounded in suspicions, they were, in all other respects, active in a reciprocal annoyance. And at length, necessitated to dissolve the treaty concluded at the ten years' period, they engaged afresh in open war.

The same Thucydides, an Athenian, has also compiled an account of these latter transactions in a regular series, according to the summers and winters, down to that period of time when the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the long walls and the Piræus. The whole continuance of the war to this period was twenty-seven years. And, if any man be inclined to think that this intervening accommodation should not be reckoned as war, he will find no arguments to support his opinion: for, let him only survey the transactions as they are distinctly related, and he will find it an absurdity to pronounce that an interval of peace, in which neither all the restitutions were made, nor the benefits obtained, which the mutual stipulations required. And, setting these considerations aside, in the Mantinean, and Epidauric, and other wars, transgressions were committed on both sides. The confederates also of

Thrace continued still to be as great enemies as ever; and the Boeotians never agreed to more than a bare cessation of arms, renewable every tenth day.

Including, therefore, the first war, which lasted ten years, and that suspicious interval which ensued, and ended at last in a second open rupture, the whole continuance, if computed by summers and winters, will turn out on inquiry, to have been so many years, and some few additional days. And such as laid stress on the predictions of oracles can assent only to this computation as genuine. For my own part, I perfectly well remember that, not only at the commencement, but even during the whole course of the war, many such predictions were given out, that ‘it must needs continue three times nine years.’ I also lived through its whole extent, in the very flower of my understanding and strength, and with a close application of my thoughts to gain an exact insight into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot to suffer a twenty years’ exile from my country, after my employment in the business of Amphipolis, and to be present at the transactions of both parties, and not the least at those of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishment, by which means I had leisure to gather more ample information about them. I shall relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the treaty, subsequent to the first ten years, and the incidents of the war which afterwards ensued.

On the conclusion of the treaty of peace for fifty years, and the subsequent alliance, the embassies from the different states of Peloponnesus, who had been summoned thither to give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedaemon. The rest of them indeed went directly home; but the Corinthians, stopping in their return at Argos, began first, at a conference with some

of the magistracy there, to insinuate, ‘that since the Lacedæmonians, not in order to serve but to enslave Peloponnesus, had entered into a treaty and an alliance, offensive and defensive, with their once most inveterate foes, the Athenians, it highly behoved the Argives now to watch over the preservation of Peloponnesus, and to form a public resolution—that any Grecian state, which is free and uncontrolled, which enjoys and supports an equal share of rights and privileges, might enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Argives, for the guard of their mutual properties against their common foes:—this to be communicated only to the few who were absolute masters of the decisions of each state, and every where to shun all conference with the bulk of the people, lest the scheme might be detected, in case the multitude should refuse their concurrence.’ They assured them that the majority of the states were so exasperated against the Lacedæmonians, that they would infallibly come in; and, after suggesting such a course, the Corinthians also returned home.

The persons at Argos, who had listened to these insinuations, reported the scheme, in the next place, to the whole magistracy and the people of Argos. The Argives resolved accordingly, and elected a committee of twelve, with whom such Grecians as desired it, might agree on an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians excepted. Neither of these states were permitted to treat with the Argives, without the public consent of the whole people.

The Argives were the more readily persuaded to such a measure, as they plainly saw a war was unavoidable between themselves and the Lacedæmonians; for the truce between them was on the point of expiring. They were also animated by the hope of

gaining into their hands the sovereignty of Peloponnesus: for, at this juncture of time, Lacedæmon lay under the greatest discredit, and was fallen into utter contempt on account of their late disasters; whereas the Argives were in the high vigor of their strength in all respects, as they had never interfered in the Attic war; and, having observed an exact neutrality with both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. The Argives, therefore, in this manner invited those Grecians who were willing to enter into their alliance.

The Mantineans and allies were the first who, out of a dread of the Lacedæmonians, accepted the proposal: for these Mantineans, in the heat of the war against the Athenians, had seized and appropriated to themselves a certain district of Arcadia subject to Lacedæmon, and now concluded that the Lacedæmonians would never leave them in the quiet possession of it, when they were at liberty to act for its recovery. This readily induced them to have recourse to the league of Argos, regarded by them as a powerful state, which had ever been at variance with Lacedæmon, and, like their own, was democratical.

No sooner had the Mantineans revolted than the rest of Peloponnesus began to mutter that 'they ought also to take the same step,' imagining that revolt to have been founded on some stronger reasons than yet appeared; exasperated also against the Lacedæmonians for sundry reasons, and, above all, for this article in the peace with Athens,—that, 'in case the two states of Lacedæmon and Athens think proper to make any additions or alterations, the same to be lawful:' for this was the clause which gave the greatest alarm to Peloponnesus, and inspired a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might make a bargain with the Athenians to enslave the other states; since, in justice, no altera-

tion ought to be made without the concurrence of the whole confederacy. Alarmed, therefore, at these proceedings, many of them made instant application to the Argives, exerting their several endeavors to obtain their alliance.

But the Lacedæmonians perceiving what a tumult had arisen in Peloponnesus, principally owing to the insinuations of the Corinthians, who were also going to enter into this league with Argos, they despatched ambassadors to Corinth, from a desire to prevent what might ensue. Here they represented to them, ‘ how criminal their conduct had been, in having thus originally fomented the present tumult; and that in case they abandoned the Lacedæmonians and went over to the Argive league,’ they assured them that, ‘ by such a step, they must break the most sacred oaths: injustice they had already committed in refusing to accede to the Athenian peace, since, pursuant to old stipulations between them, ‘ whatever a majority of the confederates resolved was to be binding on all, unless some god or hero enjoined a dissent.’ But the Corinthians, in the presence of all those of the confederacy who had not accepted the peace, and whose attendance they had previously invited, replied to the Lacedæmonians without entering into a particular detail of the injuries they had done them, in not covenanting with the Athenians for the restitution of Sollium, or Anactorium, or in any other point in which they thought themselves aggrieved; but speciously pretending that ‘ they could never abandon their allies in Thrace, whom by solemn oaths they were bound to support; oaths which they had severally sworn when they first revolted in concert with the Potideans, and had on other occasions since renewed:’ arguing from hence, ‘ that they could not have violated the common

oath of the confederates in refusing their accession to the Athenian peace, since, as they had sworn on the faith of the gods to the former, they could not betray them without the guilt of perjury. The stipulation, indeed, ran thus: ‘unless some god or hero enjoined a dissent’—their present dissent, therefore, appeared to them to be a divine injunction.’ So far they argued from their former oaths; and, in regard to the alliance offensive and defensive with Argos,—‘they would hold consultations with their friends, and take such steps as were expedient and just.’ And with this answer the Lacedæmonian ambassadors departed home. An Argive embassy happened also at the same time to be at Corinth, who pressed the Corinthians to enter into their league without any farther hesitation. They desired them to attend at the next public meeting they held, for a final answer.

There arrived soon after an embassy from the Eleans, who made, in the first place, an alliance offensive and defensive with the Corinthians; and then, from Corinth repairing to Argos, became allies of the Argives, according to the scheme pre-established for this purpose; for a misunderstanding had arisen between them and the Lacedæmonians about Lepreum. In a former war of the Lepreatæ against a province of Arcadia, the Eleans had been prevailed on to join the Lepreatæ for a moiety of the land that should be conquered; and, at the conclusion of the war, the Eleans left all the land in the management of the Lepreatæ subject to the annual tribute of a talent¹ to Olympian Jove. This was regularly paid till the Athenian war; but, that war being then made a pretence of its discontinuance, the

¹ One hundred and ninety-three pounds fifteen shillings sterling.

Eleans would have exacted it by force. The others had recourse to the Lacedæmonians. The dispute was referred to the Lacedæmonian arbitration; but the Eleans, taking up a suspicion that they should not have justice, would not abide the reference, but began to ravage the territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedæmonians, notwithstanding this, proceeded to a sentence:—that ‘the Lepreates were masters of their own conduct, and that the Eleans were guilty of injustice;’ and, as the latter would not abide by their arbitration, they threw a garrison of heavy-armed into Lepreum; but the Eleans, regarding this step as the reception of a city by the Lacedæmonians which had revolted from them, and alleging the treaty in which it was stipulated,—that, ‘of whatever places the parties were possessed on the commencement of the Attic war, the same they should continue to hold at its expiration,’ as if they had met with injustice, they revolted to the Argives; and the Eleans entered into that league offensive and defensive as has been already related.

The Corinthians soon followed their example, and, with the Chalcideans, also of Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the Boeotians and Megareans, though they had threatened the same thing, thought proper to drop it. They had been ill used by the Lacedæmonians, but judged however that the democracy of the Argives would be less compatible with their interests, whose form of government was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacedæmonians.

About the same time this summer, the Athenians, becoming masters of the Scioneans after a long blockade, put all who were able to bear arms to the sword, and made their wives and children slaves, and gave the land to be cultured by the Plateans.

They also again brought back the Delians to Delos,

induced to it by the many defeats they had suffered in battle, and the express oracle of the god at Delphi.

The Phocians and Locrians began about this time to make war on one another.

And now the Corinthians and Argives, united in league, go together to Tegea, to persuade its revolt from the Lacedæmonians. They saw it was a large district, and in case they compassed its accession, they imagined the whole of Peloponnesus would be at their back. But when the Tegeatæ declared that ‘they would in no shape oppose the Lacedæmonians,’ the Corinthians, who till now had acted with great alacrity, slackened in their zeal for contention, and began to fear that no more of the states would come in. They proceeded, however, to the Boeotians, and solicited them ‘to accede to the league between themselves and the Argives, and to co-operate with them for the common welfare.’—And as there were truces for ten days between the Athenians and Boeotians, which were agreed on soon after the peace for fifty years was made, the Corinthians now pressed the Boeotians ‘to accompany them to Athens, and solicit for truces of the same nature for them; but, in case the Athenians refused to grant them, to renounce the suspension of arms, and for the future never to treat without their concurrence.’ The Boeotians, thus solicited by the Corinthians, desired a longer time to consider about their accession to the Argive league. To Athens, indeed, they bore them company, but could not obtain ten days’ truces: for the Athenians answered,—‘The Corinthians have a peace already if they are confederates of the Lacedæmonians. And, on the whole, the Boeotians absolutely refused to renounce their own truces, though the Corinthians insisted on it, and urged, with some warm expostulations, that it had been so covenanted.

between them. So there was only a mere cessation of arms between the Corinthians and Athenians, without any solemn ratification.

This same summer the Lacedæmonians took the field with their whole united force, under the command of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and marched to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were subject to the Mantineans, and, in consequence of a sedition, had invited this expedition. But it was also designed, if possible, to demolish the fortress of Cypsela, which the Mantineans had erected; and, as it was situated in Parrhasia, towards the Skiritis of Laconia, had placed a garrison in it. The Lacedæmonians therefore ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians: but the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the guard of the Argives, marched themselves to the support of their dependents; but finding it impossible to preserve the fortress of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians, they retired. The Lacedæmonians also, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortress, withdrew their forces.

The same summer also, on the return from Thrace of those soldiers who had served under Brasidas, and who came home after the peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the Lacedæmonians decreed 'those helots, who had served under Brasidas, to be free, and to have permission to reside wherever they pleased.' And, no long time after, they placed them, together with such persons as were newly enfranchised, at Leptum: it is situated between Laconia and Elea; and they were now at variance with the Eleans. As for those Spartans who had been made prisoners in Sphacteria, and had delivered up their arms, conceiving some fears about them, lest, should they lay their late dis-

grace too much to heart, as they were persons of the greatest rank, they might introduce some innovations in the state, they declared them infamous, even though some of the number were at this time possessed of posts in the government. But this infamy extended no farther than to disqualify them from offices, and from buying and selling: yet, in a short time afterwards, they were again restored to their full privileges.

The same summer also the Dietideans took Thyssus, a town seated on the Athos, and confederate with the Athenians.

Through the whole course of the summer the communication was open between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Not but that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians began to be jealous of one another immediately after the peace, as the reciprocal restitution of places was not punctually performed: for though it had fallen to the Lacedæmonians' lot to begin these restitutions, yet they had not restored Amphipolis and other cities. They had compelled neither their confederates in Thrace, the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept the peace; always pretending, that 'should they refuse it, they were ready to join with the Athenians in their compulsion;' nay, they limited to them a time, though not by a regular written notice, 'within which, such as did not accede were declared enemies to both.' The Athenians, therefore, seeing none of these points were put in actual execution, became jealous of the Lacedæmonians, as men who acted insincerely in every step; insomuch, that when Pylus was redemanded, they refused its restitution, and heartily repented that they had released the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. They also kept possession of other places, and intended to do so till the other side had performed

their engagements: but the Lacedemonians alleged they had done every thing in their power; that, for instance, they had released such Athenians as were prisoners amongst them; had recalled their soldiers from Thrace; and wherever they were masters of the execution, had performed it. ‘As to Amphipolis,’ they said, ‘they were not so far masters of it as to make an actual surrender. They had omitted no endeavors to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians to a compliance; to recover the disposal of Panactum, and to obtain the dismission of those Athenians who were prisoners of war in Boeotia. Pylus, however,’ they insisted, ‘should be immediately restored to them; at least, that the Messenians and helots should be withdrawn, as their people had been from Thrace; and then the Athenians, if they pleased, might continue to garrison that fortress themselves.’ Many meetings were held, and much argumentation passed between them this summer: and at last, they prevailed on the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messenians and others, as well helots as all deserters whatever out of Laconia. These they transplanted to Crania of Cephallene. This summer therefore was a season of inaction, and the intercourse was open between them.

In the ensuing winter, for other ephori were in office, as the authority of those under whom the peace was made was now expired, and some who were averse to the peace had succeeded, embassies, attending from the whole confederacy, the Athenians, and Boeotians, and Corinthians, also being present, and after much reciprocal altercation coming to no regular agreement, the rest of them separated to their own homes without effect: but Cleobulus and Xenares, those two of the ephori who were most inclined to dissolve the peace, detained the Boeotians and Corinthians for a private

conference. In this they exhorted them ‘to act unanimously in promotion of their scheme ; in pursuance of which the Boeotians should first make themselves a party in the Argive league, and then employ their good offices to form an alliance between the Argives and Lacedæmonians : for by these methods the Boeotians could least of all be necessitated to take part in the Attic peace, as the Lacedæmonians would prefer the renewal of friendship and alliance with the Argives to the enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of the peace ; since, to their certain knowlege, the Lacedæmonians had ever been desirous to have the friendship of Argos, consistently with their honor ; knowing it would facilitate the success of their war without Peloponnesus.’ They also requested the Boeotians ‘to deliver up Panactum to the Lacedæmonians ; that, exchanging it if possible for Pylus, they might get clear of the main obstacle to a fresh rupture with the Athenians.’

The Boeotians and Corinthians, instructed by Xenares and Cleobulus, and the party in their interest at Lacedæmon, departed to report this scheme to their principals. But two persons of the greatest authority in the state of Argos were attending on the road for their return. They met, and conferred with them ‘about the means of gaining the concurrence of the Boeotians in this league, on the same footing with the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans : for they were confident, were this point once completed, they might easily become the arbiters of war or peace, either in relation to the Lacedæmonians, if they so determined, and would act together with firm unanimity, or to any other state whatever.

The Boeotian ambassadors were highly delighted with this discourse. The solicitations of these Ar-

gives happened to coincide with the instructions recommended to them by their friends at Lacedæmon. And the Argives, finding them satisfied with their motion, assured them they would send ambassadors to the Boëotians ; and so they parted.

But the Boëotians, at their return, reported to the rulers of Boëotia the proposals from Lacedæmon, and those from the Argives on the road. The Boëotian rulers were delighted, and grew now more zealous than ever ; because, on both sides, from their Lacedæmonian friends and also from the Argives, the solicitations were concurrent : and very soon after the Argive ambassadors arrived to forward the dispatch of the treaty. The Boëotian rulers, however, at present, gave only a verbal approbation of the scheme, and then dismissed them ; promising to send an embassy of their own to Argos to perfect the alliance.

But in the mean time it was judged to be previously expedient that the Boëotian rulers, and the Corinthians, and the Megareans, and the ambassadors from the allies of Thrace, should mutually interchange their oaths, ‘to act in support of one another, if on any occasion such support might be requisite, and to enter neither into war nor peace without joint consent ;’ and then the Boëotians and Megareans, for these acted in union, to form a league with the Argives : but, before such exchange of oaths, the Boëotian rulers communicated the whole of the plan to the four Boëotian councils, in whom the sovereignty is lodged ; recommending it, as worthy their confirmation, that ‘whatever cities were willing might mutually interchange such oaths for reciprocal advantage.’ Yet the Boëotians who composed the councils refused a confirmation ; apprehensive it might tend to embroil them with the Lacedæmonians should they pledge such an oath to

the Corinthians, who were now abandoning the Lacedæmonian interest: for the rulers had not made them privy to the scheme from Lacedæmon, how ‘Xenares and Cleobulus, of the college of ephori, and their friends, advise them to enter first into a league with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to extend it to the Lacedæmonians.’ They had presumed that the supreme council, though they secreted these lights, would not resolve against a plan which themselves had digested and recommended to them. But now, as this affair took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and ambassadors from Thrace went home without effect; and the Boeotian rulers, who had all along intended, in case their scheme had passed, to perfect an alliance with the Argives, made no farther report to the councils in relation to the Argives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence of their promise, but suffered the whole plan to sink away in careless and dilatory unconcern.

In this same winter the Olynthians, after a sudden assault, took Mecyberne, which was garrisoned by Athenians.

After the former proceedings, for conferences were still continued between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians about those places they held from one another, the Lacedæmonians, conceiving some hope that, if the Athenians could recover Panactum from the Boeotians, they also might regain Pylus, addressed themselves in solemn embassy to the Boeotians, and importuned them to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they in return might get Pylus from them; but the Boeotians persisted in a refusal, unless they would make a separate alliance with them, as they had done with the Athenians. On this the Lacedæmonians, though convinced that such a step would

be injustice to the Athenians, since it had been stipulated that, ‘without joint consent, they should neither make peace nor war;’ yet, bent on the recovery of Panactum, that they might exchange it for Pylus, the party at the same time amongst them who were meditating a fresh rupture, inclining to the Boeotian interest, made the requisite alliance in the very close of this winter, on the approach of spring. The consequence was, that Panactum was immediately levelled with the ground ; and the eleventh year of the war was brought to a conclusion.

YEAR XII.—Early in the spring of that summer which was now approaching, the Argives, when the expected embassy from Boeotia was not arrived in pursuance of promise, when they found that Panactum was demolished, and a separate alliance struck up between the Boeotians and Lacedæmonians, began to fear they should be totally abandoned, and that their whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedæmonians. They concluded that, through the prevalence of the Lacedæmonian arguments, the Boeotians had been persuaded to level Panactum, and accede to the treaty made with Athens, and that the Athenians were privy to all these steps ; and so, of consequence, they themselves were now utterly excluded from an alliance with the Athenians, and their former hopes intirely blasted, that in case disputes should arise, and their treaty with the Lacedæmonians not be renewed, they might, at worst, depend on gaining the Athenian alliance. The Argives, therefore, amidst these perplexities, and the dread of being attacked at once by the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatae, by the Boeotians and Athenians, as they had formerly refused an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, and had

grasped in thought at the sovereignty of Peloponnesus; the Argives, I say, had no longer one moment to lose, but despatched instantly Eustrophus and Aeson, whom they judged to be persons most agreeable there, in embassy to Lacedæmon. They now judged it their interest to procure the best peace which the present posture of affairs would allow from the Lacedæmonians, and then quietly to attend the event of things. In this view the ambassadors on their arrival had a conference with the Lacedæmonians about the terms of a peace; and at first the Argives insisted, that 'to some state or private person should be referred, for equitable arbitration, the controversy between them about the district of Cynuria;' concerning which, as it is frontier to both, they are eternally at variance: in this district stands the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and the possession of it is in the hands of the Lacedæmonians. But, at length, when the Lacedæmonians would not suffer any mention to be made of this, declaring only, that 'were they willing to renew the former truce, they should find them complying,' the Argive ambassadors, however, prevailed on the Lacedæmonians to agree to these proposals: that 'for the present, a peace should be concluded for the term of fifty years; provided, notwithstanding, that liberty remain to either party to send a challenge, when neither was embarrassed by plague or war, and the right of this district be then decided by arms between Lacedæmon and Argos, as had formerly been done when the victory was equally claimed on both sides';¹

¹ Herodotus relates this remarkable piece of history in Clio. 'They had a conference,' says he, 'and came to an agreement that three hundred men on each side should decide the point by combat, and the land contested should remain the property of the victors; that both armies in the mean time should retire

and that, in this case, it be not lawful to carry the pursuit beyond the boundaries of either Argos or Lacedæmon.' These proposals, it is true, appeared at first to the Lacedæmonians to be foolish : but, at length, as their necessary interest made them vastly desirous of the Argive friendship, they complied with the demand, and the terms agreed on were digested into writing ; but the Lacedæmonians, before they put the last hand to the treaty, insisted on their previous return to Argos, and reporting it to the people ; and, in case the ratification was given, to repair again to Lacedæmon, at the Hyacinthian festival, and swear observance. And on this they returned to Argos.

Whilst the Argives were employed in this negotiation, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromenes, and Phædimus; and Antimenidas, who were commissioned to receive Panactum and the prisoners of war from the Boeotians, and deliver them over into the hands

within their respective dominions, nor be present at the combat, lest, by being spectators of it, either of them, seeing their countrymen defeated, might run to their assistance. When articles were settled both armies drew off ; those selected on each side for the combat stayed behind and engaged. They fought it out with equal resolution and fortune : of six hundred men, only three were left alive ; two of them Argives, Alcinor and Chromius ; and one Lacedæmonian, Othryades : these were all the survivors when night came on. The Argives, as victors, ran in haste to Argos ; but Othryades, for the Lacedæmonians, having stripped the dead bodies of the Argives, and carried off their arms to the place where his own side had encamped, continued on the field of battle. Next morning both parties came to learn the event ; and then, truly, each party also claimed the victory ; one averring that a majority survived on their side ; the other maintaining that even those had fled, whilst their own combatant had kept his ground and spoiled the dead. In short, from wrangling they came again to blows and a general engagement ; in which, after great slaughter on both sides, the Lacedæmonians obtained the victory.'

of the Athenians, found, on their arrival, that Panactum was already demolished by the Boeotians, on pretext that, ‘in former times, on occasion of some dispute about it, an oath had been taken by the Athenians and Boeotians, that neither should inhabit that place, excluding the other, but should jointly possess it;’ but what Athenian prisoners of war were in the hands of the Boeotians were delivered up to Andromenes and his colleagues, who carried and released them to the Athenians. They also reported the demolition of Panactum, declaring this to be equivalent to a restitution, as no enemy to Athens could occupy that post for the future.

These words were no sooner heard than the Athenians conceived the deepest resentment. They thought themselves injured by the Lacedæmonians, not only in the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored standing, but also in the separate alliance made lately with the Boeotians, of which now they had notice, in open contradiction to their own declaration ‘of joining them to compel by force such as would not accede to the treaty.’ They reflected also on other points in which the engagements of the treaty had been in nowise fulfilled, and concluded themselves overreached: for these reasons, they gave a rough answer to the ambassadors, and an instant dismission.

On so much umbrage, taken by the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians, such persons at Athens as were willing to dissolve the peace set themselves instantly to work to accomplish their views. Others were laboring the same point, but none more than Alcibiades,¹

1 Alcibiades is here beginning his political intrigues, to open the field for his own soaring and enterprising genius to dilate itself more at large. Pericles was his near relation and

the son of Clinias ; a person, in respect of age, even then but a youth ; at least he would have passed for such in the other states, though for the dignity of his birth, he was much honored and caressed. It seemed to him the most expedient step to form a good understanding with the Argives. Not but that his opposition to other measures was the result of his ambition and a study of contention, because the Lacedæmonians had employed their interests in Nicias and Laches to perfect the treaty, slighting his assistance on account of his youth, nor paying him the deference he expected from the ancient hospitality between that state and the family from which he was descended. This indeed his grandfather had renounced ; but he

guardian ; Socrates was his friend and guide so long as virtue was his care. Warmer passions soon gained the ascendant over him ; and he plunged into all the busy scenes of life, with that intense application and flexible address to all persons and all occasions, which surprised the world ; ‘ more changeable than a chameleon,’ as Plutarch expresses it, ‘ since that creature cannot put on a fair and white appearance.’ His character is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and masterly pen of Cornelius Nepos : ‘ Nature,’ says he, ‘ seems to have exerted her utmost power in Alcibiades. It is agreed by all writers who have made him the subject of their pens that a more extraordinary man never lived, either for virtues or vices. Born in a most noble republic, of a most honorable family, by far the handsomest person of his age, fit for every thing, and full of address ; he was a commander that made the greatest figure both by land and sea ; an orator whom none could surpass ; nay, his manner and matter, when he spoke, were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasions required, he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, generous ; splendid in all his outward appearance, and at his table ; full of affability, profuse of civility, and of the utmost dexterity in adapting himself to the exigencies of time ; and yet, in the seasons of relaxation, and when business no longer required him to keep his faculties on the stretch, he was luxurious, dissolute, lewd, and intemperate. The whole world was astonished that so vast an unlikeness, and so different a nature, should be united in the same person.’

himself, in the view of renewing it, had shown extraordinary civilities to the Spartans who were made prisoners at Sphacteria. Thinking himself therefore in all respects slighted, at this crisis he began openly to oppose them: he affirmed, that ‘the Lacedæmonians were a people who could not be trusted; that they had treacherously entered into a peace in order to divert the Argives from their alliance, that again they might attack the Athenians when left alone.’ Nay farther; on the first dissatisfaction between them, he secretly despatched his emissaries to Argos, exhorting them ‘at his invitation to come to Athens, in company with the Mantineans and Eleans, and solicit an alliance, since opportunity favored, and his whole interests should be exerted in their support.’

The Argives having heard these suggestions, and being now convinced that the Boeotian separate alliance had been made without the privity of the Athenians, who, on the contrary, were highly discontented at the Lacedæmonian proceedings, took no farther notice of their embassy at Lacedæmon, though sent expressly there to negotiate an accommodation, but recalled all their attention from thence to the Athenians. They reflected that Athens, a state which from long antiquity had been their friend, which was governed by a democracy in the same manner as their own, and which was possessed of a great power at sea, could most effectually support them in case a war should break out against them. In short, they lost no time in despatching ambassadors to the Athenians to propose an alliance, who were accompanied by embassies from the Eleans and Mantineans.

A Lacedæmonian embassy also arrived in great haste, composed of Philochidas, Leon, and Endius, persons who were judged most acceptable at Athens.

They were afraid lest the Athenians, in the heat of their resentment, should form an alliance with the Argives. They sent also by them a demand of the restitution of Pylus in lieu of Panactum, and excuses for the separate alliance they had made with the Boeotians, ‘ which had been concluded without any design of prejudicing the Athenians.’ On these points they spoke before the senate,¹ notifying at the same time

¹ The Lacedæmonian embassy have, on this occasion, their first audience from the senate. The business of this history has been hitherto transacted in the assembly of the people; for, as the generals of the state were the chief ministers in time of war, and had a power of convening the people at their own discretion, all points that required a speedy determination were brought before the people in the first instance; and the influence of the senate, which operated on ordinary occasions, was checked and suspended in time of war, which starts many extraordinary occasions, or left it in the will of the generals of the state to call and treat as extraordinary whatever they pleased. By these means the people had engrossed the power: the balance which Solon designed always to preserve was in a great measure lost, and the aristocratical influence was quite suspended.

As, therefore, the popular assembly had its vote at first setting out, the form and constitution of the senate now requires an explanation. At this time it consisted of five hundred persons, and for that reason is often styled the council of five hundred, and sometimes, by Thucydides, the council of the bean, from the manner of their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each tribe returned the names of their members who were qualified and stood candidates for this honor. The names were engraved on pieces of brass, and cast into a vessel; the same number of beans were cast into another vessel, fifty of which were white, and the rest black. They then proceeded to draw out a name and a bean, and the persons to whom the white bean were drawn became the senators of the year. Each senator had a drachma, that is, seven pence three farthings a day for his salary.

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown into a vessel, and into another nine black beans and one white one: the tribe to whose name the white bean was drawn took the first course of presidency for a tenth part of the year, and the order of the succeeding courses was determined in the same manner by the bean. How the fifty in course were again

that ‘they were come with full power to put an end to all disputes ;’ by which they gave some alarm to Alcibiades, lest, should they make the same declaration before the assembly of the people, it might have an influence on the multitude, and an alliance with the Argives might prove abortive.

But Alcibiades now contrived to baffle them by art. He prevailed on the Lacedæmonians, by solemnly pledging his faith to them, that ‘in case they would disown, before the people, the full powers with which they were invested, he would engage for the restitution of Pylus ; for he himself would then persuade the Athenians to it with as much zeal as he now dissuaded, and would get all other points adjusted to their satisfaction.’ His view in acting thus was to detach them from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of inveighing against them in the assembly of the people as men who had nothing sincere in their intentions, and whose professions were dissonant with themselves ; and so to perfect an alliance with the Argives, Eleans, and Man-

subdivided into tens, and from these tens a chairman chosen for a day, has been already explained in the note on the popular assembly, book i.

The senate sat every day in the prytaneum, or state-house, where the presidents had also their diet. They were the grand council of state ; took into consideration all the affairs of the commonwealth ; debated, and voted by beans ; and whatever determinations were thus made in the senate were afterwards carried down to the assembly of the people, to be ratified and passed into laws. By Solon’s original constitution, nothing was to be proposed by the people before it had been canvassed and approved in the senate ; but this seems to have been eluded by the generals of the state, who had all the military business in their department, and a power to convene the people at their pleasure, and lay matters before them in the first instance. To restore the aristocratical power, and reduce that of the people, occasioned an usurpation and sad confusion in Athens, as will be seen in the eighth book of this history.

tineans. And this artifice in the sequel took effect: for when they were admitted to an audience before the people, and replied to the demand, when put, contrary to what they had said in the senate, that ‘they had no such powers,’ the Athenians in an instant lost all patience. And now, Alcibiades roaring out aloud against the Lacedæmonians with much more vehemence than he had ever done before, they listened greedily to all he said, and were ready instantly to call in the Argives and their companions, and to make them confederates. But the shock of an earthquake being felt before any thing could be formally concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

At the next day’s assembly Nicias, though the Lacedæmonians had been thus overreached, and he himself ensnared by their public acknowledgement that they had no full powers, spoke however on the Lacedæmonian side; insisting ‘on the necessity of maintaining a good correspondence with them, and deferring all agreement with the Argives till they could send to the Lacedæmonians, and be distinctly informed of their final resolutions. It makes,’ said he, ‘for your credit, but for their disgrace, that a war should be averted: for as your affairs are in a happy posture, it is above all things eligible for you to preserve your prosperity unimpaired; but they, in their present low situation, should put all to hazard, in the hopes of redress.’ He carried it, in short, that ambassadors should be despatched, he himself to be one in the commission, ‘earnestly to require of the Lacedæmonians that, if their intentions were honest, they should surrender Panactum standing, and Amphipolis; and should, farther, renounce the alliance with the Boeotians in case they still refused to accede to the peace: this in pursuance of the article, that neither should

make peace without joint consent.' They ordered it to be added, farther, that 'they themselves, could they have designed to act unjustly, had concluded before this an alliance with the Argives, as they were already attending and soliciting such a measure.' And having subjoined their instructions in relation to all other points in which they thought themselves aggrieved, they sent away the ambassadors in commission along with Nicias. These having arrived, and reported their instructions, added, in conclusion, that 'unless they would renounce their alliance with the Boeotians, if still refusing their accession to the peace, they would admit the Argives and their associates into league.' The Lacedæmonians replied, 'they would never renounce their alliance with the Boeotians:' for the party of Xenares, the ephorus, and all those who acted in the same combination, had still the majority: however, at the request of Nicias, they renewed the oaths. Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart without settling any one point of his commission, and of falling under public censure (which really came to pass), as undoubtedly author of the peace with the Lacedæmonians. And when, on his return, the Athenians had heard that no one point was adjusted at Lacedæmon; they immediately conceived the warmest indignation; and, looking on themselves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing the Argives and their associates, who were still at Athens, they entered into treaty, and an alliance offensive and defensive with them, as follows:—

'The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, for themselves and their respective dependents on all sides, have made a peace, to continue for the term of a hundred years, without fraud and without violence, both at land and at sea.'

' Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms, either by the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, or their dependents, against the Athenians and dependents of the Athenians ; or by the Athenians, and their dependents, against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their dependents, without any artifice or evasion whatsoever. On these conditions the Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, to be confederates for one hundred years.

' Provided that, in case an enemy invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, march to the succor of the Athenians, in strict conformity to a summons received from Athens, in the most vigorous manner they may be able, to the fulness of their abilities.

' But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again withdrawn, the state under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians ; and to be pursued with the offensive arms of all those confederated states.

' And farther, that it be not lawful for any of the contracting states to lay down their arms against that state which has so offended without the consent of all the rest.

' The Athenians also to march to the succor of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, in case an enemy invade the territory of the Eleans, or that of the Mantineans, or that of the Argives, in strict conformity to a summons received from any of those states, in the most vigorous manner they may be able, to the fulness of their abilities.

' But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again withdrawn, the state under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and to be pursued with the offensive arms of these confederate states.

‘And farther, that it be not lawful to lay down their arms against the state which has so offended, without the joint consent of all these contracting states.

‘That no armed force be admitted to pass in order for war through any of their respective dominions, or those of their respective dependents, nor along their sea, unless such a passage be granted unanimously by all the contracting parties, by the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans.

‘Agreed, farther, that when the auxiliaries attend, the state which summoned them supply them with thirty days’ provision as soon as they shall have entered the territory of the state which summoned their attendance, and the same at their departure.

‘And, if there be occasion for the attendance of such an auxiliary force for a larger space, that the state which sent for it maintain that force, by paying to every soldier, heavy-armed and light-armed, and every archer, three oboli of Ægina¹ a day, and a drachma of Ægina to every horseman.

‘But the state which sends for auxiliaries to have the supreme command, so long as the war continues within its district.

‘If, farther, it be agreed by the contracting states to act offensively with the united forces, the command then to be equally divided among all the states.

‘That the Athenians swear to observe these articles in their own names and those of their dependents; but the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and the depend-

¹ The value of three oboli of Ægina is about sixpence, and the drachma of Ægina nearly one shilling, English; for, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the talent of Ægina consisted of a hundred Attic minæ, and therefore was larger than the Attic talent in the proportion of one hundred to sixty.

ents of these, are to swear separately, each state for itself.

‘ Each party to take the oath in the most solemn fashion of their country, in the most sacred manner, with the choicest victims. The terms of the oath to be thus conceived :—I will stand by the alliance, according to a covenant, justly, honestly, and sincerely ; and I will not transgress its obligation by any fraud or evasion whatsoever.

‘ To be sworn—

‘ At Athens, by the senate and the city magistrates : the presidents in course to administer the oath.

‘ At Argos, by the senate, the eighty, and the artynae : the eighty to administer the oath.

‘ At Mantinea, by the demiurgi, the senate, and the other magistrates : the theori and polemarchs to administer the oath.

‘ At Elis, by the demiurgi, the officers of state, and the six hundred : the demiurgi and the keepers of the sacred records to administer the oath.

‘ These oaths to be renewed : for which purpose, the Athenians to repair to Elis, to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympic games. But the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans are to repair to Athens, ten days before the great Panathensea.

‘ The articles relating to this peace, and these oaths, and this alliance, to be inscribed on a column of stone,

‘ By the Athenians, in the citadel :

‘ By the Argives, in the forum, in the temple of Apollo :

‘ By the Mantineans, in the temple of Jupiter, in the forum ; and

‘ All jointly to erect, by way of memorial, a

brazzen pillar at Olympia, at the Olympics now approaching.

'If it be judged expedient, by any of the contracting states, to make any additions to these articles already agreed, whatever, in pursuance of this, be deemed proper, by the joint determination of all parties, the same to be valid.'

A peace and alliance, offensive and defensive, was in this manner concluded: and those subsisting between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians were not, on this account, renounced by either side.

The Corinthians, however, who were confederates of the Argives, refused to accede: but, what is more, they had never sworn to the alliance made previous to this, between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans,—'to have the same foes and the same friends.' They pretended that the defensive league, already made, was quite sufficient—'to succor one another, but not to concur in an offensive war.' In this manner the Corinthians were drawing off from the league, and again warped in their inclinations towards the Lacedæmonians.

The Olympics were solemnised this summer, in which Androsthenes, the Arcadian, was for the first time victor in the pancrace, and the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor enter the lists. They had not discharged the fine set on them by the Eleans, by virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged them with a conveyance of arms into the fort of Phyrcon, and with throwing some of their heavy-armed into Lepreum, during the Olympic cessation. The fine imposed was two thousand minæ,¹ at the rate of two minæ for every heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the letter of the law.

¹ 645*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* sterling.

The Lacedæmonians, on this, despatched an embassy to remonstrate against the injustice of the sentence; ‘that the cessation had not been notified at Lacedæmon when they threw in their heavy-armed.’

The Eleans replied, that ‘the cessation was already in force: for they proclaim it first amongst themselves; and so, whilst they were quiet, and expected no such usage, they had been wronged by a surprise.’

The Lacedæmonians retorted, that, ‘if so, it was needless for them to proceed to a publication of it in Lacedæmon, if the Eleans had already judged themselves wronged. But the fact was far different in the light they saw it, and trespass had not been committed in any shape whatever.’

But the Eleans adhered to their first charge, that ‘they could not be persuaded the Lacedæmonians had not wronged them: yet, in case they were willing to surrender Lepreum to them, they were ready to remit their share of the fine, and to pay for them that part of it which was due to the god.’

But when this would not content, it was urged again by the Eleans, that ‘if they were unwilling to part with it, they should by no means surrender Lepreum; but then, as they were desirous to have the use of the temple, they must go up to the altar of Olympian Jupiter, and swear, in the presence of the Grecians, that they would hereafter pay the fine.’ But, as they also refused to comply with this, the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple, the sacrifice, and the games, and performed their own sacrifices at home. Yet the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreatæ, were admitted to assist at the solemnity.

The Eleans, however, apprehensive they would sacrifice by force, set a guard of their armed youths around the temple. These were reinforced by the Argives and

Mantineans, a thousand of each, and a party of Athenian horse who were at Argos in readiness to attend the festival. But a great consternation had seized the whole assembly of united Greece; lest the Lacedæmonians should return with an armed force; more especially, when Lichas, the son of Archesilaus, a Lacedæmonian, was scourged in the course by the under officers, because, when his chariot had gained the prize, and the chariot of the Boeotian state was proclaimed victor, pursuant to the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians from the race, he stepped into the midst of the assembly and crowned the charioteer, desirous to make it known that the chariot belonged to him. On this, the whole assembly was more than ever alarmed, and it was fully expected that some strange event would follow: the Lacedæmonians, however, made no bustle; and the festival passed regularly through its train.

After the Olympics, the Argives and their confederates repaired to Corinth, in order to solicit the concurrence of that state. A Lacedæmonian embassy happened also to be there. Many conferences were held, and nothing finally determined; but, on feeling the shock of an earthquake, they parted each to their respective cities. And here the summer ended.

In the ensuing winter a battle was fought by the Heracleots of Trachis, against the Ænianians, Dolopians, Meliensians, and some of the Thessalians: for the bordering nations were enemies to the city of Heraclea, as this latter place had been fortified for their more especial annoyance. From its foundation they had ever opposed it, preventing its growth to the utmost of their power; and at this time they defeated the Heracleots in a battle, in which Xenares, the son of Cnidis, the Lacedæmonian commandant, was slain; a number also of the Heracleots perished. And thus

the winter ended : and the twelfth year of the war came also to an end.

YEAR XIII.—The succeeding summer was no sooner begun than the Boeotians, viewing the low estate to which it had been reduced by the late battle, took into their own hands the city of Heraclea, and discharged Hegesippidas, the Lacedæmonian commandant, as guilty of mal-administration. They took this city into their own hands, from the apprehension that, during the embroilments of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, the Athenians might seize it. The Lacedæmonians, however, were chagrined at this step of the Boeotians.

The same summer also, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, with the concurrence of the Argives and their allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small party of heavy-armed Athenians and archers, and enlarged his forces on his route by the aids of the confederates in those quarters; where he not only made such a disposition of affairs as might best answer the views of the alliance, but also, traversing Peloponnesus with his force, he both persuaded the Patreans to continue their works quite down to the sea, and intended also to execute a plan of his own for erecting a fort on the Rhium of Achaia.¹ But the Corinthians and Sicyonians, and all such as were alarmed at the annoyance this fort might give them, rushed out to prevent him, and obliged him to desist.

The same summer a war broke out between the Epi-

¹ This was a grand project indeed! It aimed at no less than the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end to all the navigation of that trading and opulent city through the bay of Crissa. The Athenians were already intire masters of the sea on the other side of the isthmus.

daurians and Argives. The pretext was grounded on a victim due from the Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an acknowledgement for their pastures; for the Argives were now the chief managers of the temple. But, this pretended grievance set apart, it had been judged expedient, by Alcibiades and the Argives, to get possession, if possible, of Epidaurus, in order to prevent molestation on the side of Corinth, and to render the passage of Athenian succors more expeditious from Ægina than by fetching a compass about Scyllæum. The Argives, therefore, were intent on their preparations, as resolved to take the field, and act against Epidaurus, in order to exact the victim by force of arms.

But, about the same time, the Lacedæmonians also marched out, with their whole force, as far as to Leuctra, on their own frontier, towards Lyceum, under the command of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. Not a man was privy to the design of their thus taking the field, not even the states from which the quotas were furnished out. But, when the victims they sacrificed for a successful campaign proved inauspicious, they again marched home, and circulated fresh orders to their confederates to be ready to take the field again after the next month, which was the month Carneius,¹ the grand festival of the Dorians.

¹ This festival was observed by most cities in Greece; but with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparta, where it began the thirteenth of the month Carneius, according to the Lacedæmonian style, and lasted nine days. A camp was formed for its celebration, in which they continued during the whole solemnity, and observed strict military discipline. By these means, as we find a little lower, the Argives, in this instance no slaves to superstition, attended to the festival and warfare at the same time, and annoyed the Epidaurians, whilst religious awe restrained the friends of the latter from acting in their defence. See Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. i. p. 408.

But, when they were thus withdrawn, the Argives, taking the field on the twenty-seventh day of the month preceding Carneius, and though celebrating their own festival that very day, continued all this intermediate time to make incursions and ravages on Epidauria. The Epidaurians sent about to solicit the succors of their allies; some of whom excused themselves as bound to observe the approaching festivals, though others advanced as far as the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refused to act. And, during the space of time that the Argives were in Epidauria, embassies from the several states held a congress at Mantinea, at the request of the Athenians; and proceeding to a conference, Ephamidas, the Corinthian, remonstrated, that 'their words were by no means consistent with their actions; for, whilst they were here sitting together on the terms of peace, the Epidaurians and allies and the Argives were opposing one another in arms: that, consequently, the first thing to be done was to send deputations on both sides to disband those armies, and then orderly to proceed to treat of peace.' Yielding therefore to the justice of such a remonstrance, they fetched the Argives out of Epidauria; and, returning to the congress, they were not able even then to agree together: on which the Argives once more entered Epidauria, and resumed the ravage.

The Lacedæmonians now had taken the field, and were advanced to Caryæ; but, as now again the victims sacrificed portended no success to a campaign, they once more withdrew.

The Argives also, after ruining about a third of the territory of Epidauria, were returned home. In this incursion they were assisted by one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, with Alcibiades at their head: who having heard that the Lacedæmonians had now left

the field, as their service was now no longer needful, marched away. And in this manner the summer passed.

In the beginning of the next winter the Lacedæmonians, unknown to the Athenians, threw a body of men to the number of three hundred, with Hegesipidas, as commandant, into Epidaurus by sea. On this, the Argives repaired instantly to Athens, with remonstrances, that, ‘though it was explicitly mentioned in the treaty that no enemy should be suffered to pass through their respective dominions, yet they had permitted the Lacedæmonians to make this passage by sea without molestation.’ Unless therefore they would replace the Messenians and helots in Pylus, to annoy the Lacedæmonians, they should deem themselves aggrieved.’ On this, the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, underwrote this charge on the Laconic column, that ‘the Lacedæmonians were guilty of perjury;’ and removed the helots from Crania into Pylus, to resume their depredations, but refrained from any other act of hostility.

In the course of this winter, though the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, yet no regular battle was fought between them. The hostilities consisted of ambuscades and skirmishes, in which, according to the chance of action, some persons perished on both sides.

But in the close of winter, when the spring was now approaching, the Argives, provided with ladders for scaling, came under Epidaurus, hoping to take it by surprise, as insufficiently manned by reason of the war; but, failing of success, they soon withdrew. And then

¹ The Argives, in this remonstrance, acknowledged the dominion of the sea, even on the coast of Peloponnesus, to belong to Athens.

the winter ended, and with it ended also the thirteenth year of the war.

YEAR XIV.—About the middle of the ensuing summer, when their confederates, the Epidaurians, were sadly distressed, when some of the Peloponnesians had already revolted, and others showed plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedæmonians were clearly convinced that, unless expeditiously prevented, the mischief would spread abroad. On this they took the field against Argos with their whole force, both themselves and their helots; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded in chief. They were attended in the field by the Tegeate, and all the other Arcadians whatever confederated with the Lacedæmonians. But the allies of the other parts of Peloponnesus, and those without the isthmus, were assembled at Phlius; the Boeotians, consisting of five thousand heavy-armed, and the same number of light-armed; five hundred horsemen, each attended by a soldier on foot: the Corinthians of two thousand heavy-armed; the other confederates with their several quotas; but the Phliasians with the whole of their force, because the army was assembled in their district.

The Argives, who had some time before intelligence of the Lacedæmonian preparations, and that since they were filing towards Phlius in order to join the forces assembled there, now took the field themselves. They were joined by a succor of the Mantineans, strengthened by the addition of their dependents, and three thousand heavy-armed Eleans. On their march, they fell in with the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party posted itself on a rising ground. The Argives got every thing in readiness to attack the

Lacedæmonians whilst yet they were alone ; but Agis, dislodging by night, and stealing a march, completed his junction with the body of confederates at Phlius. When this was perceived by the Argives, they drew off early the next dawn, first of all to Argos, and then to the pass on the route of Nemea, by which they expected the Lacedæmonians, with their confederates, would fall into their country. Yet Agis took not that route which they expected ; but, having communicated his design to the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he took a different route, though much less practicable, and descended into the plains of Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians followed by another more direct route ; and orders had been given to the Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians, to take the route which led to Nemea, on which the Argives were posted, that, in case the Argives should march into the plain to make head against the Lacedæmonians, the last with their cavalry might press on their rear.

After these dispositions, and such a descent into the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and other places ; on intelligence of which, the Argives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from Nemea to stop the depredations, and on their march met with the body of Phliasians, and Corinthians ; and, encountering, slew some few of the Phliasians, whilst not a much greater number of their own men were destroyed by the Corinthians. The Boeotians also, Megareans and Sicyonians, took the route of Nemea conformably to orders, and found the Argives already dislodged ; but the latter, on entering the plain, and viewing the ravage made on their lands, drew up in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians stood regularly drawn up on the other side. And now the Argives were shut up in the middle of

their enemies : for, on the side of the plain, the Lacedæmonians, and those in their body, intercepted their return to the city ; on the high ground above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians ; on the other part, towards Nemea, were the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. Cavalry they had none : for the Athenians were the only part of their confederacy who were not yet come up.

The bulk indeed of the Argives and confederates apprehended not the danger which at present environed them to be so great : but rather concluded they might engage with advantage, and that they had caught the Lacedæmonians fast within their territory, and near to Argos itself. Two Argives, however, Thrasyllus, one of the five in command, and Alciphron, the public host of the Lacedæmonians, the very instant the armies were moving to the charge, had addressed themselves to Agis, and proposed expedients to prevent a battle : giving their word, that ' the Argives were ready to do and to submit to justice, on a fair and equitable arbitration, in case the Lacedæmonians had any charge against them ; and for the future would live at peace, if a present accommodation could be effected.'

In this manner these Argives presumed to talk, merely of themselves, and without the public authority. Agis also, by his own private determination, accepted the proposals ; and without reporting them to the council of war, without canvassing things maturely himself, or, at least, communicating only with one person of the number which had authority in the army, granted them a four months' truce, ' in which space they were to make good what engagements they had made ;' and then instantly drew off the army, without imparting the reasons of his conduct to the other confede-

rates. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, and confederates, followed when he led them off, because their laws exacted such obedience; yet, amongst themselves, were lavish of their censure against Agis, that, when so fine an opportunity of engaging was in their power, when their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, both by their horse and their foot, they were drawn off, without performing any thing worthy of such mighty preparations; for, to this very day, a finer army of Grecians had never appeared in the field. A most gallant figure in truth it made, whilst they were all together at Nemea. The Lacedæmonians were there to be seen with the whole collected force of their state, accompanied by the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans. The troops which composed their several quotas were all picked men, and were judged a match in the field of battle, not only for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition of double strength. This great army, however, laying all the time most heavy imputations on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and were disbanded to their several habitations.

On the other part also, the Argives were still much more exasperated against those who had made this suspension without public authority. They imagined the Lacedæmonians had escaped them, when they had the finest opportunity of striking a blow, inasmuch as the contest must have been decided under the very walls of Argos, and in company with a numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, on their return, at the Charadrum, the place where the crimes committed in an expedition are judged, before they enter the city, they were beginning to stone Thrasyllus, who, flying to an altar, escaped with life: his effects, however, they confiscated to public use.

But, after this, came up the Athenian succor, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed, and three hundred horsemen, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, who, after all, were afraid to break the agreement with the Lacedæmonians, ordered them ‘to be gone forthwith;’ and though they requested a conference, refused to introduce them into the assembly of the people till the Mantineans and Eleans, who were not yet departed, by great importunity obtained a compliance. Here the Athenians,¹ in the presence of Alcibiades, their ambassador, assembled with the Argives and their allies, averred, that ‘the suspension was not valid, since agreed to without the consent of the body of the confederates; now, therefore, as themselves were come up opportunely to their assistance, they were obliged in honor to prosecute the war.’ The confederates allowed the force of this argument; and the whole alliance, except the Argives, marched instantly away against Orchomenus, of Arcadia. But even the Argives, though they stayed behind at first, were persuaded by such reasoning, and soon after went also to take part in the expedition. Thus united, they sat down before and besieged Orchomenus. They made several assaults on it, desirous for other reasons to get it into their hands, but more particularly because the hostages from Arcadia were lodged in that city by the Lacedæmonians.

The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakness of their walls and the multitude of their besiegers, and lest, as no relief appeared, they should soon be exhausted, thought proper to capitulate on these conditions: ‘to be received into the confederacy; to give hostages of their own body, and to deliver up to the Mantineans those whom the Lacedæmonians had lodged with them.’

¹ Laches and Nicostratus.

Having thus got possession of Orchomenus, the confederates, in the next place, held a consultation, ‘against what other city, in their plan of conquest, they should next proceed.’ The Eleans exhorted them to march against Lepreum, but the Mantineans against Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the Mantineans. The Eleans, on this, were offended that they had not voted for the siege of Lepreum, and separated to their own home. But the rest of the confederates set about preparations at Mantinea, as fully bent on the siege of Tegea; and even some of the citizens of Tegea were exerting their efforts within that city to betray it to them.

But the Lacedæmonians, after they were withdrawn from Argos, in pursuance of the suspension of arms for four months, laid heavy charges on Agis, for not conquering Argos at so fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they had reason to expect, ‘since so numerous and so gallant a body of confederates could never again, without greater difficulty, be assembled together.’ And, when afterwards the news arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their indignation became more violent than ever. In such a ferment they instantly resolved, though not consistently with the calm Lacedæmonian temper, that ‘his house must needs be demolished, and a fine of one hundred thousand drachmas¹ be imposed on Agis.’ He earnestly pleaded against the execution of the sentence, that ‘in another expedition he would purge the charge by some notable service to the state; if not, they might then proceed to punish him at pleasure.’ On this they suspended the fine and demolition, but passed a law on the present

¹ 3229*l.* 3*s.* 4*d.* sterling.

occasion such as never before had been made amongst them ; for they elected a committee of ten Spartans to attend him as a council, without whose concurrence he was not permitted to lead out their army into the field.

In the mean time a message was brought them from their friends at Tegea, that ‘unless they come thither with the utmost expedition, Tegea will revolt from them to the Argives and their confederates; and is only not revolted already.’

To prevent this the whole Lacedæmonian strength, both of citizens and helots, was levied with more sharpness than had ever been known before ; and, taking the field, they marched to Oresteum, of Menalnia. An order was sent beforehand to their Arcadian allies, to assemble and follow them directly towards Tegea.

But when the whole Lacedæmonian strength was thus marched to Oresteum, the sixth part of the number, consisting of the more aged and younger classes, was from thence again dismissed to Sparta, to take on them the guard of that place, whilst the rest of their military force marched to Tegea ; and, not long after, their Arcadian confederates joined them.

They sent also to Corinth, to the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, a summons of speedy aid into the Mantinean : but for some of these the summons was too short ; and for the rest, it was by no means an easy task to take the field in separate bodies, and waiting for their mutual junction, to force their passage through an enemy’s country ; for such lay between to obstruct their advance : however, they were earnestly bent to attempt it. The Lacedæmonians, in the mean time, enlarged with such Arcadian parties as were already come up, marched on and broke into the Manti-

nean; and, having formed their camp near the temple of Hercules, they ravaged the country.

The Argives and their allies, when their enemy was thus in sight, having posted themselves on a spot of ground by nature strong and difficult of approach, drew up in order, as ready to engage. The Lacedæmonians immediately advanced towards them, and even approached so near as within the cast of a stone or a dart: but one of the old experienced Spartans, perceiving that they were to attack so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis,¹ that ‘he was going to repair one evil by another;’ as if, by his present ill-judged eagerness, he was bent on making reparation for his censured retreat from Argos. On this, either struck with such an exclamation, or whether on a sudden his own thoughts suggested to him a different conduct, he drew off his army again with all possible expedition, before the battle could be joined: and wheeling from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a stream of water into the Mantinean; about which, as apt to do great damage to the lands on which side soever it flowed, the Mantineans and Tegeatæ are eternally at blows. It was his scheme to draw down the Argives and their allies from their strong post on the eminence, in order to prevent the turning of this stream, so soon as they knew it was in agitation, and thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the plain. In pursuance of this he halted the whole day on the stream, and accom-

¹ Plutarch says it was an apophthegm of this Agis, that Lacedæmonians never asked concerning their enemies, ‘How many are they?’ but, ‘Where are they?’ And that, when he was hindered from fighting at Mantinea, he said, ‘They who would rule over many, must fight against many.’ And, being asked what was the number of the Lacedæmonians, he replied, ‘Enough to beat cowards.’

plished its diversion: but the Argives and their allies, surprised at this sudden and precipitate retreat, had been at first unable to conjecture what it meant. At length, when the enemy was totally withdrawn, and quite out of their view, after lying inactively in their posts, and no orders received for a pursuit, they began a second time to lay heavy imputations on their own commanders; that, ‘on the former occasions, the Lacedæmonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape; that now again, though they were openly flying, not a soul must pursue them; but, through shameful indolence, their enemies are preserved, and themselves are treacherously betrayed.’ The commanders, on the first noise of these clamors, were highly chagrined; but afterwards they marched them down from the eminence, and advancing into the plain, encamped them there, as determined to fight the enemy. The day following, the Argives and allies were drawn up to be in readiness for action should the enemy appear. And the Lacedæmonians, marching away from the stream, to reoccupy their former camp near the temple of Hercules, on a sudden perceived that the whole body of their foes were ready drawn up in order of battle, and had quitted their strong post on the eminence.

At that crisis the Lacedæmonians were struck with a greater astonishment than the memory of man could parallel: for now, in an interval of time exceeding short, they were bound to get every thing in readiness for fight; yet, such was their diligence, that in an instant they were formed into a beautiful army; Agis, their king, issuing all the necessary orders, according to law; for when a king leads their armies all orders are given by him: he himself declares what he wishes

to be done to the general officers;¹ they carry his orders to the colonels;² these to the captains,³ who afterwards forward them to the subalterns,⁴ by whom they are communicated to all the private men under their respective commands. The orders, when any such are requisite, are in this method dispersed and circulated with the greatest expedition: for in the Lacedæmonian armies almost the whole soldiery, few only excepted, have a command assigned in regular subordination; and the care of executing orders is incumbent on numbers.

In their present array the left wing consisted of the Skiritæ, who, of all the Lacedæmonians, ever claim this post as their peculiar right; next them were posted the Brasidean soldiers who had served in Thrace, accompanied by those who had lately been honored with the freedom of Sparta; then, along the line, were regularly posted all the troops which were composed of pure Lacedæmonians; next to them stood the Hereans of Arcadia, and beyond them the Mænaliens. In the right wing were the Tegeatæ, but in the utmost extent of it some few Lacedæmonians. Their cavalry was equally posted on both the wings: and in this form was the Lacedæmonian disposition made.

On the side of the enemy the Mantineans had the right wing, because the business fell on their ground; next to them were the allies from Arcadia; then a picked body of Argives, to the number of a thousand, who long had been exercised in the study of arms at the public school at Argos; and next to them stood the rest of the Argive forces; these were followed by their own confederates, the Cleoneans and Orneatæ.

¹ Polemarchs.

² Pentecontactors.

³ Lochages.

⁴ Enomataarchs.

The Athenians were ranged in the outermost body, and composed the left wing, supported by their own cavalry. Such was the order and disposition on both sides.

The army of the Lacedæmonians had the appearance of superior numbers: but exactly to write the number, either of the several bodies on each side, or of their whole force, I own myself unable. The amount of the Lacedæmonians was not known, because of the profound secrecy observed in their polity; and the amount of their enemies, because of the ostentation ordinary to mankind in magnifying their own strength, has been still disbelieved. However, from the following computation, an inquirer may discover the number of the Lacedæmonians who on this occasion were drawn up in the field.

Besides the Skiriteæ, who were in number six hundred, seven battalions were in this engagement. Now in every battalion there were four companies; and in every company four platoons; in the first rank of every platoon were four fighting soldiers. In regard to depth they were not equally formed, as every colonel determined the depth at his own private discretion; but generally they were drawn up eight deep. The front line of their whole force, excepting the Skiriteæ, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men.¹

¹ The Lacedæmonian mora, or brigade, consisted of four lochi, or battalions, = 2048 men; for a lochos, or battalion, consisted of four pentecosties, or companies, = 512 men; a pentecosty or company, of four enomatriæ, or platoons, = 128 men; and each enomatia, or platoon consisted of 32. This is the account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 in front and eight in depth. The platoon consisted therefore of 32; which, \times by 4, = 128, the number of a company; which, also \times by 4, = 512, the number of a battalion. The number of battalions was seven, which shows the number of Lacedæmo-

When both sides were ready, the small respite before the engagement was employed by the several commanders in animating the soldiers under their respective orders.

To the Mantineans it was urged, that ‘the points for which they were going to fight were their country and their future fate, either rule or slavery; that of rule, whose sweets they had known, they might not be divested, and that they might never feel again what slavery is.’

To the Argives, it was ‘for their ancient sovereignty, and the equal share of dignity they had once enjoyed in Peloponnesus, now timely to prevent an eternal submission to such losses, and earn revenge for the many injuries a neighboring state, unrelenting in its enmity, had done them.’

But to the Athenians, that in honor they ‘were obliged to signalise their valor in a conspicuous manner, in the company of numerous and gallant allies: that should they gain a victory over the Lacedæmonians on Peloponnesian ground, their own empire would be established and enlarged, and no enemy would ever again presume to invade their territories.’

And in this manner were the Argives and their confederates animated to the fight.

But the Lacedæmonians were encouraging one another, and, during martial strains enjoined by their discipline, like men of bravery as they were, each animated his neighbor with the recital of the gallant acts they had performed together. They were persons who

nians to have been 3584: and then, with the addition of 600 Skiriteæ, who were posted on the left, to have amounted, in the whole, to 4184 men. Or again the whole front line, = 441, \times 8, the number in depth, is equal to 3584, + 600 Skiriteæ, = 4184.

knew that a long experience in the toils of war conducted more to preservation than a short verbal harangue, how finely soever delivered.

And now the armies were mutually approaching : the Argives and their allies advanced in a brisk and angry manner ; but the Lacedæmonians moved slowly forwards to the sound of many flutes, the music which their laws ordain, not from any religious motive, but for advancing with equal steps, keeping time with the notes, to prevent all disorders in the ranks ; accidents very frequent in large armies whilst drawing to an encouater.¹

But, during the approach, Agis, the king, bethought himself of making a new disposition. It is the constant case with all armies that, on the right, their

¹ Milton has made use of this Lacedæmonian march to adorn and raise his own noble poetry. It was full and strong in his imagination when he wrote the following lines. *Paradise Lost*, b. i.

—Anon they move

In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood
 Of flutes and soft recorders ; such as raised
 To height of noblest temper heroes old,
 Arming to battle ; and, instead of rage,
 Deliberate valor breathed, firm and unmoved
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat :
 Nor wanting power to mitigate and suage,
 With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase
 Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain,
 From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they,
 Breathing united force, with fixed thought,
 Moved on in silence to soft pipes, that charm'd
 Their painful steps o'er the burnt soil ; and now,
 Advanced in view, they stand a horrid front
 Of dreadful length and dazzling arms, in guise
 Of warriors old with order'd spear and shield,
 Awaiting what command their mighty chief
 Had to impose : he through the armed files
 Darts his experienced eye ; and sooth, traverse
 The whole battalion, views their order due.

wings, whilst they approach one another, extend themselves too far, so that constantly, on both sides, the left wing is overreached and flanked by the enemy's right. This proceeds from the dread every soldier lies under of being exposed on his unarmed side, which makes him eager to get it covered by the shield of the next person on his right, and positive that a firm closing together, in this manner, will render them impenetrable to the shock of the enemy. This turn of the body is first begun by the right-hand man of the whole front; and is the result of his constant care to shift his defenceless side from the aim of the foe; and the dread of being in the same manner exposed obliges all the rest to follow his motion. And thus in the present approach, the Mantineans in their wing had far overreached the Skiritæ: but the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatae had done so, more in regard to the Athenians, in proportion as they exceeded them in numbers. Agis therefore, fearing lest the left wing of the Lacedæmonians might be quite surrounded, and judging that the Mantineans quite too far overreached them, sent orders to the Skiritæ and Brasideans to wheel away from the spot where they were first posted, and fill up the extremity of the line, so as to render it equal to the Mantineans: and, to supply the void thus made, he ordered, from the right wing, two battalions, commanded by general officers, Hipponeidas and Aristocles, to repair thither, and, falling in, to close up the ranks; judging that their own right would still be more than sufficient to execute their parts, and the wing opposed to the Mantineans might, by this disposition, be properly strengthened. But, as he issued these orders in the very onset and close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and Hipponeidas absolutely refused to change their post; though for such disobedience, as

apparently the result of cowardice, they were afterwards banished from Sparta; and before the new disposition could be completed the enemy had begun to charge. On the refusal of these two battalions to change their post, Agis countermanded those marching to strengthen the Skiritæ to their former places, who were unable to fall into the ranks, or close together with those whom they had quitted: but, on this occasion, more remarkably than ever, the Lacedæmonians, though in all respects outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of their superiority in true manly valor.

For, to come to particulars, when once they were at blows with the enemy, the right wing of the Mantineans routed their Skiritæ and Brasideans. Then the same Mantineans, supported by their confederates and the thousand picked Argives, falling in at the void in the Lacedæmonian line, which was not yet filled up, did great execution on them; for, taking them in flank, they intirely broke them, drove them for shelter among their carriages, and made a slaughter of the old men who were appointed for their guard. And in this quarter the Lacedæmonians were clearly vanquished.

But in the other quarters, and especially in the centre, where Agis, the king, was posted, and round him the horse-guards, styled the Three Hundred, falling on those troops which were composed of the elder Argives, and them which are called the pentelochi, and on the Cleoneans, and Orneatæ, and those Athenians who ranked along with them, they broke them in an instant, so that many of them durst not stand to exchange a blow, but so soon as they felt the Lacedæmonian shock, turned about at once, and others were trampled under foot in the great hurry they were in to secure their escape.

But, when the main body of the Argives and their allies was in this quarter routed, their foot, on both the flanks, were instantly discomfited. Now also, the right of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the advantage of superior numbers, had overreached and encompassed the Athenians. These now, on all hands, were beset with danger; in this quarter they were surrounded by their enemies, in another they were already vanquished; and they must have suffered the most of any part of the army, had it not been for the excellent support their own cavalry gave them. It happened also that Agis, when he perceived that the Mantineans and the thousand Argives had got the better on the left, commanded the whole army to wheel off to the support of the vanquished: and, whilst this was executing, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, which this motion of the enemy, and their drawing off from around them, occasioned, to secure their own escape without any opposition, accompanied by the Argives, who were also vanquished with them.

But the Mantineans, and those who fought in company with them, and the picked band of Argives, were now no longer intent on pressing on their adversaries; but, perceiving their own side to be completely vanquished, and the Lacedæmonians approaching to their attack, they turned about and fled. Yet numbers of them perished, and those chiefly Mantineans; for the greatest part of the picked band of Argives completed their escape.

The flight however was not precipitate, nor the distance to a place of safety great: for the Lacedæmonians, till the enemy flies, maintain their combats with long and steady toil; but, after a rout, pursue them neither long nor far.

And thus, or very nearly thus, was the procedure of the whole battle, the greatest that for many ages had been fought amongst Grecians, and where the competition lay between most renowned and flourishing states. The Lacedæmonians, amassing together the arms of their enemies who had been slain, immediately erected a trophy, and rifled the bodies of the dead. They also took up their own dead, and carried them to Tegea, where they received the rights of sepulture ; and also delivered, on truce, the slain of their enemy. There fell, of the Argives, Orneatæ, and Cleoneans, seven hundred ; and two hundred of the Mantineans ; two hundred also of the Athenians, including the Eginetæ and their several commanders. On the Lacedæmonian side, as the confederates were never hard pressed, what loss they suffered is scarcely deserving of notice ; and the exact number of their own dead it is difficult to discover, but it was reported to have been about three hundred.

When a battle was certainly to be fought, Pleistanax, the other king, marched out to their support, with the whole body of citizens, both old men and youths. But, when he was advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians also sent messengers to command their allies from Corinth, and from without the isthmus ; and, being themselves returned to Sparta, after giving dismissal to their allies, as the Carneian solemnities were at hand, they celebrated the festival. The imputation also of cowardice, at that time laid to their charge by the rest of Greece, because of their misfortune at Sphacteria, and some other instances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by this one action they completely purged away. Now it was determined that

their depression had been merely the result of fortune, but that in inward bravery they were still themselves.

The day before this battle was fought it happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole of their strength, had made an incursion into Argia, as left defenceless, and had done great execution on the guards, left behind at the general march of the Argives.

Three thousand heavy-armed Eleans, as auxiliaries to the Mantineans, came up after the baffle ; as did also a thousand Athenians to join the former body ; on which the whole alliance marched immediately against Epidaurus, whilst the Lacedæmonians were solemnising the Carneian festival. After an equal distribution of the work, they began to raise a circumvallation around that city. The rest, indeed, soon desisted ; but the Athenians, conformably to their orders, completed theirs round the eminence on which stood the temple of Juno. To guard this work, the whole alliance left behind a sufficient number draughted from the several bodies, and then departed to their respective homes. And the summer was now at an end.

In the commencement of the succeeding winter, and after the celebration of the Carneian festival, the Lacedæmonians immediately took the field ; and, advancing as far as Tegea, sent from thence to Argos proposals for an accommodation. There was already in that city a party in their intelligence, who were also bent on overturning the popular government at Argos : and since the event of the late fatal battle, they were enabled to use more cogent arguments to persuade the many into the accommodation. Their scheme was, first to enter into truce with the Lacedæmonians, as preparatory to an alliance offensive and defensive, which

was next in agitation ; and this point carried, then immediately to execute their plot against the people.

Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the public host of the Argives, accordingly arrived at Argos, charged to make two demands in the name of the Lacedæmonians : the one, ‘ whether war be still their option ? ’ the other, ‘ how, if their choice be peace ? ’ On this a strong debate arose, for Alcibiades was present. But the party who acted in the Lacedæmonian interest prevailed with the Argives to accept their proposals of an accommodation ; which were as follows :—

‘ Thus resolved by the Lacedæmonian council to compound with the Argives.

‘ These to restore their children to the Orchomenians, and their men to the Mænaliens ; to restore also to the Lacedæmonians their citizens now detained at Mantinea ; to evacuate Epidaurus and demolish their works.

‘ And the Athenians, if they will not quit Epidaurus, to be declared enemies to the Argives and to the Lacedæmonians, and to the confederates of the Lacedæmonians, and to the confederates of the Argives.

‘ And, if the Lacedæmonians have in their power any young men, to release them to all the states.

‘ In relation to the god,¹ we consent that an oath be administered to the Epidaurians, and we grant the form to be prescribed by the Argives.

‘ The states of Peloponnesus, both small and great, to be, none excepted, free, according to their own primitive constitutions.

¹ The Pythian Apollo. This article seems designed to adjust the quarrel about the victim, related in the transactions of the last year.

‘ And, if any state without Peloponnesus shall enter offensively into the lands of Peloponnesus, succors to be united, in pursuance of a general consultation of Peloponnesians about to determine on the most expedient methods.

‘ All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy the same privileges as those of the Lacedæmonians, and those of the Argives enjoy, each remaining in free possession of their territories.

‘ These articles to be communicated to the confederates, and ratification to be made, if they approve. If different methods seem advisable to the confederates, all parties to desist, and return directly home.’

These proposals, by way of preliminary, the Argives accepted; and the army of the Lacedæmonians was drawn off from Tegea to their own home. And afterwards, in the course of mutual negotiation, the same party at Argos prevailed on their countrymen to renounce their alliance with the Mantineans and Eleans, and even with the Athenians, and to make peace and an alliance offensive and defensive, with the Lacedæmonians. The tenor of it was this:—

‘ Resolved thus, by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives, on a peace, and an alliance offensive and defensive, for the term of fifty years.

‘ They shall do justice to each other reciprocally, with impartiality and equity, according to their several forms of law.

‘ The other states in Peloponnesus, comprehended in this peace and alliance, shall continue in the enjoyment of their own laws, their own independence, holding the same territories, doing justice with impartiality and with equity, according to their several forms of law.

‘ All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy the same privileges with the Lacedæmonians themselves: and the Argive confederates shall enjoy the same with the Argives themselves; each holding their respective territories.

‘ If a joint expedition be at any time requisite, a consultation to be held by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives about the determinate and most expedient methods of issuing orders to the rest of the alliance.

‘ But, if any controversy arise between the states, either those within or those without Peloponnesus, concerning their boundaries or any other point, it shall be determined by judges.

‘ And, if any confederate state have a dispute with another state, they shall go with a reference to that state, which to the contending states shall be thought most impartial. Private persons, however, to be judged by the laws of that state to which they are subject.’

This peace, and such an alliance, was now perfected: and the reciprocal damages of war and all other offences were now buried in oblivion. And, having already settled all points to general satisfaction, they concurred in a suffrage ‘ to receive no herald nor embassy from the Athenians till they were withdrawn out of Peloponnesus, and had given up their fortifications at Epidaurus;’ and farther, ‘ for the future to make neither peace nor war but with joint concurrence.’ Their attention was also extended to objects more remote; and in conjunction they despatched ambassadors to the cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced Perdiccas to swear adherence to their league: not that he instantly declared his revolt from the Athenians, but he was bent on accomplishing it ever since he saw the Argives had done it; for he was originally

descended from Argos. They renewed also their ancient oaths to the Chalcideans, and strengthened them by the addition of new.

The Argives also despatched an embassy to the Athenians, requiring them to quit the works they had raised at Epidaurus. The latter, sensible that their soldiers there were but a handful of men, when compared with those who were associated with them in that service, sent Demosthenes to draw them off. He, on his arrival, pretending to solemnise some martial game without the fortress, when the rest of the garrison was gone out to the spectacle, barred fast the gates. And afterwards the Athenians, having renewed the peace with them, surrendered the fortifications they had raised into the hands of the Epidaurians.

When the Argives had in this manner gone off from the alliance, the Mantineans also, who at first stood out, finding at length that without the Argives they could do nothing of themselves, thought proper to accommodate their disputes with the Lacedæmonians, and resigned their command over the cities of Arcadia. The Lacedæmonians also and Argives, to the number of a thousand each, marched in company to Sicyon; where, principally by the presence of the Lacedæmonians, the government was shifted into the hands of a smaller number. And after transacting such points in concert, they soon procured the demolition of the popular government at Argos; and an oligarchy, suited to the Lacedæmonian model, was erected in its stead.

As the winter was now in its close, these transactions ran out nearly into the spring; and the fourteenth year of the war expired.

YEAR XV.—In the following summer the Dictideans
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of Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcideans; and the Lacedæmonians resettled the state of Achaia, which for a time had been under a management not agreeable to them.

The people of Argos also, combining gradually together, and resuming their spirits, made an assault on the few. They waited for a favorable opportunity, till the festival of the naked games was celebrating at Lacedæmon. A battle was fought within the precincts of Argos, in which the people were victorious: some of their opponents they slew, and others they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedæmonians, when their adherents implored their succor, were too dilatory in moving; but at last they adjourned the games, and marched away to their support; and hearing, when they were come to Tegea, that ‘the few were vanquished,’ they determined to proceed no farther, notwithstanding all the intreaties of the new exiles; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, they resumed the celebration of the games: yet, being afterwards attended by deputations from those in Argos, as well as by such as had been lately banished, in the presence of the whole confederacy, after many arguments had been urged on both sides, they came to a resolution, that ‘the Argives in the city were guilty of injustice;’ and a decree was passed, that ‘they should march against Argos.’ But, after all, their proceedings were dilatory and remiss.

In the mean time the people of Argos, dreading the Lacedæmonian strength, and readdressing themselves again to Athens for a renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute a plan which they thought the strongest expedient of preservation, built long walls quite down to the sea, that in case they should be blocked up by land all proper supplies might be thrown

into the city by sea, through the good offices of the Athenians. To this scheme of new fortification some cities also of Peloponnesus were secretly accessory. The whole body of the Argives without distinction, the citizens, their wives, and their servants, forwarded the work ; and from Athens they were supplied with carpenters and masons. And here the summer ended.

Winter now succeeding, the Lacedæmonians, when advertised of these new fortifications, marched their forces against Argos ; their own, and all those of their allies, excepting the Corinthian. Some new projects in their favor were now also in agitation within Argos itself. The whole army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. The new turns they expected for their service took no effect within the city ; but they made themselves masters of the new-erected walls, and levelled them with the ground. They also took Hysiae, a town in Argia ; and, having put all the freemen found within that place to the sword, they drew off, and dispersed to their several cities.

After this the Argives marched their force into Phliasia ; and after ravaging that district, because the exiles from Argos had met with a reception there, they again retired : for many of those exiles had taken up their residence at Phlius.

In the same winter the Athenians, exasperated against Perdiccas, prevented all manner of importations into Macedonia. They charged him with ‘ taking part in the late treaty, confirmed by the sanction of oaths, between the Argives and Lacedæmonians ; that, farther, when they had made great preparations against the Chalcideans of Thrace and Amphipolis, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, was appointed to command in that service, he had violated his obligations to act in

concert, and that expedition came to nothing purely through his secession : he was therefore an enemy to Athens.

The winter expired in this manner ; and with it the fifteenth year came also to an end.

YEAR XVI.—When summer came on Alcibiades, with twenty sail, arrived at Argos, where he seized three hundred of the citizens, whose fidelity to the Athenians, and adherence to the Lacedæmonian interest, was still suspected ; and these the Athenians secured in the neighboring islands which were subject to their dominion.

The Athenians also undertook the reduction of Melos with a naval force, consisting of thirty sail of Athenians, six of Chians, and two of Lesbians ; on board of which were transported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred archers, and twenty who drew the bow on horseback. The number also of their dependents, from the continent and islands, which attended, was about fifteen hundred heavy-armed. The Melians¹ are a colony of the Lacedæmonians, and had

¹ The origin of this colony is curious, according to the account given of it by Plutarch : ‘ When the Tyrrhenes were masters of Lemnos and Imbrus, and made a practice of ravishing the wives of the Athenians at Brauron, a mixed breed was the consequence ; whom, as half barbarians, the Athenians drove out of the isles. Thus exiled, they repaired to Tænarus, and were useful to the Spartans in their war against the helots. They were afterwards rewarded for their good services with the freedom of Sparta and liberty of intermarriage. Yet, not being allowed the honor of serving the offices of the state, or a seat in the council, they became afterwards suspected, as caballing together for bad designs, and projecting to overthrow the constitution : the Lacedæmonians therefore apprehended them all ; and, throwing them into prison, kept them confined under a strong guard, till they could find out clear and incontestable evidence against

therefore refused to receive law from the Athenians in the same manner as the inhabitants of the other islands received it. At first, however, they observed a strict neutrality; but in process of time, when the Athenians, by ravaging their country, would have obliged them to act offensively, they openly took part in the war against them.

With a force as strong as has been described, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, landed and encamped on the island: yet, before they proceeded to hostilities, they sent a deputation from the army to demand a conference; whom the Melians refused to introduce into the assembly of the people, but, in the presence only of the magistrates and the few, commanded them to deliver their instructions. On this the Athenian deputation expressed themselves as follows:—

‘ Since to the people in full assembly we are precluded from speaking, lest the many, hearing their true interest declared at once by us in a continued dis-

them. The wives of the prisoners came in a body to the prison, and, after much prayer and intreaty, were at length admitted by the guard to the sight and discourse of their husbands. When once they had gained access, they ordered them immediately to strip, and change clothes with them; to leave them their own, and, dressed in those of their wives, to make their escape directly in that disguise. It was done; the women stayed behind, determined to endure whatever might be the consequence; and the guards, deceived by appearances, let out the husbands instead of the wives. They marched off and seized Taygeta; then seduced the helots to revolt, and promised to support them; which struck a great terror amongst the Spartans. They sent to treat with them, and made up the matter on these conditions: that they should have their wives restored safe to them; should be furnished with money and vessels for removal; and, when settled in another country, should be reckoned a colony and kinsmen of the Lacedæmonians.—A body of them settled some time after in the isle of Melos.’ Of the Virtues of Women.

course, and proved by arguments fitted to persuade and too strong to be refused, might be wrought into our views, for such, we are sensible, is the plain construction of this our guarded audience by the few: to you, also, who now sit here, we recommend a method of making that point yet more secure; that, to the reasons we offer, you reserve not your objections for one formal deliberate reply, but, in case we offer any seeming incongruity, you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the point. And tell us, first, whether or not this proposal be agreeable.'

The Melians, who composed the synod, answered thus:

'The candor of such leisurely debate, for mutual information, is not to be disapproved: and yet there seems to be great inconsistency between such candor and those warlike preparations, with which you no longer intend hereafter, but in present act have already beset us. For we perceive, that hither you are come to be authoritative judges of your own plea, and that the decision must needs prove fatal to us: since if, superior in debate, we for that reason refuse submission, our portion must be war; and, if we allow your plea, from that moment we become your slaves.'

Athenians.—'To what purpose this? If here you are met together to retail your suspicions of future events, or to talk of any thing but the proper means of extricating and preserving your state from the present and manifest dangers which environ it, we had better be silent: but, if the latter be your purpose, let us come to the point.'

Melians.—'There is reason for it, and there ought to be forgiveness, when men, so situated as we are, are liable to much distraction both in speech and thought. The point for which we are assembled is, it

is true, no less than our future preservation : if therefore it must be so, let the conference proceed in the method you require.'

A.—As, therefore, it is not our purpose to amuse you with pompous details ; how, after completely vanquishing the Mede, we had a right to assume the sovereignty ; or how, provoked by the wrongs received from you, we come hither to earn redress ; we shall wave all parade of words that have no tendency towards conviction ; and, in return, insist from you, that you reject all hopes of persuading us by frivolous remonstrances ; that, as a colony of the Lacedæmonians, you were incapacitated from accompanying our arms, or that wrongs in any shape you have never done us. But, these things apart, let us lay all stress on such points as may really on both sides be judged persuasive : since of this you are as strongly convinced as we ourselves are sensible of it, that in all competitions, equal wants alone produce equitable determination ; and, in what terms soever the powerful enjoin obedience, to those the weak are obliged to submit.'

M.—‘ If this be so, we boldly aver, for, as you have discarded justice from the question, and substituted interest in its place, we must follow the precedent, that you also it concerns, we should not be deprived of the common privilege of men ; but that to human creatures ever liable to so dangerous a loss, the pleas of reason and equity, even though urged beyond their exact limitations, should be indulged and allowed their weight. And more to you than to others is this proper to be suggested, lest, after satiating revenge in all its fury, should you ever be overthrown, you may teach your enemies how you ought to be treated.’

A.—‘ That affects us not; for, though to our share

an overthrow of empire fall, the event would render us neither abject nor desponding; because men, injured to enlarged command, as the Lacedæmonians for instance, are never terrible to the vanquished. But our contest, at present, is not against the Lacedæmonians. That revenge alone is terrible, when subjects tumultuously rebel, and gain the ascendant over such as were once their masters: and truly, to avert such dangerous extremities, be the care intrusted to us. But on the present occasion, that we are here for the enlargement of our own power, and that what we have to urge concerns the preservation of the state of Melos, these are the points we are to establish. We are desirous to have our power extended over you without obstruction; and your preservation to be amply secured for the common benefit of us both.'

M..—‘ And how can it turn out as beneficial for us to become your slaves as it will for you to be our masters?’

A..—‘ Plainly thus: because instead of suffering the extremities of conquest, you may merely become our subjects; and we, by exempting you from a total destruction, shall gain your service.’

M..—‘ But will not these terms content you: that we be permitted to persevere in quiet; to be friends to you, instead of enemies; but, in regard to war, to be strictly neutral?’

A..—‘ No; for all your enmity cannot hurt us so much as the acceptance of such friendship from you. The latter, to those over whom we rule, would suggest intimations of our weakness; your enmity is a proof of our power.’

M..—‘ Are your subjects then such sorry judges of equality and right, as to place on the same level those

who are under no manner of tie, and who were never indebted for their settlement to you, and those who, revolting from you, have been again reduced?’

A.—‘ Why should they not? They know such a sense of things may be well grounded in regard to both; inasmuch as those, who are exempted from our yoke, owe such exemption to their own superior strength, and if we attack them not, it is the pure result of fear. And hence, the reduction of you, besides enlarging our empire, will invest it with more ample security: especially when seated on an island, you are bound to submit to the masters of the sea, and to remain henceforth too weak for resistance, unless you are victorious at the present crisis.’

M.—‘ Do you then conclude that what we have proposed is incompatible with your own security? For since, excluding us from the plea of justice, you endeavor merely to persuade us into subserviency to your interest, we also are again necessitated to insist once more on the profitable to ourselves, and by showing that with our welfare your own also coincides, endeavor to prevail. What think you of all those states, which now stand neutral in your disputes? how will you avoid their implacable hatred, when, terrified at such your usage of us, they must live in constant expectation of your hostilities? And whither can such conduct tend, but to enlarge the number of your declared enemies, and to constrain others, who never designed to be your foes, to take up arms against you, though to their own regret?’

A.—‘ That never can be: since from states seated on the continent we have nothing to apprehend: they are under no immediate necessity of guarding their liberty against attacks from us. Those alone we dread who are seated in islands; and who, like you, refuse

our government; or who, having felt the pains of subjection, are irritated against us. Such are most likely to have recourse to violent measures, and to plunge themselves and us into imminent dangers.'

M.—‘ If this be so; and if you, ye Athenians, can readily embark into so many perils to prevent the dissolution of your own empire; if states, by you enslaved, can do as much to throw off your yoke; must it not be wretchedly base and cowardly in us, who yet are free, to leave any method, even to the last extremity, untried of averting slavery?’

A.—‘ If you judge of things as wise men ought, we answer—Not. For the point in which you are at present concerned, is not a trial of valor on equal terms, in order to escape the reproach of cowardice; but your deliberations proceed at present about the means of self-preservation, that you may not be obliged to encounter those who must by far overpower you.’

M.—‘ But we, on the contrary, know, that the enterprises of war have sometimes very different events to those which superiority of numbers gave reason to expect; and, in regard to ourselves, that if we yield at once, eternal despair must be our fate: but, by acting resolutely in our own defence, we may yet entertain a hope of success.’

A.—‘ Hope in this manner is ever applied to the solace of danger. And truly, in situations which can afford to be disappointed, though ever prejudicial, it is not always fatal. But such, as idly lavish their last resource, their very all, on hope (for it is prodigal by nature), are only by their own ruin convinced of its delusion; nay, when its delusion is thus by sad experience discovered, and men should guard themselves against it, it will not yet let go its hold in the human heart. Choose not, therefore, so fatal a resource for

yourselves in your present destitute situation, hanging as you are on the very brink of ruin. Let not your conduct resemble the foolish behavior of the mob of mankind, who, though by human means their safety might be earned, yet, when calamity has chased away all visible hopes of redress, betake themselves to others of a darker cast, to divinations and to oracles, and all such vain expedients as hope suggests, to draw them to their destruction.'

M..—‘Difficult indeed, as we apprehend, and you well know, the contest must prove to us against your strength and fortune, matched as we are so unequally together; yet the confidence still supports us, that in fortune, since of divine disposal, we shall not be inferior, as, with innocence on our side, we stand against injustice; that, farther, our deficiencies in strength will be amplified by the addition of Lacedæmonian aid; since it is incumbent on them to support us, if from no other motive, yet from the ties of blood and a sense of honor. And thus it is not intirely without good grounds that we can form the resolution to withstand your efforts.’

A..—‘Nor have we any reason to apprehend, on our own account, that the divine benevolence will not equally exert itself for us; because neither our opinions nor our acts are worse than those of the rest of mankind, either in regard to the worship of the gods, or an acknowledgement of their providence: for of the divine nature we think like the rest of the world; and of men, that beyond a scruple they are impelled, by the inherent bent of their nature, to seize dominion wherever they have power. As for ourselves, we were not the authors of this constitution, nor were we the first who digested it into practice. We found it already in force; we have accordingly applied it

and shall leave it behind us for the practice of every future age; conscious that you yourselves, and every other state invested with equal power, would make the same exertion of it. And truly, so far as relates to the gods, we have no more reason to distrust their protection than our neighbors. But your sentiments of the Lacedæmonians are such, that you are confident of support from them because it will be base in them to refuse it. Here we bless your simplicity, but envy not your folly. The Lacedæmonians, we allow, amongst one another, and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country, give ample proofs of honor and virtue; but their behavior towards the rest of mankind, though it would open a large field of censure were it to be minutely examined, yet at present shall be shown by one concise declaration, that, according to the best lights we have been able to collect, they repute as honorable the things which please them, and as just, the things which promote their interest. Such maxims are not in the least conducive to your preservation: it is all chimera.'

M..—'No. We ground our hopes of relief from them on their own clear conviction of what their interest enjoins them. This never can suffer them to entertain a thought of abandoning the Melians, who are a colony of their own; of being faithless to the states of Greece, who wish them well; or of promoting the schemes of the common foe.'

A..—'Of consequence you imagine, that their interest is connected with your security; that the duties of justice should in honor be observed, though attended with dangers. But these are maxims which the Lacedæmonians, least of all men, have resolution enough to observe in fact.'

M..—'We have the strongest grounds to imagine that

in our defence they will hazard any dangers, from a sense that their own preservation depends more on us than any other people, as we are finely situated for doing them service in Peloponnesus, and in affection are more faithfully attached to them through the bands of consanguinity.'

A.—‘But the certainty of obtaining succor in the intervals of need seems not to depend so much on the merit of those who implore it, as on the consciousness of superior strength in those who are implored to give it: a maxim, this, to which no state adheres so strictly as the Lacedæmonian. Hence, ever through a diffidence of their own domestic force, they never dare even to invade their neighbors without the concurrence of numerous allies. There cannot therefore be the least room to expect that they will transport an aid into an island whilst we are masters of the sea.’

M.—‘Not perhaps of their own forces; but they have confederates enough to employ in this service. The sea of Crete is wide and spacious; a passage through it even the lords of the sea will find it more difficult to obstruct than those who are intent on stealing it to effect with safety. Or, grant they miscarry in the attempt, at worst they can make a diversion on your territory, or against the remainder of your dependents who escaped the efforts of Brasidas. And then your attention and your arms must be drawn from a quarter where you have no right to fix them, for the necessary defence of your own home and your own appendage.’

A. ‘Though such turns may intervene, your own experience should teach you to distrust them: for you are not, cannot, be ignorant, that the Athenians never yet would condescend to raise a siege through hostile dread. But we cannot avoid observing, that in the

whole course of this debate, though declared by you to be held as the means of your preservation, you have not so much as started one single point on which wise men can presume to fasten the least confidence of redress. Your firmest security is placed in the faint hope of some distant contingencies; but your present strength is merely trifling against the extensive scope of your antagonists. Nay, victims you must fall to your own absurd presumptions, unless, when we are once withdrawn to give you time to consult, you determine to try some other expedient. You will then no longer be controlled by that sense of shame, which, when dishonor glares before and danger presses on, precipitates men into ruin: for though they see with their eyes quite open, into what an abyss they are going to plunge, yet, to avoid the imputation of what the world styles dishonor,—so prevalent is the force of one bewitching sound!—though vanquished by it, they scorn to yield to reason, wilfully embarrassing themselves with incurable calamities, and contracting a more shameful weight of dishonor, through their own mad obstinacy, than fortune could award them. Such consequences you are now concerned by mature deliberations to avoid. You are next to reflect, that no shame can attend your plying under the force of a most formidable state; a state, which designs to make moderate demands alone,—that you would accept her alliance, and securely enjoy your territory on the condition only to pay her tribute; and, when war or safety are left to your own option, that you would not peevishly prefer the worst: for those are the men, to maintain themselves in credit and prosperity, who never suffer their equals to insult them, who pay proper regard to their superiors, and towards their inferiors behave with moderation. Reflect on these points whilst

we withdraw ; and remember, again and again, that your country now calls for all your prudence, since, by the single deliberation of this single day, as either it takes a prosperous or sinister turn, her fate will be determined.'

Here the Athenians withdrew from the conference ; and the Melians, after being some time alone, and resolving finally to reject what they had already refused, gave in their answer thus :—

' We continue, Athenians, in the very same sentiments we have already declared. We shall not in an instant of time abandon that liberty which, in the free possession of our own state, we have enjoyed for the space of seven hundred years ; which still we shall spare no endeavors to preserve, intrusting it to that fortune which, by divine permission, has hitherto preserved it, and to the redress we expect from human aid and the Lacedæmonians. But thus much again we offer :—to be friends to you, enemies to neither, on condition you quit our lands, after an accommodation ratified between us to our reciprocal satisfaction.'

The Melians in this manner delivered their final answer. But the Athenians, the very moment they quitted the place of conference, spoke thus :—

' You, Melians, alone, of all mankind, are the persons, so far as we can judge, who regard future contingencies as an overbalance for instant dangers, and, through mad presumption, value things yet invisible as really actual. But, the greater your dependence, the more rash your confidence, on Lacedæmonians, on fortune, and on hope, the more abundantly fatal your delusions will prove.'

And, this said, the Athenian deputation returned to their camp.

But the Athenian commanders, on this refusal of

submission from the Melians, applied themselves instantly to the acts of war; and dividing the work in shares to the several parties in their army, completely shut up the Melians in a line of circumvallation. And, when this was perfected, and a sufficient number, both of the Athenians and their dependents, were appointed to stay behind and continue the blockade both by land and sea, they departed with the bulk of their forces. Those farther, who were left for this service, stayed behind and continued the blockade.

About the same time, the Argives, making an irruption into Phliasia, and caught in an ambuscade, laid for them by the Phliasians and their own exiles, were slaughtered to the number of eighty.

The Athenians, by their excursions from Pylus, committed many depredations on the Lacedæmonians. But these had not influence enough on the Lacedæmonians to cause a renunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the war. They only proclaimed, that 'their people had free leave to make reprisals on the Athenians.'

The Corinthians also had a war with the Athenians, on account of some private differences between them; but the rest of Peloponnesus interfered not in the quarrel.

The Melians, farther, assaulting it by night, carried that part of the Athenian circumvallation which lay close to their market. They slew the guards who were posted there; and, having gained a conveyance into the town for provisions, and all necessary stores they could procure by money, they afterwards withdrew, and discontinued all efforts of resistance: but the Athenians took care for the future to place a stronger guard on their works. And here the summer ended.

In the winter which followed, the Lacedæmonians drew out their forces in order to begin an expedition

into Argia : but, when the victims, offered on the frontiers, boded no success to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet the Argives, as such an invasion had been intended against them, suspected it was owing to the intrigues of a faction within their city ; some of whom they immediately secured, but the rest escaped by flight.

About the same time also, the Melians carried another part of the Athenian circumvallation, as the party by which it was guarded was not numerous. But, on such disturbances, a strong reinforcement was sent from Athens, under the command of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. The Melians were now closely invested on all sides ; and, some schemes to betray the town being in agitation amongst them, they thought proper to make a voluntary surrender. This they did ‘at the discretion of the Athenians,’ who put to death all they found within the place able to bear arms, and made the women and children slaves. The town they afterwards repeopled by sending thither a colony of five hundred.

BOOK VI.

YEAR XVI. B. C. 416.—IN the same winter the Athenians came to a resolution to make a second expedition against Sicily, with a larger force than had been sent thither heretofore, under Laches and Euryomedon, and to attempt its total reduction. The bulk of the people was, in truth, ignorant of the largeness of the island, and of the multitude of the Grecians and barbarians by whom it was inhabited; ignorant, farther, that they were going to embark in a war not much less considerable than the Peloponnesian.

The compass of Sicily is little under eight days' sail for a trading vessel; and though it be so large, it is severed from the main-land, so as not to be part of the continent, by a gut, in breadth but twenty stadia.¹ The manner in which it was inhabited in the earliest ages was this; and the several nations which possessed it these.

The Cyclops and Lestrigons are said to be the most ancient inhabitants of some part of this country; but, from what stock they were derived, or from whence they came hither, or what is become of them since, I have nothing to relate. Poetical amusements must here suffice, or such information as every man picks up for his own use.

The Sicanians appear to be the first people who, next to those, inhabited this country; though, according to their own accounts, they are prior, because they claim to themselves the original tenure: but, accord-

¹ About two miles.

ing to the truest discoveries, they are found to have been Iberians, who were compelled to remove from the banks of the Sicanus, in Iberia, by the Libyans. And from them, at that time, this island received the name of Sicania, having before been called Trinacia. They continue to this day to inhabit the western parts of Sicily.

After the taking of Troy some of the Trojans, who had escaped the Achæans, arrived in their vessels on the Sicilian shore, and, forming a settlement adjacent to the Sicanians, they all took jointly the name of Elymi; and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. They were also increased by the accession of some Phocians from Troy; who, having first been driven to Libya by a storm, passed over afterwards from thence to Sicily.

The Siculi passed over first into Sicily from Italy; for there they originally dwelt. They fled before the Opici: and, as the story is told, not without probability, having observed how the current set within the strait, and seized a favorable gale, they crossed over on rafts, and perhaps by some other methods. There are, even to this very day, a people in Italy called Siculi; and that region, in a similar manuer, obtained its name of Italy from a certain Arcadian king who bore the name of Italus. These, crossing into Sicily with formidable numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians in battle, drove them into the southern and western parts; caused the name of the island to be changed from Sicania to Sicily; settled themselves in, and kept possession of, the richest tracts in the country; since their passage hither was near three hundred years earlier than the landing of any Grecians in Sicily. Nay, they continue to this very day in possession of the midland and northerly parts of the island.

The Phœnicians also had various settlements on

the coasts of Sicily. They secured the capes on the sea, and the small circumjacent isles, for the sake of trafficking with the Sicilians: but when the Grecians in considerable numbers began to cross over and fix their residence here, the Phoenicians abandoned their other settlements, and, uniting together, seated themselves at Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, near to the Elymi; secure of their own continuance in these quarters from their friendship with the Elymi, and because from this part of Sicily the passage to Carthage is exceeding short. So many were the barbarians seated in Sicily; and such the order of their settlements.

The first Grecians who came hither were the Chalcideans of Eubœa. Thucles led the colony, which settled at Naxus, and erected the altar of Apollo the Guide, which is still to be seen without the city; and on which the deputations, sent from hence to the oracles, offer sacrifice before they begin their voyage.

In the year following Archias, a Corinthian, of the race of Hercules, founded Syracuse, having previously expelled the Sicilians out of that island on which the inner city is seated, though now no longer washed round about by the sea: and, in process of time, the upper city also, being surrounded by a wall, became exceeding populous.

In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Thucles and his Chalcideans sallied forth out of Naxus; and having by force of arms driven away the Sicilians, they built Leontium, and afterwards Catana. But the Cataneans themselves declared Evarchus their founder.

About the same point of time Lamis also, leading a colony from Megara, arrived in Sicily, and planted them on a spot called Trotilus, on the river Pantacias. But removing afterwards from thence to Leontium, he associated himself a short time with the Cataneans

for the protection of his party ; yet being ejected by them, and then having founded Thapsus, he died. His followers, on this, removed from Thapsus ; and Hyblon, a Sicilian king, betraying another place into their hands, and becoming himself their conductor, they settled those Megareans who are called Hyblean ; and after a continued possession for two hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled out of their city and territory by Gelon, tyrant of the Syracusans. Yet, before this ejection, about a hundred years after their settlement there, they had sent out Pammilus, and built the city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither more lately from Megara, their mother city, and assisted them in making this new settlement at Selinus.

Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, each leading a separate colony, founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The name of this new city was taken from the river Gela : yet the spot where the city now stands, and which was first walled round, is called Lindii. Their polity was framed on the Doric model.

In the hundred and eighth year, as near as possible, after this last settlement, the Geloans built Acragas ; giving the city its name from the river Acragus. They declared Aristonous and Pystilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil institutions of Gela.

Zancle was originally founded by a band of pirates, who arrived there from Cyme, a Chalcidic city in Opicia ; though afterwards a numerous reinforcement from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa joined them, and possessed that district in community. The founders were Perieres and Cratæmenes ; one of them from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. But the name of Zancle was first of all given it by the Sicilians, because in shape it bears resemblance to a scythe ; and the Sici-

lians call a scythe zanclum. But in process of time these people were driven from thence by the Samians and other Ionians, who, flying from the Medes, had landed in Sicily. And after a short interval Anaxilas, tyrant of the Rhegians, ejected the Samians, repeopled the city with a number of mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to Messene, in honor of the country from whence he was originally descended. Himera also was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus and Sacon. Into this colony came also a very numerous body of Chalcideans. Some exiles, farther, from Syracuse, who had been worsted in a sedition, and were distinguished by the title of Miletidæ, took up their residence amongst them. Hence their dialect became a mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric ; but the Chalcidic model prevailed in their civil institutions.

Acræ and Casmenæ were founded by the Syracusans ; Acræ, seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenæ near twenty years after Acræ. Camarina also was first founded by the Syracusans, very nearly one hundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse : its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarineans being afterwards driven out by the arms of the Syracusans, because of a revolt, in process of time Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, received the lands of the Camarineans as a ransom for some Syracusan prisoners of war ; and taking on himself to be their founder, replanted Camarina. Yet once more it was demolished by Gelon ; and replanted a third time by the same Gelon. So many nations of Greeks and barbarians inhabited Sicily.

An island so large and so populous the Athenians were passionately bent on invading. Their truest and final view was to compass its total reduction ; but the pretext, alleged for a color, was their readiness to suc-

or such as by blood were related, or by prior alliances had been attached to them. An Egestean embassy, now residing at Athens, labored the point with all possible industry, and with extraordinary earnestness pressed them to engage in it: for the Egesteans, who bordered on the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a war with the latter about some connubial points, and a certain tract of land to which both laid claim. The Selinuntians, farther, assisted by their Syracusan allies, pressed hard on them both by land and sea. And hence the Egesteans were now suggesting at Athens, that ‘they ought not to forget their alliance with the Leontines, made by Laches in the former war;’ requesting farther, that a naval force might be sent thither for their succor. To this purpose many other arguments were alleged by them, but the principal was this:—‘If the Syracusans who have overthrown the Leontines be left in the unmolested enjoyment of their conquest, and proceed still farther to destroy the remaining parties of that alliance, they will get into their hands the whole power of Sicily. Such an event would be attended with the utmost danger; lest, in consequence of it, as they were Doric by descent, they might think themselves bound by the ties of blood to assist with a powerful armament their kindred Dorians, and, in quality of colonies, might succor those Peloponnesians by whom they were originally planted, and thus form a combination to demolish the Athenian empire. In policy, therefore, the Athenians were obliged to support the allies who yet remained, in order to make head against the Syracusans; and this the more readily, as they themselves would undertake to furnish them with sums of money equal to the exigences of the war.’ With such discourse the Athenians were frequently entertained in their popular as-

semblies, as the Egestean ambassadors, still urging their point, had gained many advocates to second their arguments. And at length it was decreed, that ‘ambassadors should be previously despatched to Egesta to inspect the state of their wealth; whether they had such sums as they talked of in the public treasury and the temples; and also to draw up a report of the present posture of their war against the Selinuntians.’ And, in pursuance of this, the ambassadors from the Athenians were sent to Sicily.

The Lacedæmonians, in the same winter, joined by their allies, those of Corinth excepted, and marching into Argia, ravaged a small part of that territory, and carried off the corn, having brought carriages for that purpose. They also removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and left them a small detachment from their main army for the security of their persons. A temporary truce being also made, during which the Orneatæ and Argives were to abstain from all hostilities against one another, they drew off the army to their respective homes.

However, not long after this, the Athenians arrived with thirty sail of ships and six hundred heavy-armed. The Argives, in conjunction with the Athenians, took the field with all their strength, and besieged those in Ornea for the space of a day. But, as at night the besiegers removed to a distance in order for repose, those of Ornea made their escape. On the day following the Argives, when sensible of their escape, levelled Ornea with the ground, and then withdrew. And afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for Athens.

The Athenians also threw in by sea a party of horsemen into Methone, a frontier town on Macedonia. With these, consisting of their own citizens, and such Macedonians as had refugeed among them, they harassed

the country belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lace-dæmonians sent a summons of aid for Perdiccas to the Chalcideans of Thrace, who kept terms with the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth day : these however refused to march. Thus ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth year of the war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history.

YEAR XVII.—In the succeeding year, very early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, accompanied by the Egesteans. They brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, being a month's pay for sixty sail of ships, the equipment of which for succor they were instructed to solicit from the Athenians. On this, an assembly of the people was called, and the reports of the Egestean and their own ambassadors were received, consisting of many points, specious indeed, but false in fact, so far as related to their treasure, that ‘ sums ample enough are already deposited in their temples and their public treasure.’ In consequence of this a decree was made, that ‘ a fleet of sixty ships should sail for Sicily : the commanders, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus,¹ the son of Xeno-

¹ Lamachus, the third in this commission, seems to have been picked out for the command from the peculiar constitution of his own character, which was a proper mean between the cautious and phlegmatic disposition of Nicias, and the fiery impetuous ardor of Alcibiades. He was now, according to Plutarch, a brave old experienced officer. In his youth he had been remarkable for heat and fire ; a length of service and years had mellowed him into the right temper to deliberate beforehand, and then gallantly to carry the point into execution ; but then he wanted the means of properly supporting the authority and dignity of his post. He was now ranked with two of the most wealthy and noble Athenians ; whereas his own condition was low ; nay, he was, according to Plu-

phanes, to be invested with full powers to act at their own discretion. The whole armament to act as an aid to the Egesteans against the Selinuntians; to replace also the Leontines in their former habitations, if the state of the war gave them leisure to execute that service; and to manage all other points in Sicily as they should judge most beneficial for the Athenian interest.'

But, the fifth day after this, another assembly of the people was held on the ways and means to expedite the equipment of the fleet, and by proper decrees to supply the commanders with what might be requisite to accelerate their departure. Nicias, who against his will had been named for a commander, was persuaded that the public determinations were rash and premature, since, on short examination, and motives merely specious, they were bent on the total reduction of Sicily, an arduous undertaking! Now, therefore, he stood up, and having a mind to stop proceedings, he advised the Athenians as follows :

' I am aware that the present assembly is held to concert the means of expediting our preparations, and to get all in readiness for the expedition to Sicily. But, in my sentiments, we ought once more to resume

tarch, so exceedingly poor, that before he went to any foreign command, he was used to petition the state for a little money to furnish him out, and even to buy him some shoes. Mr. Wasse, in his notes on Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of Aristophanes, 'The Acharnians,' that is to inquire after the character of a plain blunt officer from a professed droll, or to seek truth from him who ridiculed all mankind. Aristophanes has represented Lamachus as a vainglorious roaring bully, a mere thing of arms, a creature of verbal pomp and parade, contrary to all the truth of history. Writers who live by turning great and good men into ridicule, should never be reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of characters, when history dissents.

the consideration of the previous point, ‘ whether on the whole it be advisable to equip such a fleet:’ and not by rash and premature resolves on points of such vast importance, through too easy compliance with foreign solicitations, to embroil ourselves in an unnecessary war: for my own part, truly, I am invested with honor by the present measures, and no man on earth is so little anxious about his own personal safety. But at the same time I pronounce that person to be a valuable member of the public, who makes use of all his prudence to preserve his own life and property: for such a one, purely for his own private benefit, must be desirous that the public welfare florish and abound. But, however, neither in the preceding assemblies could the pre-eminence of honor awarded to me bias me to speak in contradiction to my judgment; nor shall it bias me at present; but what I think tends most to the public good, that only shall I utter.

‘ I am also sensible, that what I can urge may have but little influence on Athenian tempers, when I attempt persuading you to secure what you already possess, and not to hazard the present for things invisible and future; but that your eagerness is quite unseasonable; and that the ends, which you too sanguinely propose, are not easy to be accomplished; these things I shall clearly demonstrate.

‘ To this purpose I aver, that if the intended expedition proceeds, you are going to leave many enemies behind you here, and to take the most certain method of fetching hither more numerous opponents. You imagine, perhaps, that the late peace will be firmly and constantly observed, though it was merely a nominal peace, and that only so long as you remain inactive. Nay, such it has been made by the conduct

of some even of our own community. And should any considerable force of ours have the unhappiness to sink under hostile efforts, our old enemies will be suddenly on us ; since merely by calamities they were reduced to an accommodation, and in a manner more disgraceful to themselves than to us, were necessitated to treat. In the next place we have found, that in the treaty itself many articles are still controverted. There are, farther, divers states, and those by no means the weakest, who have not accepted the accommodation ; but, on the contrary, are still in arms against us ; whilst others are inhibited merely by ten-day truces, and that only because the Lacedæmonian measures are hitherto pacific. But suddenly perhaps, when once they find our strength divided, the very measure into which we are now precipitating ourselves, they may fall on us in a general combination, augmented by the strength of Sicily, whose accession to their former confederacy they would have been glad to purchase at any price. On these possibilities we are bound sedately to reflect, that we may not plunge a state, so highly exalted, into superfluous dangers, nor fondly covet to wrest their empire from the hands of others before we have adequately insured our own : since the Chalcideans of Thrace, though so many years are now elapsed since they first revolted, are not yet reduced ; and some other states on the continent render us only a precarious obedience.

‘ Yet, to the Egesteans, our old allies, who are injuriously oppressed, we are bound in honor to send a most speedy succor. And, in the mean time, we continue to defer avenging ourselves on those, whose revolt from us is of long standing now, and whose injustice we are still obliged to suffer. Though the latter, could we once bring them back to their duty,

we might easily control for the future : but the former, should we ever become their masters, remote and numerous as they are, we should not without difficulty be able to awe. It must be madness, therefore, to invade that people, whom, though conquered, you can never retain in their obedience ; and who, in case the attempt against them miscarry, will for the future be much more disaffected towards you than they were before that attempt was made.

‘ But it is farther my real opinion, that the Sicilians, as their affairs are now circumstantiated, would become less formidable to us, if once reduced to the Syracusan yoke : and yet on this remote contingency the Egesteans have chiefly insisted, in order to alarm us. Perhaps now it may come to pass, that its single states may combine against us to gratify the Lacedæmonians : but, in the other case, it is quite improbable that a united empire would hazard its own welfare to demolish another. For if, acting from a political precaution, they may side with the Peloponnesians to overturn our empire, those very Peloponnesians may probably, from the same principle, concur with us to demolish the Sicilian. As for us, the Grecians, they may have reason to dread us most if we go not at all amongst them ; and, what is next to that, if we only give them a sight of our power for a short time, and then withdraw. But if, acting offensively, we incur miscarriage, they will instantly despise us, and join our neighboring foes to annoy us here. For things that are placed most remotely from us, as likewise those which yield no opportunity of adjusting our opinion of them by experience, such, it is universally known, are most apt to excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of Athens, that your present elevation of spirits is owing to your success against the Lacedæmo-

nians and allies. You crouched for fear under their first attacks; till, having gained the superiority over them, to their utter disappointment, you instantly despised them. And now, nothing less than Sicily can content you. We by no means ought to be too much buoyed up by the disasters of our foes, but only to be so far confident as we are able to awe their intriguing tempers. We ought to ascribe no other view to the Lacedæmonians, than a vigilant care to seize the first opportunity of wiping off their disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recovering their former reputation, and that they are most earnest on accomplishing this, since from time immemorial the glory of military valor has been their warmest, most prevailing passion. Our welfare therefore, if we know in what our welfare consists, by no means summons us to enter the lists in behalf of the Egesteans of Sicily, who to us are mere barbarians; but to exert our utmost vigilance to guard our own constitution from oligarchical encroachments.

‘ My duty obliges me also to remind you, that we have had but a short respite to breathe from the havoc made amongst us by pestilence and war, and to repair the prodigious waste of our fortunes and our lives. These, according to all the rules of equity, should be reserved for our own domestic exigencies, and not to be lavished away on a set of fugitives, who implore our protection, and are bound in interest to tell specious falsehoods; though, whilst plunging their neighbors into hazards, they have nothing but words to contribute; and should we redress them, know not how to be grateful; but, in case we miscarry in the attempt, must involve their friends in their own destruction..

‘ If there be, farther, a person who, elevated with his own designation to the command, incites you ear-

nestly to sail ; heedful of nothing but his own private views, nor qualified by his years for so important a trust ; if his passion be merely to excite admiration for his fine breed of horses, or, by the gains of his commission, to repair the havoc of his fortune caused by prodigality ; I conjure you to afford no such person an opportunity to make a splendid figure at the expense of your country ; but rest convinced, that men of such a turn will be corrupt in public office as they are bad economists in private life ; that the enterprise in hand is a very arduous trust, far beyond such measures or such exploits as a stripling can devise or execute.

‘ I own myself intimidated by that crowd of youths who sit by this person and abet his schemes. I am hence obliged to implore the men of years and experience, who happen to sit near them, by no means to dread that appearance of pusillanimity which, in case this decree of war be revoked, might be objected to them ; by no means to indulge the same raw passions by which boys are actuated, so as to dote on remote contingencies. You, gentlemen, by experience are convinced, that success very rarely results from hot and sanguine presumption, but most frequently from calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf therefore of your country, which is now on the brink of more critical dangers than ever it has known before, hold up your hands in opposition, and support what I am going to move ; namely, that ‘ the Sicilians, confining themselves within their present limits, which we do not pretend to abridge, with free navigation along the coast of the Ionian gulf, and transacting their own affairs at large through the whole extent of the Sicilian seas, be at liberty to take care of their own concerns without any molestation :’ and, in particular, to return the Egesteans the following answer :—‘ since without

the privity of the Athenians they have already involved themselves in a war against the Selinuntians, let them also, without the concurrence of the Athenians, bring it to a conclusion: that, moreover, we shall form no alliance for the future, as has formerly been the case, with men whose indirect behavior we must be forced to abet, though when we stand in need of reciprocal assistance from them we shall get none at all.'

' And you, sir, who at present preside in this assembly, if you are conscious that it is your duty to superintend the public welfare, if you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot, put the question, and call on the Athenians once more to give their votes; and in case you are afraid to act contrary to order, in proposing what is counter to a former decree, reflect that, when so great a crowd of witnesses are at hand to justify the step, you only act the part of a physician to your country, which has swallowed down pernicious counsels; and that he best discharges the duty of first magistrate who will render to his country all the service he is able; at least, with his eyes open, will never suffer it to be hurt.'

In this manner Nicias delivered his sentiments. But the far greater part of the Athenians who were present declared for the expedition, and against the repeal of what had been already decreed. Some however there were who made a fruitless opposition.

The person who showed most ardor, and pressed them most earnestly to proceed, was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias; partly from a resolution to oppose Nicias, with whom, in other political points, he generally clashed, and because he had calumniously glanced at him in his speech; but principally, because he was ambitious of being at the head of this expedition. He presumed, that not Sicily only, but Carthage also,

might be reduced by himself; and, when he should be the author of so great a success, that he must needs abound in wealth and glory. His credit was great at present among the citizens; but the warmth of his passions threw him into larger expenses than his fortune could support, being sumptuous in every article of life, and especially in horses; and it was chiefly by him that the final overthrow of Athens was at length occasioned: for the bulk of the city, alarmed at the great irregularity of his private life, the excessive luxury of his dress and diet, as also at that greatness of spirit which he showed in every single branch of his conduct, turned out enemies to him as a man who affected the tyranny. And though, when in public commands, he conducted the war with the utmost bravery, yet, at home, each single citizen was chagrined at his manners, and displaced him to make room for others, which soon drew after it the subversion of the state. On this occasion therefore Alcibiades stood up, and advised the Athenians as follows:—

‘ Yes, to me, ye citizens of Athens, in preference to others, this command is due; for with this I must needs begin, since on this point Nicias has attacked me; and I also judged myself deserving of the trust. In regard to those things which have caused me to be so loudly censured, those very things give splendor to my ancestors and to myself, and are of public emolument also to my country. The great magnificence I displayed at the Olympic solemnities has raised in the Grecians an idea of Athens far beyond its actual strength; though, previous to this, they entertained the hope of being able totally to subdue her: for I am the man who brought seven chariots thither; more than any private person ever furnished out before; who carried off the first, and the second, and the fourth

prize; and, in all other respects, supported my quality as a victor. Such things, it must be owned, are declared to be honor by the laws of Greece; and, whenever achieved, they leave a high opinion of power behind them. The splendid figure I have made at home, whether in exhibiting entertainments for the public, or any other method of munificence, may naturally excite the envy of Athenians, but are to strangers instances of our grandeur. And that man's extravagant spirit is not useless to the public, who, at his own private expense, does service not merely to himself, but to a whole community. Nor can it imply injustice, for a person whose sentiments are generous and exalted, to soar above the ordinary level; since, should he afterwards be reduced to a state of depression, no man is to share in his reverse of fortune. As therefore in calamity we are not to expect even civil salutations, let others in the mean time submit, as in justice they ought, to that assuming behavior which prosperity inspires; or, at least, let equality of demeanor be first shown by him who demands it as a debt from another. I am indeed aware, that persons of such uncommon elevation, and all in general, who, in some splendid qualities, outshine the crowd, must, so long as they live, be the objects of spleen, chiefly to those who claim equality with them; and, in the next place, to those amongst whom they are conversant: and yet, to succeeding generations, they leave an ambition of claiming affinity to them, though quite groundless and chimerical; and to their country, whatever it be, that they were not aliens, were not offenders, but citizens of its own growth, and patriots of true renown and worth. Of such reversionary honors I own myself ambitious; and, in order to succeed in the pursuit, have ever rendered my name illustrious in private

life ; and, as to my public behavior, reflect, Athenians, whether I am inferior to any person whatever in performing good services to my country : for I am the person who, without throwing you into hazard or expense, have brought the strongest powers of Peloponnesus to act in concurrence ; who reduced the Lacedæmonians to stake their all on the fortune of one day at Mantinea. It is true they came off victorious from the contest, but have not even yet so far resumed their spirits as to dare to act offensively.

‘ Such are the exploits which my greener years, nay even that unnatural giddiness imputed to me has achieved ; which, by insinuating language, has made the Peloponnesian strength to ply before it, and giving energy to my frantic humor, has now persuaded the world that it is no longer to be dreaded. Whilst, therefore, I flourish in this manner, whilst Nicias yet continues to be esteemed fortunate, lay hold of that service we are each of us able to perform ; and by no means repeal the decree of our expedition to Sicily, as if intended against a people we were not able to encounter.

‘ For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds of promiscuous disunited inhabitants ; inhabitants for ever used to sudden revolutions and to perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one of those crowds is equipped with such arms as are requisite to defend a native soil, or to secure even personal safety ; nor is the region supplied with the needful stores of resistance. It is the habit of each, either to execute his purpose by artful language, or to wrest it from the public by sedition. These are all his resources ; and, if they fail, at the worst, he barely shifts his habitation. It is therefore improbable that a rabble, so jumbled to-

gether, will ever be unanimously guided by one concerted plan, or combine together for its just execution. Each moment they will be veering about to such expedients as happen most to soothe their caprice ; and the more, on account of these seditions, in which, we are informed, they are already embroiled.

' Their number of heavy-armed, it must also be observed, is not so large as the pompous accounts of fame have made it : nor does the sum total of the Grecians amongst them turn out so considerable as each city has computed for her own : but Greece, in this manner ever addicted most terribly to belie her own numbers, has been found, in the present war, scarce able to provide herself with arms.

' Such, according to the best information I have been able to collect, is the present condition of affairs in Sicily. Nay, there are means within our reach still more to facilitate its reduction : for we shall obtain the concurrence of many barbarians seated there, who, from inveteracy against the Syracusans, will join us to attack them. Neither can any obstacles accrue from the situation of our affairs nearer home, if you only view it in the just and proper light.

' The bravery of our fathers, though opposed by the very same enemies, who at present, it is urged, should we sail for Sicily, must be left behind us, though opposed by all the power of the Mede, erected this our empire, by the sole resource of their superiority in naval power. The Peloponnesians, farther, have never had less hopes of being a match for us than at this very juncture, even though their strength be in all its maturity of vigor. It is true, they have it ever in their option to make inroads into our dominions, even though we wave this expedition ; but, at sea, they

never can be able to hurt us: the fleet we shall leave behind will be amply sufficient to make head against them.

‘ By what plausible arguments, therefore, can we excuse our behavior, should we now pusillanimously desist? what evasion can we find to deny our confederates the succor they demanded? We are bound in honor, by the oaths we have sworn, to undertake their redress. Unavailing is the pretext, that they have never done such good offices for us. Our alliance with them was not made on the condition of their sailing hither to bring us succor, but of giving such full employment to our enemies there, as might effectually deter them from coming hither. The ready road to empire, as not Athenians only, but every people who have risen to a summit of power, by experience know, is ever to succor those who implore our protection, whether they be Greeks or barbarians: for had it been the constant method to cherish indolent inactive measures, or minutely to litigate who in justice ought to be protected, the enlargement of our empire had been but trifling, or rather we had been liable to the loss of our original portion: for a state invested with superior power is not only openly opposed in the field, but recourse is had to every precaution to prevent their appearance in it. Neither is it in our power to prescribe exact or arbitrary limitations to our new empire; but we are by necessity compelled to cabal against some, and with a high hand to keep others in subjection; because, should we relax our command over others, we endanger our own authority, and those we will not awe may become our masters. Nor, farther, ought peace to be so much the object of regard to you as it is to other people, unless you new-model

your government, and render it conformable to that of your neighbors.

' Weigh therefore these arguments ; and be convinced, that thus only our interest is capable of any considerable advancement ; if we proceed against Sicily, and execute the expedition in order to deject the haughty Peloponnesian spirit, by so plain an instance how much we despise them, how little fond we are at present of this inactive interval, and how eager to begin again with a Sicilian voyage. And, by acting thus, there is probability on our side, that, in case we subdue the people there, we may gain the sovereignty over all Greece ; or, at worst, we shall depress the Syracusan power : the latter point alone will be an important service to ourselves and our allies. But, in case any measure of success attends us, our ships will enable us to secure our acquisitions, or at worst our departure : for though the whole body of the Sicilians combine together against us, we shall be absolute masters of our own retreat.

' Let not therefore the words of Nicias, calculated merely for the service of sloth, and to raise dissensions between the young and the old, disconcert your plan. But let the usual decorum take place, observant of which our forefathers, at whose consultations both the seniors and the youths assisted, exalted this state to its present height ; and do you now, adhering to the established practice, endeavor its farther exaltation. Remember also, that youth and age, if debarred one another's reciprocal assistance, lose all their influence and weight ; that, on the other hand, from the wildness of youth, and the moderation of the middle aged, and the consummate prudence of the old, when tempered harmoniously together, the most perfect strength must

infallibly result; that a state, which supinely gives way to sloth, like other things for want of exercise, must infallibly droop and pine away, and the whole of her skill grow old and obsolete; but, when inured to uninterrupted conflict, it is continually improving by practice, and will gain a perfect habit of surmounting every obstacle, not by a parade of words, but by active perseverance.

‘ On the whole, I am firmly convinced, that a state, which has been accustomed to full employment, must soon droop into destruction if it resigns itself to sloth; and that such persons take the best method of infallibly securing their welfare, who adhere most steadily to their present customs and laws, though possibly better might be substituted in their stead.’

In this manner Alcibiades spoke: and the Athenians, moved by his arguments, which were also seconded by the intreaties of the Egestean and Leontine exiles, who, standing forth in the assembly, implored their protection, and, reminding them of their oaths, adjured them to redress their wrongs; declared for the expedition with a warmer zeal than at any time before. Nicias was convinced by this, that whatever dissuasion he could allege would be quite incapable to change their resolves. Yet as possibly, by a minute detail of the immense preparations he was going to demand, he might cause them at once to change their sentiments, he stood up again, and re-addressed them as follows:

‘ I perceive, Athenians, that your resolutions are fixed on this expedition beyond the power of dissuasion: and, may its event be such as your wishes portend! But I shall once more beg leave to communicate to you my own sense of the affair.

‘ According to the best information I have been

able to procure, we are now going to invade a number of powerful cities; cities independent of one another, nor standing in need of public revolutions, which people who cringe under the yoke of slavery might readily embrace, in order to render their condition more supportable. Nor is it, farther, to be presumed that they will readily exchange their own liberty for subjection to us, as they are numerous, at least for one island, and many of them inhabited by Grecians. For, without reckoning Naxus and Catana, which I hope, on account of their affinity to the Leontines, will side with us, there are no less than seven provided in all respects with as good martial habiliments and stores as our own armies; and more particularly those against which we chiefly bend our course, Selinus and Syracuse. These cities abound with soldiers heavy-armed, with archers, and with darters. They have a great number of triremes, and plenty of hands to man them. They possess a large quantity of wealth, not only in private purses, but in their public treasuries. So rich are even the Selinuntians: and to the Syracusans, farther, a tribute is paid by several barbarians. But the points, in which they most of all excel us, are, that numerous cavalry of which they are possessed, and corn of their own growth sufficient to answer all demands without foreign importations. An armament, therefore, simply naval, will by no means be sufficient to cope with such a strength. A large land force must accompany the naval, if we are desirous of performing such achievements as may be worthy the greatness of our plan, and would not be debarred an opportunity of landing by their numerous cavalry. And this will be yet more needful, should the cities, alarmed at our approach, combine together against us, and no other friends but the Egesteans join us, or supply us with a

body of cavalry sufficient to countenance our landing. It would be a terrible disgrace, should we be compelled by force to give over our design, or to send for a larger supply, as if our councils at first setting out were rash and ill-concerted. We must steer at once against them with preparations in all respects well proportioned to the design, since we know that we are bound to a land far remote from our own, and are under many disadvantages to grapple with our foes. It will not be now your employment to march to the relief of your dependents seated near to Athens against a hostile invasion, where all the needful supplies would be brought to your camp out of the territories of friends; but you are to roam to a distant climate, where you cannot call one inch of ground your own, and from whence, in the four winter months, you will scarcely be able to send a messenger to Athens.

‘ In my opinion, therefore, it is incumbent on us to carry thither large parties of heavy-armed, to be raised out of our own citizens, our allies, and our dependents, and an additional strength of Peloponnesians, if we are able to procure it by persuasion or by pay. Our archers and slingers must be also numerous, that we may be able to make good our descent in spite of the Sicilian horse. We must also be attended by supernumerary vessels, that we may be enabled with greater ease to fetch in necessaries for our army. We must also carry with us from Athens, in our tenders, a great quantity of corn, such as wheat and barley, parched; with bakers, some of whom, for certain wages, must be obliged to grind, that, if our armament lie any where weather bound, we may not stand in need of the necessaries of life: for, so numerous as we must be, it will not be possible for every city to receive us. All other provisions must be laid in by ourselves to the ut-

most of our power, and we must trust for nothing to the care of others.

' But what concerns us most is, to carry from hence a fund of money as ample as we can raise. As for that which the Egeateans pretend is already laid up for our use, conclude it to be only as far as words are current: for unless we set out from Athens, not barely provided as well as those we are to encounter, but, equality in strength for battle alone excepted, in all other respects far surpassing them in every needful appointment, we shall hardly be able to reduce who are to be reduced, or even to protect who are to be protected. We should regard ourselves in the character of people who are going to seek a new settlement among aliens and enemies; and as such are necessitated to render themselves victors of the spot the very day they land; or to rest assured, if they then miscarry, that the whole of that region will be in arms against them. Of this I own myself afraid; against this I am convinced that by repeated consultations we ought timely to provide; and, after all, must trust still farther to the goodness of our fortune, hazardous, as we are but men. Yet hence, I should be glad to set out in this enterprise with as little occasion as possible to rely on uncertain fortune, and to be amply provided with every expedient for a successful expedition: for these, to my apprehension, are the readiest means to secure the public welfare, and the safety of us who are destined for the voyage. But if any man thinks my reasons chimerical, I am ready to resign my command to his superior abilities.'

In this manner Nicias delivered himself; with a view, if possible, to discourage the Athenians from proceeding, by so vast a demand of articles requisite to the design: or, at least, that, in case he should be

obliged to undertake the service, he might set out with such ample expedients of security.

Yet all this bulky and embarrassing demand of appointments could not raise in the Athenians the least aversion to the expedition, but rather fastened their eagerness on it more intensely than ever; and Nicias prevailed on that side of the question where he hoped to have been defeated. It was now universally agreed that his advice was just and proper; and, if obeyed, the expedition must be attended with all imaginable security. All ranks of men were now equally seized with a fondness for the voyage: for such as were advanced in years were confident that a career of success must attend the enterprise, and that so formidable an armament could not possibly miscarry; the younger sort were animated with the desire of seeing so remote a clime, and gratifying at large the curiosity of their tempers; assured that safety would attend their course: the bulk of the populace, and the soldiery in general, were pleased with their present assignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging dominion, which would afford them perpetual employment and subsistence. The passions of the generality were for these causes so vehemently elated with the project, that such as could by no means approve were afraid to oppose it by a vote, lest they might be censured as men who malevolently opposed the public glory. And by this all opposition was effectually quashed.

At length a certain Athenian, standing forth from amongst the crowd, and calling aloud on Nicias, told him, ‘he must no longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate delays; but declare expressly, now, in the presence of them all, the particulars of the preparations which the Athenians should vote him.’

Nicias, though sorry at his heart, was obliged to

reply, that, ‘in order to be exact, he ought to consult more leisurely with his colleagues : but, so far as he could judge in this sudden manner, they ought to set out with a fleet consisting of at least one hundred triremes ; that the Athenians themselves ought to furnish as many transports for heavy-armed soldiers as was possible, and to send for an additional number from their dependents ; that the number of heavy-armed, both of Athenians and dependents, should at least be five thousand, and if possible more ; that to these the rest of their preparations should be proportioned, such as archers to be levied at home, and procured also from Crete, not forgetting slingers ; and, in fine, that whatever should be judged in any degree expedient should be provided in good time, and carried along with them in the fleet.’

This the Athenians had no sooner heard than they instantly voted, ‘that the generals should be invested with absolute authority to determine the numbers of the expedition, and the whole procedure of the voyage, at their own discretion, as might best promote the public welfare.’

In pursuance of this, the preparations were immediately in hand. Summonses for the quotas adjusted were sent to their dependents, and the levies at home went briskly forward. Athens was now fully recovered from the pestilence and a long-continued destructive war, both in a multitude of young men now arrived at the vigor of their age, and an increase of the public revenues by favor of the peace. By this means all the needful supplies were more easily provided ; and thus were the Athenians busied for the present in fitting out their armament.

But at this very juncture almost all the statues of Mercury, wherever found within the precincts of

Athens, and according to the established custom they were very numerous, both in the porches of private houses and the public temples, * * * * *¹ had their faces disfigured in the space of one night. The authors of this outrage were not known; but large rewards were offered by the state in order to discover them; and a decree was also passed, that ‘if any person knew of the commission of any other impiety of the same nature, he should boldly inform the public of it, whether he were a citizen, a foreigner, or a slave.’

This accident in truth made a deep impression on their minds: for it was construed as a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, and as an evidence of some terrible combination to introduce innovations and an overthrow of the democracy.

An information was at length given in by some sojourners and their footmen, relating indeed not at all to the Mercuries, but to the defacements of other images committed formerly by some young men in a frolicsome and drunken mood; and how, farther, they had celebrated the mysteries² in private houses by way of mockery; and amongst others, they also accused Alcibiades. The party most inveterate against him caught readily at this charge. As he was the main obstacle to the advancement of their own popularity and credit, they concluded that, in case they could rid themselves of him, they might at once be-

¹ I have omitted two words in the original, because I cannot translate them with any precision or clearness.

² The sacred mysteries celebrated by the Athenians at Eleusis. Plutarch relates that the informers were brought in by one Androcles, a demagogue, a virulent foe of Alcibiades. They deposed that one Theodorus acted the part of the Crier, Polytion of the Torch-bearer, Alcibiades that of the Hierophant, and many of his intimates assisted and were initiated in solemn and formal mockery.

come leaders of the state. Hence they aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud, that 'those mystic frolics, and the defacements of the Mercuries, struck at the very foundations of the democracy; and that none of these outrageous acts had been committed without his participation.' They alleged as a circumstance that corroborated the charge, the whole tenor of his behavior, flagrantly licentious, and quite inconsistent with a democratical constitution.

Alcibiades endeavored forthwith to clear himself in the best way he could from all appearances of guilt, and declared himself ready, before he entered on the voyage, to submit to a trial (for the armament was now almost completed), and, if proved to be guilty, to suffer the penalties of law; and only, if acquitted, to take on him the command. He conjured them, farther, to receive no calumnious accusations against him in his absence; but, if he was really guilty, to put him instantly to death: that, in common prudence, it could not be justified, to intrust a person so heavily charged with the command of so large an armament before his innocence had been regularly explored.

But his enemies, apprehensive that, in case he was brought to an immediate trial, he would be supported by all the favor of the soldiery; and, that the people, whose idol he was, might possibly relent, because in compliment to him the Argives and some of the Mantineans accompanied the expedition, opposed and put off the prosecution. They put the management of this point into the hands of a set of orators, who urged that for 'the present he might proceed in his voyage, that the expedition ought not to be deferred on his account, and on his return a day should be assigned for his trial.' Their design was to gather more heavy matter against him, which in his absence could be more easily

effected, and then to recall him, and force him to his trial. In short, it was resolved that ‘ Alcibiades should go the voyage.’

Things being thus determined, and the year now advanced to the middle of summer, the fleet set sail for Sicily. Orders had been issued before for the bulk of the confederates, and victualling ships, and small craft, and all the tenders in general, to repair to and assemble together at Corcyra: that, from thence, in a body, they might cross the Ionian to the cape of Japygia. But such as were subjects of Athens, and such of the confederates as were then in the city, marching down to the Piræus on the appointed day by morning’s dawn, went on board the ships in order to weigh and be gone. They were conducted thither by a great crowd, it may be said by the whole crowd of Athens, both citizens and strangers. The former attended to perform the parting decorums where their several attachments claimed it; some to their friends, some to their relations, some to their own sons. The whole company moved along with a medley of hope and lamentation; with hope, that success would attend their course; with lamentation, lest they might never meet again. The sad recollection occurred—to how great a distance from their native soil they were going to be sent! And now that the hour of departure was come, and when this moment they were going to be dismissed into scenes of danger, the impressions of terror were felt with much keener sense than when the expedition was only decreed. However, at the sight of their present strength, of the numerous expedients of a prosperous enterprise which their eyes beheld, their spirits were again elated.

As for the strangers and the bulk of the crowd, they

attended merely for the pleasure of gazing at the means intended to accomplish a great and stupendous design: for never did any one state of Greece, before this time, equip by its own strength such a powerful armament. It was the finest and most glorious fleet that to this day the world had seen. It is true, in number of ships and heavy-armed on board, that which sailed against Epidaurus under command of Pericles, and that also against Potidæa under Agnon, were by no means inferior: for those carried four thousand heavy-armed soldiers, all native Athenians, with three hundred horsemen: the number of their triremes was a hundred; fifty more was furnished by the Lesbians and Chiens, besides a large number of confederates who attended those expeditions. But then they were fitted for a voyage in comparison trifling, and in a slight and penurious manner.

On the contrary, the present equipment was calculated for a length of time, and completely fitted out for both services, as occasion might demand, either of the sea or of the land. The shipping, at the great expense of the captains of the several triremes and of the state, was quite elaborate. The pay assigned by the public to every mariner was a drachma¹ a day. The number of new ships for the battle and chase was sixty; that of transports for the heavy-armed, forty. The several captains of the triremes were very choice in making up their crews, and gave to such of the mariners as rowed on the uppermost bench, and to the sailors, a gratuity out of their own pockets, over and above the public pay. They had farther adorned their vessels with images and all kinds of sumptuous decora-

¹ Seven-pence three farthings.

tions. It was the high ambition of every single captain to have his own ship excel all the rest of the fleet in splendor and in swiftness.

The land force was distinguished by the choiceness of their levies and their arms; and all the individuals vied with one another in the goodness of their accoutrements and equipage whatsoever. It happened also on the same account that a warm contention was kindled amongst them, under what officers they should be ranged; and opportunity afforded to the rest of Greece to construe the whole into a mere ostentation of their power and opulence, rather than an effective equipment against a foe: for, were a computation to be formed, both of the public disbursements of the state on this occasion, and the private expenses of the whole soldiery;—of the state, what prodigious sums they had already advanced, and what additional sums the generals were to carry along with them; of the soldiery, what each had expended on his own equipage, every captain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how much greater charges he was still liable;—without taking into the account the vast list of necessaries which, over and above the public allowance, each private person was obliged to lay in for so long a voyage, or the goods which a soldier or trader might take with him on board for the sake of traffic; the amount of talents now carried out of Athens would turn out exceeding large.

Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the enterprise, or the splendor of its show, that the armament was noised abroad, but also for the numerous force with which it was provided to attack the foe; for the remoteness of the voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from their native clime, and that prodigious expectation which was raised of the event, in order to

which the state had now exerted itself quite beyond its strength.

When the whole force was got on board the fleet, when the stowage of all necessary stores and all baggage whatever was completely adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by sound of trumpet; but the solemn prayers for a successful expedition were not offered from every vessel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the voice of a herald. The goblets filled with wine ran the circle of the whole armament, and every crew as well as the commanders poured out the libations, and drank success and happiness out of gold and silver cups. The whole crowd that stood on the beach, both of citizens and such strangers as were there and wished them prosperity, joined with them in the public prayer. And now, the pæan being sung, and the libation finished, they put out to sea.¹ After moving off, at first in a line a-head, each vessel made afterwards the

¹ Many incidents are related by Plutarch, in the life of Nicias, in regard to the denunciations of the priests against this expedition, the coining and wresting of oracles both for and against it, and omens which portended nothing but misfortune. Mere human foresight, and a consciousness that the means were not equal to the end proposed, gave the wisest and steadiest part of the Athenian community a sad apprehension of the event. Socrates constantly declared against it; and assured his friends it would draw after it the destruction of the state. This his presentiment soon became the public talk. Meton, the astronomer, who was named to a post of high rank in the expedition, feigned himself mad, and set his house on fire. Others deny that circumstance of his counterfeiting madness, and say he set his house on fire by night, and appeared next morning in the forum in the most abject manner, and begged of his fellow-citizens, in order to comfort him under so great a misfortune, to excuse his son, who was to have commanded a trireme, from going the voyage. An incident, farther, at the very time of the departure of the grand fleet, gave many persons vast concern. The women were then celebrating the rites of Adonis, in which many representations of deaths and funerals were exhibited all over Athens; and the women, according to custom, were making

best of her way to *Ægina*. And this armament made all possible haste to reach Corcyra, where the force of their allies by which they were to be joined was already assembled.

Though the intelligence of such an intended invasion had been brought to Syracuse from several quarters, yet for a long course of time they would yield no credit to its truth. Nay more, when an assembly was convened, such speeches as follow were made by different persons; some believing the accounts received in relation to this armament of the Athenians; others pronouncing them absolutely false. On this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, standing forth in the assembly, and as one convinced in his own mind that all such accounts were true, addressed and advised his countrymen thus:—

‘ It will probably be my own fate, as it has been the fate of others, to be disbelieved, when I speak of this intended invasion as a matter of truth and certainty. And I also know by experience, that both those who vent and those who retail such accounts of things as seem incredible, are so far from effectually persuading, that they generally incur the imputation of madness. Yet no such apprehension shall intimidate or strike me dumb, when such a weight of danger hovers over my country; when in my own heart I am convinced that I am more clearly enlightened on the point than any other person whatever.

‘ For I assert that to be a matter of the highest certainty, which you hear only with a fit of stupid surprise—that the Athenians have already set sail against

heavy moan and lamentation. This struck sad forebodings into people, who laid stress on such incidents, that this expensive and mighty armament, though now so vigorous and magnificent, would soon moulder into ruin.

us with a numerous force, both for the service of the sea and the land. The pretext alleged by them is, execution of treaties with the Egestans, and the restoration of the Leontines; but the true motive is their ambition to enslave Sicily, and above all, this our own Syracuse, which, if once reduced, they are well assured that nothing will be able afterwards to give a check to their arms. Taking it therefore for granted that they will be immediately on us, deliberate in what manner you may make the most gallant defence, in the present posture of your strength; careful that through contempt you be not taken unprovided, nor through incredulity abandon the means of preservation. Nor, farther, let those who are convinced of their immediate appearance, be terrified at the boldness or strength of their undertaking; for they will not be able to hurt us more than we shall be enabled to retaliate on them. Nor are they more beyond our reach, because they invade us with so vast an armament; since this, in regard to the other Sicilians, will plead more abundantly in our cause; for, terrified at the foe, they will be disposed with higher warmth of friendship to co-operate with us. And if thus, in the train of affairs, we are either enabled to defeat their arms, or merely to force their return, their schemes unexecuted and their ambition disappointed (for I am not in the least afraid that their sanguine expectations can be glutted with success), such events would reflect the highest glory on you, and complete what I firmly hope.

It is a truth, evinced by facts, that few considerable armaments of either Grecians or barbarians, which have been sent out on remote expeditions, have returned successful. Nor, farther, are our present invaders more numerous than the Syracusans themselves, or their friends of the neighboring states, whose

strength mere hostile dread will cement and bind fast together. If therefore, though merely for want of needful supplies, they incur miscarriages on a foreign shore; if they prove unsuccessful, though chiefly through their own misconduct, the whole honor must however rest with us, as if we had ruined their projects by art and management. Even these very Athenians were indebted to a parallel coincidence of events for the vast enlargement of their strength and empire; when the Mede, who gave out that he aimed the blow at Athens, was, contrary to all human expectation, disconcerted by a series of errors that were purely his own. And some such fortunate coincidence, in our own behalf, we have at present all imaginable reason to expect.

‘ Let us therefore, with active resolution, put our domestic affairs into a posture of defence, and despatch our ambassadors to the Siculi, to keep firm in our friendship such as are already our friends, and to endeavor to procure the friendship and concurrence of the rest. Nay, let our embassies regularly complete the whole circuit of Sicily, where they may represent the common danger which equally threatens them all. Let them, farther, cross over to Italy to procure for us their defensive alliance, or at least to negotiate a denial of reception to the Athenians. I also judge it advisable to send to Carthage: for even the Carthaginians are not exempted from the present dangers, but have been ever under apprehensions of receiving from them a visit at Carthage. It may perhaps effectually occur to their thoughts, that, should they now abandon us, the storm must soon extend itself to them; by which they may be determined, either secretly or openly, by some expedient or other, to vindicate our cause. And, were their inclination equal to their

power, no people on the globe could so easily redress us ; for they are possessed of an immensity of wealth, which gives an easy and prompt completion to the schemes of war and to every human enterprise. Let us send, farther, to Lacedæmon and Corinth, requesting the despatch of immediate succors hither, and the renewal of the war against the Athenians.

' There is one point more, which in my opinion is more critical and important than all the rest : and which, though perhaps, inured as you are to domestic indolence, it may not gain your ready approbation, I shall however boldly recommend. Would all of us in general who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at least would only we Syracusans, with what other people we can get to assist us, put out instantly to sea with all the ships we have in readiness, and victualled but for the space of two months ; would we then give these Athenians the meeting either at Tarentum or Cape Japygia, and there convince them, that, before they enter the lists of war for the conquest of Sicily, they must fight for their passage across the Ionian ; we should then strike them with the utmost terror, and infinitely perplex them with the thought, that from a friendly port we shall sally forth to guard our out-works, (for Tarentum will readily receive us,) whilst they have a long tract of sea to pass with all their cumbersome train, and must find it hard, through so long a voyage, to be always steering in the regular order. As their course must thus be slow, and must advance only in exact conformity to orders, we shall have a thousand opportunities to attack them. If again they clear their ships for action, and in a body bear down expeditiously on us, they must ply hard at their oars ; and, when spent with their toil, we can fall on them. Or, in case that may not be judged ad-

visible, we have it always in our power to retire into the harbor of Tarentum. And thus the Athenians, if, in constant expectation of being fought with at sea, they must make their passage with a small portion only of their stores, will be reduced to great distress on coasts which will afford them no supply. Should they choose to continue in their station, they must infallibly be blocked up in it. Should they venture a passage, they must unavoidably leave their tenders and store-ships behind; and, as they have no assurance of a hearty reception from the cities on the coasts, must be terribly dismayed.

‘ It is my firm opinion that, amidst that great perplexity of thought which must result from these obstructions, they will never presume to sail from Corcyra; or, at least, whilst they are agitating the forms of procedure and sending out spy-boats to discover our numbers and position, the season of the year must be protracted to winter; or, utterly dispirited at so unexpected a resistance, they will give up the voyage. This I more readily expect, as I am informed that their most experienced commander has been forced into office against his inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the pretext to desist, if such a show of resistance could be made by us as would preserve his honor from suspicion. And I am perfectly convinced that rumor will increase and aggravate our strength. Now the sentiments of mankind are constantly adjusted by rumors; parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy declares he is ready to begin the attack; and such an enemy is always more dreaded than he who betrays an intention merely to defend himself against an enemy’s assaults. Such excess of fear must now fall to the lot of the Athenians. They are invading us, with the fond presumption that we shall not fight. They think

they have grounds for such a presumption, because we have not concurred with the Lacedæmonians in their demolition. But when, to their bitter disappointment, they find we have the courage to act offensively, the suddenness of our efforts will terrify them more than all the reality of our unexpected strength could have done.

' Determine therefore to execute with bold and ready resolution the plan I have proposed ; or, if this must not prevail, with the utmost expedition to get all things at home in readiness for war. And let each Syracusan be firmly convinced, that contempt of an enemy ought never to be shown but in the heat of action ; that the conduct of those men must tend most highly to the public preservation, who, alarmed by a decent fear, judge it needful to prepare with all caution and alacrity, as if the danger was instant at our doors. But these our enemies are actually coming ; they are already, I know it well, on the voyage ; they are this moment only not in sight.'

In this manner Hermocrates spoke his sentiments. But the popular assembly of the Syracusans was embroiled with much variance and contention. One party cried out, ' that it was all a joke, the Athenians durst not think of invading them.' Another, ' Hermocrates had truth and reason on his side.' A third, ' let them come, what damage can they do us which we are not able heartily to repay them ?' Others betrayed an open contempt of the whole account, and laughed at it as downright ridiculous. The party was but small which gave credit to Hermocrates and trembled for the future. At length, Athenagoras stood up, who being the first magistrate of the people, and whose credit at this time was highest with them, delivered himself as follows :

‘ The man, who wishes the Athenians may not be so mad as to come hither and run themselves headlong into our subjection, is either a coward or a traitor to his country. But for those who vent such news and endeavor to frighten you by the terrible recital, at their audaciousness, truly, I am not in the least surprised; but I am greatly so at their folly, if they imagine their views can escape detection! Poor abject souls! quite dispirited within through their own pusillanimity, are glad to spread consternation throughout a whole community; that, under the general panic, their own may lie veiled and undistinguished. And such is the effect, which the present information may be ready to produce; not from any grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions and falsehoods of an iniquitous cabal, who are ever dabbling in the practices of faction.

‘ But you, Syracusans, I exhort to apply your good sense on this occasion, and search after probability; not by considering such accounts as these men have pompously detailed, but such enterprises as a wise and abundantly enlightened people, for such I esteem the Athenians, are likely to undertake: for, what probability is there, that, leaving the Peloponnesians at their backs, when the war at home is not yet brought to any settled conclusion, they would wilfully embark in another of no less importance? For my part, I am persuaded they rest well contented, that, so many and so powerful states as we Sicilians are, we have not yet thought proper to invade them.

‘ But, allowing these informations to be true, and that they are actually coming, I am firmly persuaded that Sicily is better able than Peloponnesus to defeat them, since in all respects it is better furnished with every resource of war; and that this our Syracuse

alone is far superior in strength to that, nay double that armament, which by report now threatens its invasion : for I know, assuredly, that no horse can follow in their train ; that, farther, none can be procured for them in this country, if we abate an inconsiderable party which the Egestean may furnish. And I know, that a body of heavy-armed, equal in number to our own, can never be transported by them across such a length of sea. The enterprise is bold indeed, to attempt so long a voyage hither with only light and nimble ships, and to bring all those military stores, the amount of which must be excessively large, in order to attack so great a city. Shall I therefore be terrified by vain reports ? I, who am firmly persuaded that, if the Athenians were possessed of a city on our coasts as considerable in all respects as Syracuse itself, and should dare to provoke us ; if masters of the neighboring territory, they should from thence make war on us ; even with such advantages they would with difficulty escape a total destruction. And what therefore, in all human probability, must be their fate, when all Sicily to a man will be combined to oppose them ? For now their war must issue from a camp on the beach of the sea, of which their ships must form the ramparts. They will not be able to make long excursions from their tents and magazines of needful stores, as our cavalry will bridle and control them. But, in short, it is my firm opinion that they never will be able to accomplish a descent, so far am I convinced that our force is in all respects superior.

‘ I am well persuaded, that all those obstacles which I have hitherto recited, their own wise reflections have suggested to the remembrance of the Athenians, and deterred them from hazarding their own ruin ; and that our own malcontents amuse us with fictitious accounts

of things that neither have nor can have existence. This is by no means the first occasion on which I have been able to detect their schemes. I am no stranger to their constant attempts of fomenting faction, ever intent as they are, by forgeries like these, or more malicious than these, or even by the open efforts of sedition, to strike a panic amongst the Syracusan people, and to seize the helm of your government. And I have reason to apprehend that, amongst the many projects they attempt, some one at length may be fatally successful. But this must be charged to our own pusillanimity, who exert no precautions to avert impending miseries, nor bravely oppose the storm, though we perceive it to be gathering around us. And from hence it unavoidably results, that our state is seldom blessed with a season of tranquillity, but feels the bitter lot of sedition on sedition, of more numerous struggles against factions within than public hostilities without; nay, sometimes tyranny and despotic rule have been our portion.

‘ To guard the present times from such disastrous contingences shall be my constant endeavor; and, if favored with your concurrence, my care shall be successful. To this end I must prevail on you, who are the many, to co-operate with me, whilst I inflict on these artificers of faction the punishment they deserve, not barely for overt commissions, for in these they are not easily caught, but for all the treacherous plots which, how desirous soever, they are not able to execute: for we ought not only to award our vengeance on the open outrages of an enemy, but to disarm his malice by wise precaution; because the man who will not thus in time disarm it will feel its blow before he is aware.

‘ On the few I have also to bestow, partly some reproofs, partly some cautions, and partly some instruc-

tions: for chiefly by these methods I judge it feasible to deter them from their factious designs. Let me therefore request from you, ye youths of Syracuse, the solution of a point which has frequently occurred to my own imagination. What is it you would have? An immediate possession of the government of your country? Why, the very laws of that country declare you incapable of it: and these very laws were intended rather to exclude you, so long as you are unequal, than to give you a disgraceful rejection when you shall be equal, to the trust. But, farther, are you not piqued in heart at being placed on the same rank and level with the bulk of your fellow-citizens? And where would be the justice in awarding distinctions of honor and trust to those who are in no respect different from others? It may perhaps be urged, that a democracy is repugnant to the dictates both of wisdom and justice; that the most opulent members of a state are entitled to its highest honors; are best able to superintend the public welfare. But to this I reply, that, in the first place, by the word people is signified a whole community, including its every individual; but an oligarchy means only a party; in the next place, that men of opulence are the most suitable guardians of the public treasure; that men of understanding and experience are best qualified to advise; but the many, after hearing, are the best judges of the measures. And thus, by a democracy, equality of right and of privilege is most fairly preserved, as well to the separate members as to the whole community. An oligarchy indeed bestows an ample portion of danger on the many; but in beneficial points it not only assumes the larger share to itself, but by an unbounded rapacity monopolises the public harvest. These are the ends which the men of power and the raw inexperienced

youths amongst you ambitiously pursue ; ends incompatible with the welfare of a great and flourishing state. The accomplishment of these, I say, you have this very moment in agitation ; though the world cannot furnish such a set of fools, if you perceive not the pernicious tendency of your schemes. Nor can any set of Grecians, within my knowledge, equal either your brutality or your villainy, if with open eyes you dare proceed. Lay hold then at once of sound information, or repent if already informed, and unite in the infallible advancement of the general welfare of the whole community. And let the men of probity amongst you rest perfectly satisfied, that thus they shall obtain a proper share, nay, more than a share, in those emoluments, which will equally redound to all their country. But, in case you give in to different schemes, the hazard is great that the whole of your plan will be baffled and confounded.

‘ Trouble us therefore no farther with your informations, as we are privy to, and shall certainly disconcert, the views of their authors : for the Syracusan state, even though the Athenians actually invade us, will repel their efforts with a magnanimity worthy of herself ; and we have already a set of brave commanders, who will effectually manage the point. But if not one tittle of these intended invasions be true, which is my firm opinion, the state will not be struck into a panic by your rumors, will never place the command of her forces in your hands, so as to rivet a voluntary servitude on herself. She, on the contrary, will exert her own vigilance and discretion ; she will interpret the rumors you have spread as so many acts against her welfare, and will not give up her liberty to accounts expressly forged to terrify the ear ; but, aware in time,


by no means to intrust herself into your management, will leave no possible method of defence untried.'

Thus spoke Athenagoras. But here one of the generals rising up, prevented any other person from continuing the debate, and put an end to the present heats by delivering himself thus :—

' It is contrary to all decorum, both for those who speak to pour forth calumniations against one another, or for those who hear to receive them with attention. At present; we are rather concerned to yield regard to the informations which are brought us, that every individual in this community may be timely prepared to repel the invaders. And if this should prove at last to be mere superfluity of care, yet what harm can possibly accrue from such an equipment of the state with horses and arms, and such other habiliments as are the glory of war? We ourselves shall take all proper care of the provisions of war and the levy of soldiers ; and at the same time shall circulate our messengers to the cities around us, to watch the appearance of the foe ; and shall expedite every point judged needful in the present emergence. Some care of these points has already been taken ; and what more we shall perceive to be expedient, we shall on the proper occasions communicate to you.'

When the general had expressed himself thus, the Syracusans broke up the assembly and departed.















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